North Korea invites IAEA back in
The UN News Centre [the UN uses British English spelling] reports that “More than four years after ordering United Nations inspectors out and withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has invited the head of the UN atomic watchdog to visit for talks next month. ‘I see this as a step toward the denuclearization of the North Korean Peninsular’, UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei told reporters of the invitation, which follows six-party talks in Beijing where the DPRK committed to dismantle eventually all nuclear weapon facilities and materials in return for energy and other aid … ‘I hope that the DPRK may eventually come back as a member of the IAEA’, Mr. ElBaradei told a joint news conference with [UN SG] Ban [who is on an official visit to Vienna, after attending talks with the Quartet in Berlin last week]. ‘We will discuss issues of mutual concern and how we can implement the agreement reached at the six-Party talks about the shut down and eventual abandonment of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility’. He said he looked forward to ’seeing the DPRK come back to the Agency as full members where we can not only provide verification but provide also assistance in many areas in terms of nuclear technology and nuclear safety’.”
In an interview with the BBC World Service Radio on Friday evening, IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming said that it would be possible for North Korea to re-join the IAEA, even without re-joining the NPT Treaty — because, as she pointed out, India, Pakistan and Israel are all members of the IAEA, but not of the NPT.
However, unlike these other states — who used to be called, with diplomatic ellipticism, “threshhold” states, but which are now regarded as full (but not official - see next paragraph for explanation of terminology) nuclear weapons states — North Korea was a member of the NPT, before giving the required six months’ notice and pulling out. U.S. non-proliferation negotiators (including John Bolton) accused North Korea of treacherously staying within the NPT and using all its benefits thereunder, until it gained the knowledge to become a nuclear weapons state. (This is an important sub-theme that also underlies the present criticism of Iran’s nuclear program, which is not prohibited by the NPT — at least, not yet — though Iran did not announce all its activities to the IAEA, as required by some subsequent protocols. Therefore, Iran is mainly accused of inspiring a lack of confidence in its declarations of exclusively peaceful intentions. And, as Iranian officials note, these are “political” and not “legal” concerns.)
It is the NPT itself which gives the “legal” definition of a nuclear weapons state: Article IX (3) of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) specifies that “a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.†There are only five states which did so: the U.S., the Russian Federation, China, Britain and France. It just so happens that these are also the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, and the only ones with the power to “veto” any resolution, but this is officially all just the purest of coincidences. Then the 1995 NPT Review Conference — which extended the life of the NPT “indefinitely” (forever) — barred creation of a special category for “threshhold” nuclear-weapons states, so, as things now stand, they would have to join as Non Nuclear Weapons States – which none of them seem eager to do (certainly not India, and with the new Bush policy of offering to share nuclear technology with India, because it is a “democratic” state, it does not even seem necessary. Many see this U.S. proposal as undermining the NPT, but never mind. Pakistan has never announced itself as a nuclear weapons state, as India did, but it has said that it must keep parity with India. Israel has officially maintained a policy of “nuclear ambiguity” — not acknowledging having nuclear weapons, but maybe they are not technically fully assembled, or something — but with large numbers of winks and nods, plus elbow jabs even. However, the element of bluff in nuclear strategy should not be underestimated.)
In the specific case of North Korea (the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, or DPRK), it claimed in February 2005 to have nuclear weapons. This announcement was made two years after DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. This situation poses a whole different set of problems, that are not totally clear, at least “legally”, for the NPT regime. The European Union is one group of states that argue that North Korea did not withdraw properly or correctly from the NPT — so, it says, its withdrawal is invalid (!). The U.S. appears to have been temporarily intrigued by the EU position, but now appears to have accepted that DPRK has withdrawn from the NPT, as do Russia and China. More research needs to be done on this, but, with North Korea now appearing more interested in pleasing some (if, indeed, not all) of the major powers, it could all be academic…
In any case, UN SG BAN (who was, previously, South Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator with North Korea), and who is currently visiting Vienna, was standing by Mr. ElBaradei’s side in their joint meeting with journalists, when this North Korea invitation was announced.
BAN said: “I welcome Dr. ElBaradei’s visit to DPRK. I am confident that his visit to Pyongyang will make a great contribution to implement the joint statement, which was adopted among Six Parties on [February] 13 [this] month. I hope that he and his delegation will be able to discuss with the North Korean authorities on detailed matters, on first freezing nuclear facilities and including the eventual dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and facilities. I am confident that through this process, the Korean Peninsula will be able to realize the ultimate denuclearization, which has been a long commitment both of South and North Korea and a wish of the international community. I also hope that during his visit, the IAEA and DPRK will be able to discuss the pending issues of status with IAEA. This is an encouraging development of the situation, again, after the agreement on [February] 13th. I would sincerely hope that the international community, not only the parties to the Six Party process, but the whole international community would encourage such a process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue as soon as possible.”
ElBaradei, asked what he specifically hoped to accomplish when he visits North Korea, told the journalistsi: “Well I think, according to the letter of invitation, they would like to see how we can improve, normalize relationship with the Agency, which is a positive development, I hope eventually they will come back to be a member of the IAEA. We are obviously also going to discuss issues of mutual concern, as we discussed, and that obviously includes how we can implement the agreement reached about the freeze of facilities of Nyongbyon, and eventual dismantlement of these facilities, so the discussion hopefully will be wide-ranging, but the first is how to develop a plan to freeze the Nyongbyon facilities in accordance with the agreement, and more important for me to make sure they come back to the Agency as full-fledged member of the Agency, where we not only provide verification, but also provide assistance in many areas, in terms of nuclear applications, in terms of nuclear safety, and many other areas, so I welcome very much that opportunity and I hope that it will be a constructive visit.” http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=990
One powerful additional impulsion that has inspired North Korea may be the present U.S. complaint against how UN programmes and Agencies operate inside the DPRK. SG BAN has ordered a system-wide audit, and there is a real threat that all UN in-country operations, and all UN assistance of any kind, could be suspended or cut-off. On the other hand, if North Korea satisifies the requirements discussed in the Six-Party talks, it could get significant international assistance, and even have the U.S.-imposed financial sanctions lifted. Those are, apparently, very powerful incentives … especially since North Korea maintains that all its nuclear activitity has been essentially aimed at warding off U.S. “aggression” against the DPRK.
Filed under: BAN Ki-Moon, Disarmament, Donors, North Korea, UN Secretary-General




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