He will be speaking at a conference at Bir Zeit University this [Tuesday] morning [co-sponsored by the Bir Zeit University Institute of Law + the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung] on “The Quest for Palestine Statehood: Legal, Political and Economic Implications”.

At an appearance at the [Quaker] Friends Meeting House in Ramallah [arranged by the independent Palestinian human rights organization Al-Haq] on Monday night, Quigley said that the Palestinian right to statehood existed before or prior to — and without reference to — the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 181 [adopted 29 November 1947], but he noted that the PLO relied upon Resolution 181 as the basis for their claim to statehood in 1988.

Asked [by Sam Bahour, who was in the audience] if UNGA Resolution 181 is legal, if it had a legal foundation, Quigley replied that it was adopted as a recommendation, as a suggestion to 2 parties, as a proposal to the two parities, to deal with the situation by partition, with economic union and respect for the rights of everyone. [The situation = Britain announced after the Second World War that it wanted to get out of its responsibility for the Mandate of Palestine that it acquired from the League of Nations after the First World War].

So, Quigley continued, this UNGA Resolution 181 was viewed very clearly as a recommendation, but because it was rejected by Arab countries, the major powers a few months later put it aside.

Quigley then suggested that what gave UNGA Resolution 181 legality, or legitimacy [he avoided specifying the term] was the PLO’s acceptance of it, over 40 years later, as the basis for the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in 1988.

In terms of the unfulfilled Palestinian right of Self-Determination, Quigley said that it would have been better supported if the PLO had not, in 1988, confined its territorial claim to the West Bank and Gaza — it could have, at that time, called for Self-Determination in much larger territory.

However, he said, having made the determination in 1988 that they would establish their independent state within the borders / armistice lines that existed before the June 1967 war, it would be very difficult [if not impossible] for the Palestinians to go back on this now.

He did note that Israel became UN member in 1949 without specific mention of territory [or borders]; Israel’s subsequent occupation of territory in 1948 [after the departure of British forces] beyond the delimitation proposed in the UNGA resolution’s 1947 partition plan, has “never been dealt with in any way”.

It is very hard to argue that Jewish settlers in the West Bank have a right or claim to territory there on the basis of Self-Determination — especially, he said, since the International Criminal Court has now solidified the position of the Geneva Conventions, and also of customary international law [including the Hague Convention of 1907, which Israel does accept], that establishing settlements under a military occupation is a war crime.

The real problem, Quigley added, is that it will be very difficult for the Palestinians to gain jurisdiction over Israel in in international fora, because Israel opts out from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in every international human rights treaty except the Genocide Convention.

In contrast to the positions held by some in the audience in Ramllah, Quigley said that the PLO’s “UN bid” — its filing of an application for full membership on 23 September — will enhance its ability to represent Palestinian interests.

If anything, Quigley said, Palestinian statehood enhances representation for the Palestinian diaspora. He argued that some Palestinian complaints [including the fears of diaspora about their lack of representation] with regard to the recently-submitted “UN bid” are “internal questions”.

Just because there hasn’t been a very effective effort made in the past to implement the rights of those outside, doesn’t mean that they still won’t be in the future, Quigley noted. “All I’m saying is that Palestine as a state will be in a stronger [and better] position to do so”, though it remains to be seen what will happen.

He also noted that there doesn’t seem to be any indication of an attempt to abandon the Palestinian right of “repatriation”.

And, he said, Palestinian complaints that there should have been greater consultation before making the UN bid is also an internal Palestinian matter, while “at an international level, a state representing a population that acquiesces in its control — even if it doesn’t like what that state does — is capable of taking such actions”.

The legal opinions of Oxford Professor Guy Goodwin Gil are “a bit hard to follow, for me”, Quigley said, as Goodwin Gil doesn’t think Palestine is a state [contrary to the position Professor Quigley has held for years], and wouldn’t be — even if that status is accepted by the UN General Assembly”… By contrast, Professor Quigley said he believed that “the Government of Palestine has every right to represent and present those issues [human rights obligations] in whatever fora are available… It is recognized that states have a right to make complaints and seek reparations”.

But, Quigley noted, this memo “was exaggerated a bit … to mean that statehood is a bad idea — which Goodwin Gil didn’t say … his concern was that the PLO might be abandoned … and Self-Determination would then become a problem”. But, Quigley said, “Mahmoud Abbas in the UN was quite clear that the PLO would continue its representation of all Palestinians, including those outside”

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UPDATE: One of Professor Quigley’s most distinctive positions is that Palestine is a state, already.

How does he come to this conclusion?

He explained it, both at the event at the Friends’ Meeting House last night, and again today in the conference at Bir Zeit University on “The Quest for Palestine Statehood”:

After the First World War, he said, there was a rather contradictory approach:

(1) On the one had, it was recognized [in the Covenant of the League of Nations, he specified] that the peoples of the Arab territories in the former Ottoman Empire had the right to Self-Determination — that is, there was acceptance of the peoplehood of the inhabitants of those Arab territories, and of their right to Self-Determination, yet
(2) on the other hand, the major powers were looking out for their own interests.

The Balfour Declaration [issued during the First World War] was adopted out of consideration of British interests at that time. After the war, in 1923, the British Cabinet entered into a [secret, internal] program of reassessing whether or not to stick with the Balfour Declaration, which they decided, after a serious study, wasn’t going to work. This was discovered only years later, when the documents were finally made public. But, he said, the British government was afraid that if it went back on the Balfour Declartion, they might risk being relieved of the Palestine Mandate which had been given to them at their insistence. So, the British continued to give reports about how it was establishing a Jewish National Home and also at the same time protecting the right of all inhabitants of Palestine.

[Quigley noted in the Bir Zeit Conference today that "the Balfour Declaration was very much contradictory to Self-Determination", though "the actors at that time [including, Quigley noted, Palestinian lawyer Henry Cattan, and British Mandatory official Norman Bentwich] considered Palestine a state”. .

Quigley said that Iraq, Syria and Palestine were three entities which — though under separate mandates after the First World War issued by the international organization of the time, the Geneva-based League of Nations — were considered States. “This may seem odd, if you don’t have complete control [or sovereignty]“. But, he said, the precedent for this situation existed in international law, and was the “Protectorate” regime.

What is necessary, Professor Quigley said, is “that there be no other entity that claims sovereignty”, he argued.

And, he said, there were no other claims on Palestine [that is, he said, there were and still are are no other claims -- at least not officially, on the West Bank, and on Gaza -- except for Israel's unilateral annexation of the Old City of East Jerusalem and nearby areas of the West Bank which it agglomerated in the weeks after the June 1967 and re-named the "Greater Jerusalem Municipal Area", a move which UN member states subsequently declared in numerous resolutions, both in the UN General Assembly and in the UN Security Council, as "null and void"].

Other evidence that Palestine was considered a state, Quigley added, included these facts:
(A) the Permanent Court of International Justice, which had been set up by the League of Nations, determined a claim in Justice that “Palestine was a successor state to the Turkish empire in the State of Palestine [like Syria, like Iraq, in their respective territories]; and
(B) in 1932, the British government wanted to change its tariff law to exempt goods coming in from Palestine [so as not to disadvantage Palestinian goods, Quigley explained]. But, there was a slight legal problem, he said: Britain at the time had a number of Most Favored State Treaties already with other states. “The question turned on the status of Palestine — was it a state, or was it so connected to Britain [that it was part of Britain]. The British Government decided to ask the U.S., in secret correspondence that was made public some years later. The U.S. response was: Palestine is a state, so if you give Palestine zero tax status, we too will claim zero tax status”. Quigley added that Britain also asked Italy and France, who also replied [in 1932] that they considered Palestine a state, and if Palestine was given zero tariffs then they would also claim the same zero tax status; and
(C) Palestinian nationality was considered separate from Britain, based on the statehood of Palestine: and
(D) after World War Two, Egypt administered Gaza on the basis that it was Palestine, and maintained Palestine law which was published in the Palestine Gazette because “it was the territory of Palestine. In the West Bank, the situation was somewhat different — the territory was incorporated by decision of the National Assembly of Jordan at the time — but this was considered, Quigley explained, “provisional upon the resolution of the ‘just case of Palestine’ “.

Furthermore, Quigley told the audience at the Friends Meeting House in Ramallah, in 1945, at the time when the League of Nations was formally dissolved and the United Nations came into being, UN member states pledged in the UN Charter to establish / continue the rights that existed under the League of Nations –which included the right of the population of Palestine to Self-Determination.

And, when Britain announced [in 1946] that it was going to abandon the mandate, the Palestinian representatives at the UN said that if that’s going to happen, then there should be a Palestinian state.

Instead, Quigley noted, the UN General Assembly-appointed Committee came up with the idea of partition — even though the League of Nations Mandates were supposed to end with the independence of the territories under mandate.

Quigley explained that he believed that the UN General Assembly was seeing the Palestine Question in conjunction with the Question of displaced Jews in Europe, and Palestinian interests were being subordinated to those of displaced Jews in Europe — which, he said, “to my mind is why UNGA Resolution 181 is written as it is”.

And, he said, when the Jewish fighters took over territory beyond the partition plan, “the UN did not react — why? Because it [Resolution 181] had been rejected by the Arab sides. And the U.S., which had been the major backer of Resolution 181, they abandoned it and decided it would be good to do something else. The U.S., in April and May of 1948, developed a detailed plan for Trusteeship. But, the organized Jewish community decided to declare a state in Palestine, and got the U.S. [President Truman, who was then engaged in an election campaign] on their side … to the great consternation of the U.S. Secretary of State and State Department, which was at that time heavily involved in trying to go to Trusteeship over Palestine”.

[In 1967, Israel did not declare sovereignty over Gaza and most of the West Bank territory it acquired by war -- leaving room for a Palestinian claim, Quigley said -- though Israel did, about three weeks after the June war ended, declare sovereignty over some areas which it then called the "Greater Jerusalem Municipality".]

Quigley’s argument then jumps to the PLO decision [ratified by the Palestine National Council] in 1988 to constitute itself as a government for the State of Palestine.

At the Bir Zeit Conference today, Quigley noted that the PLO Declaration of Independence in 1988, and its decision taken in the same session that the PLO Executive Committee would serve as the Provisional Government of Palestine, refers back to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne [which made it possible for the British Mandate over Palestine go into effect]. In the 1988 statement, Quigley said, “the PLO said that it was not creating new state — but instead was creating itself [or, its Executive Committee] as the potential government of Palestine”.

Subsequently, Quigley added, “in the practice of the UN, though not as a formal matter but instead for practical purpose, Palestine has been treated as a state in the UN General Assembly and in the UN Security Council”.

At the Friends Meeting House in Ramallah last night, Quigley noted that after the PLO’s 1988 Declaration, the UN General Assembly then adopted a resolution welcoming that decision, with the explicit idea the the PLO was the representative of the Palestinian people — presumably, Quigley said, with the idea of eventual statehood being accepted by the UN.

“The premise of the Declaration was based heavily on Self-Determination and Statehood”, Quigley noted, and the PLO “through the 1980s tried to find a way through international law” to reach statehood.

But, Quigley said, the U.S. opposed the idea that Self-Determination and Statehood should be at the center of the move. Instead, he noted, in 1991, the U.S. took the lead in promoting the concept of bilateral negotiations — which took legal considerations out of the picture and left it up to negotiations between the two parties, who definitely are not on a par”.

So, “since those negotiations are not based on any legal concept”, Quigley said, “nothing would go ahead unless Israel would agree to stop constructing settlements — so now we have a situation where negotiations are serving as a cover for settlement construction … [Then], in the Oslo Process starting in 1993, no obstacles were placed on the construction of settlements. So by 2011, there is now very little prospect of a negotiated settlement because of that issue.”

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John Quigley is a Professor at Ohio State University, and author of. among other things, these specifically-relevant books:
• The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective (Duke University Press, 2005);
• The Statehood of Palestine: International Law in the Middle East Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2010); and
• ‘Self-determination in the Palestine Context’, in International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Routledge, 2011).

The interview is published today, here.

Pollak was told to report to jail on 11 January to begin the sentence. Like many people who imagine the possibility of going to jail, he thinks he will be able to pass the time usefully by reading. But, asked by Amira if he were afraid of prison, he replied “Yes. I’m not yet sure of what, but I am”.

He was given a suspended jail sentence earlier, stemming from a demonstration against the construction of The Wall in the West Bank (which the International Court of Justice said was illegal, in a ruling on 9 July 2004).

Now, he has been ordered to serve the two sentences, simultaneously.

It is not known yet if he will appeal…

Pollak told Amira Hass that he was arrested “in the middle of our cycling route, on Bograshov Street in Tel Aviv. I was in the midst of the crowd. Two plainclothes policemen who know me and I know them approached me and took me off my bike. They said something to me like: “We told you if you raised your head, we would cut it off,” and took me to a police van. The rest of the cyclists continued without any interference. No one else was arrested”.

The prosecutor apparently asked for a six-month jail term, plus a fine, arguing that the demonstration was “illegal”. Pollak commented: “I am not a jurist but to the best of my knowledge, the police orders demand a permit for a demonstration in which more than 50 people participate. The prosecutor, who is a policewoman, is supposed to know that. We were about 40 people”.

But, he told Amira Hass, he would, personally, not have asked for a permit even if more activists had gathered, “Because I don’t believe that when you are demonstrating against a regime, the regime is the one that has to approve the demonstration”.

The demonstration that is sending Pollak — and only Pollak — to jail took place in Tel Aviv on 31 January 2008 — just days after the Israeli Supreme Court decided on 28 January against a petition brought by GISHA and a group of nine Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations who asked the Court to stop IDF-administered deliberately tightened sanctions against the entire population of the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli government had issued a declaration on 19 September 2007 that the Gaza Strip — ruled solely by Hamas after its rout of Fatah/Palestinian Preventive Security Forces in mid-June 2007 — had become an “enemy entity”, or “hostile territory”.

The Israeli government gave the Israeli mililtary the sole and entire responsibility for deciding on and administering the regime of deliberate sanctions, which the military announced would be tightened on a regular basis. These sanctions went into effect at the end of October 2007, and the military said that fuel and electricity supplies would be reduced by an additional 15 percent each month. The Supreme Court allowed the fuel reductions to continue, but stopped the reductions in electricity until its decision on 28 January 2008, when they were allowed to go ahead. (However, after a brief trial, the Israeli military apparently realized that the electricity cuts could not be stopped so easily, and without greater damage).

For the final Supreme Court Hearing on the matter, on 28 January 2008, two Palestinians from Gaza who had agreed to testify to the Israeli Court and who had been issued permits to come to Jerusalem to testify, were held up that morning at Erez checkpoint until just before the Supreme Court hearing had adjourned. One of the men was from the Gaza Power Plant, the other was from the Coastal Municipalities Water Society. When they were finally allowed through, they jumped into a waiting taxi and raced to Jerusalem, but arrived after the hearing had completely ended…

The Israeli military was allowed to do whatever it decided in Gaza, without any independent governmental oversight or any other civilian supervision of the IDF-administered sanctions that were applied against 1.5 million people in Gaza.

The absurdity and cruelty of the situation was evident, but difficult to monitor precisely, as the military kept all details until very recently — after the Flotilla Fiasco on 31 May. when 8 Turkish men and one Turkish-American high school student were killed in the Israeli naval boarding at sea of the Mavi Marmara.

In any case, GISHA’s petition argued that such sanctions were collective punishment. But the Supreme Court allowed them to go ahead, on the sole condition that the Israeli military must take care to ensure that no “humanitarian crisis” should ensue.

There was no definition given by the Court of what constitutes a “humanitarian crisis”, but many people believe that one certainly exists in Gaza — one which was exacerbated by the massive IDF attack on the Gaza Strip from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009.

In his discussion with Amira Hass, Pollak explained: “I don’t know what other option there is in so extreme a situation, in which four million people are being kept under a military regime without democratic rights by a country that is interested in presenting a democratic image. In a situation where there is a blockade and collective punishment of 1.5 million people, can one hesitate at all whether to hold a very minimalist protest in Tel Aviv? It seems to me part of the duty of a human being, the least we can do. The question is not why I need all this mess but why so few people join in”.

Pollak, 28 years old, has been a member of the Israeli group, Anarchists against The Wall, and is now on the coordinating committee of the Palestinian-led Popular Struggle Coordination Committee.

The article argued that “In the early days of its nuclear program, Israel had no concerns about legitimacy, recognition and responsibility; its focus was acquiring a nuclear capability. Today, the situation is different. Israel is now a mature nuclear weapons state, but it finds it difficult under the strictures of opacity to make a convincing case that it is a responsible one. To the extent that opacity shields Israel’s nuclear capabilities and intentions, it also undercuts the need for its citizens to be informed about issues that are literally matters of life and death, such as: Whose finger is on the nuclear trigger and under what circumstances would nuclear weapons be used? Opacity also prevents Israel from making a convincing case that its nuclear policy is indeed one of defensive last resort and from participating in a meaningful fashion in regional arms control and global disarmament deliberations. Israel needs to recognize, moreover, that the Middle East peace process is linked to the issue of nuclear weapons in the region. International support for Israel and its opaque bomb is being increasingly eroded by its continued occupation of Palestinian territory and the policies that support that occupation. Such criticism of these policies might well spill over into the nuclear domain, making Israel vulnerable to the charge that it is a nuclear-armed pariah state, and thus associating it to an uncomfortable degree with today’s rogue Iranian regime … in order to deal effectively with the new regional nuclear environment and emerging global nuclear norms, Israel must reassess the wisdom of its unwavering commitment to opacity and realize that international support for retaining its military edge, including its nuclear capacity, rests on retaining its moral edge”.

After the evacuation from Beirut [on a Greek ship, under a "UN umbrella"] of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters along with their leader, the late Yasser Arafat, some of those left behind — those in Sabra + Shatila, a crowded Palestinian refugee camp on the southern outskirts of Beirut — were massacred over a two-day period while a few journalists and international medical workers tried to alert the world.

By the time anyone paid any attention, the killing was all but over, and only the bloated bodies remained.

An Israeli commission of inquiry concluded that Ariel Sharon, then Israel’s Defense Minister, who had led the Israeli Army out of its enclave in southern Lebanon in a rapid advance north to the Beirut, and then surrounded it, demanding — between the terror of massive bombings and announced attempts to assassinate Arafat (who, unaccountably, escaped) — that Arafat must cease hiding “behind the skirts of Lebanese civilians”.

Sharon’s assault on the eastern part of the Lebanese capital was apparently not authorized in advance by the Israeli cabinet [though then-Prime Minister, Menahim Begin, was informed of Sharon's plan].

Israel accused the PLO of being behind a number of cross-border attacks, but it was reportedly an attempted assassination against Israel’s then-Ambassador to London [Shlomo Argov] which became the justification for Sharon’s massive reprisal.

[The Israeli diplomat was shot in the head and seriously wounded.  He needed nursing care for the remainder of his life, and died of his injuries in 2003.    The Abu Nidal organization, headed by a Palestinian mercenary, was reportedly hired for this assignment by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who was reportedly furious with the PLO's Arafat at the time for trying to mediate the Iran-Iraq war.  Saddam believed that all Arabs ought to have totally backed Iraq in that war...]

Sharon (who remains on life support in a long-term care facility in Israel following a stroke in 2006) later — successfully — sued CBS Television and Time Magazine [in 1985], in for libel for reporting that he was directly involved in the Sabra + Shatila massacre.

Sharon prevailed.  [I  was one of only three journalists who attended and monitored that libel trial on a regular basis -- and,  for lack of a babysitter, I sometimes had to bring my one-year-old son with me to court...]

Sharon won his libel suit because the court, upon examination, became convinced that Israeli researcher David Halevy had overstated his argument, without sufficient proof, of Sharon’s involvement in the massacre. Halevy’s notes, submitted as a research file to Time Magazine, were later written up by an editor; the subsequent published Time Magazine article was then cited as the source for a report by Mike Wallace on CBS News’ 60 Minutes Program.

Franklin Lamb, an American author of the book The Price We Pay: A Quarter-Century of Israel’s Use of American Weapons Against Civilians in Lebanon, is also as well as Director, Americans Concerned for Middle East Peace, Beirut-Washington DC, as well as Board Member of The Sabra Shatila Foundation, and a volunteer with the Palestine Civil Rights Campaign He was recently in Lebanon doing research for a new book, and compiled this account recalling what happened in Sabra + Shatila:

THE SHELTERS AND THE “AID WORKERS” – in horrifying detail

“In Shatila Palestinian refugee camp and outside Abu Yassir’s shelter, the bullet marks still cover the lower half of the 11 ‘walls of death’ where some of the dried blood is mixed and feathered in with the thin mortar. An elderly gentleman named Abu Samer still has some souvenirs of the event: three American automatic pistols fitted with silencers, a couple of knives and axes that were strapped to some of the killers belts as they quickly and silently shot, carved and chopped whoever they came upon starting at around 6 pm on Thursday September 16, 1982. Plus a couple of whisky bottles … Locating the 11 ‘walls of death’ requires help from the few older Palestinians who still live in this quarter … Zeina [last name not given, who reportedly lost her husband and two daughters during the massacre] recalls that it was late on a Thursday afternoon, September 16, that the Israeli shelling had grown intense. Designed to drive the camp residents into the shelters, almost all of which Israeli intelligence, arriving the previous day in three white vehicles and posing as ‘concerned NGO staff’ had identified and noted the coordinates on their maps. Some residents, thinking aid workers had come to help the refugees, actually revealed their secret sanctuaries. Other refugees, based on their experience in the crowded shelters during the preceding 75 days of indiscriminate, ‘Peace for Galilee’ Israeli bombing … suggested to the ‘aid workers’ that the shelters needed better ventilation and perhaps the visitors would help provide it. According to Zeina the Israeli agents quickly sketched the shelter locations, marked them with a red circle and returned to their HQ which was located less than 70 meters on the raised terrain at the SE corner of Shatila camp still known as Turf Club Yards. Today, this sandy area still contains three death pits which according to the late American journalist Janet Stevens is where some of the hundreds of still missing bodies of the more than 3,000 slaughtered are likely buried … Journalist Robert Fisk and others who studied these events, concur that more slaughter was done during the 24 hour period after 8 a.m. Saturday, the hour the Israeli Kahan Commission, which declined to interview any Palestinians, ruled that the Israelis had stopped all the killing. Eyewitness testimony also established that the ‘aid workers’ described by Zeina passed the shelter descriptions and locations to Lebanese Forces operatives Elie Hobeika and Fadi Frem, and their ally, Major Saad Haddad of the Israeli-allied South Lebanese Army. Thursday evening, Hobeika, de facto commander since the assassination the week previously of Phalange leader and President-elect Bachir Gemayel, led one of the death squads inside the killing field of the Horst Tabet area near Abu Yassir’s shelter. It was in 8 of the 11 Israeli-located and marked shelters that the first of the massacre victims were quickly and methodically slaughtered. There being few perfect crimes, even in massacres, the killers failed to find 3 of the shelters. One of the overlooked shelters was just 25 meters from Abu Yassir’s shelter. Apart from these three undiscovered hiding places there were practically no Shatila shelter survivors”…

MUNIR’s STORY

“Munir Mohammad was 12 years old on September 16, 1982 …

At around about 8 p.m. on September 18 Munir Mohammad entered the crowded Abu Yassir shelter with his mother Aida and his sisters and brothers Iman, Fadya, Mufid and Mu’in … Munir later recalled events that night: ‘The killers arrived at the door of the shelter and yelled for everyone to come out. Men who they found were lined up against the wall outside. They were immediately machine gunned’. As Munir watched, the killers left to kill other groups and then suddenly returned and opened fire on everyone, and all fell to the ground. Munir lay quietly not knowing if his mother and sisters were dead. Then he heard the killers yelling: ‘If any of you are injured, we’ll take you to the hospital. Don’t worry. Get up and you’ll see’. A few did try to get up or moaned and they were instantly shot in the head.

Munir remembered: ‘Even though it was light out due to the Israeli flares over Shatila, the killers used bright flash lights to search the darkened corners. The killers were looking in the shadows’. Suddenly Munir’s mother’s body seemed to shift in the mound of corpses next to him. Munir thought she might be going to get up since the killers promised to take anyone still alive to the hospital. Munir whispered to her: ‘Don’t get up mother, they’re lying’. And Munir stayed motionless all night barely daring to breath, pretending to be dead. Munir could not block out the killers words. Years later he would repeat to this interviewer as we passed the Shatila Burial ground known as Martyrs Square:

‘After they shot us, we were all down on the ground, and they were going back and forth, and they were saying: “If any of you are still alive, we’ll have mercy and pity and take them to the hospital. Come on, you can tell us”. If anyone moaned, or believed them and said they needed an ambulance, they would be rescued with shots and finished off there and then… What really disturbed me wasn’t just the death all around me. I…didn’t know whether my mother and sisters and brother had died. I knew most of the people around me had died. And it’s true I was afraid of dying myself. But what disturbed me so very much was that they were laughing, getting drunk and enjoying themselves all night long. They threw blankets on us and left us there till morning. All night long [Thursday the 16th) I could hear the voices of the girls crying and screaming, “For god’s sake, leave us alone”. I mean…I can’t remember how many girls they raped. The girl’ voice, with their fear and pain, I can’t ever forget them’ …

Munir’s 15-year-old brother Mufid was among the first to enter Abu Yassir’s shelter, but he left and later appeared at Akka Hoppital with a gunshot wound. After being bandaged he left the hospital to seek safety and his family. No one has seen him since and for a long time Munir could not even mention him. According to camp residents, Munir’s older brother, Nabil, then 19 years old, being of fighting age would have been shot on sight by the killers. Aware of this, Nabil’s cousin and his cousin’s wife fled with him as the Israeli shelling increased and camp residents reported indiscriminate killing. The trio dodged sniper bullets to seek refuge in a nursing home where his aunt worked. Like Munir, Nabil soon learned that his mother and siblings were all dead … During the month following the 1982 Massacre, British Dr. Paul Morris treated Munir at Gaza Hospital approximately one kilometer north of Abu Yassir’s shelter, and kept the youngster under observation. Dr. Morris reported to researcher Bayan Nuwayhed al Hout (Sabra and Shatila: September 1982, Pluto Press, London, 2004) that Munir ‘will smile once in a while, but he doesn’t react spontaneously like others of this age, except just occasionally … Now in America, both Munir and Nabil are leading relatively ‘normal lives’ … Both brothers return to Shatila camp regularly”…

Franklin Lamb’s recounting of the Sabra + Shatila massacre, 28 years ago, on the outskirts of Beirut is published here .  (Thanks to Seham on mondoweiss…)

Once the results are known, the names of the students who passed, and their grades, are published. Then, there is a night of wild fireworks (until at least 1:30 in the morning), and a weekend of more parties and fireworks.

Ma’an News Agency, the privately-owned and operated, donor-funded Palestinian news agency based in Bethlehem, has published a story about two teenage girls who attempted to commit suicide because their names were not listed among the students who had passed the Tawjihi.

The Ma’an report said that “Yousef Odeh, director of the education ministry’s Qalqiliya office, warned parents not to be hard on children who had failed the exams, adding that social pressure to succeed on the difficult tests was enough stress on young men and women. Candidates can take the tests up to five times. They are offered once each year for students, and determine eligibility for university classes. Top scoring candidates are eligible for the sought-after spots in university law, engineering and medicine … Adding pressure is the public celebration of top scoring Tawjihi students, whose families rent halls for parties and let off fireworks from roofs for the week after the results are announced“. This is posted here.

Hell, they shoot these fireworks off everywhere — on the streets, in darkened side streets, by the front gate of houses, under my kitchen window. Some of them are nearly as big and powerful (and expensive, and dangerous) as rockets … It is completely nerve-wracking.

An earlier Ma’an story reported that “Usually with a near 50 percent pass rate, the 2010 results had 85 percent achieve a pass in the Scientific Stream while 60.6 percent passed in the Literary Stream and 63 percent in the Professional Branches. President Mahmoud Abbas congratulated all the students who succeeded this year, with particular felicitations to a Nablus student who achieved the top overall score of 99.5 percent”. This can be read in full here.

A Gazan student achieved an overall score of 99.4 percent in the Tawjihi literary stream — but she had to study by the light of her mobile phone when electricity cuts caused black-outs in her neighborhood, Ma’an reported here.

The Tawjihi is one of the few remnants of unity between Gaza and the West Bank.

Professor Ruth Lapidot, a former legal adviser to Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is one of — if not the – preeminent Israeli expert on international law [also known as public international law]. Her views are taken extremely seriously in official Israeli circles.

She recently [on 16 June] discussed Israel’s announced naval blockade of Gaza’s maritime space in a meeting with diplomats and journalists at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs [run by Israel's former Ambassador Dore Gold.

Some of the more interesting things she said are: Israel has declared a formal naval blockade of Gaza's coastline, in January 2009 [as we have reported here]. The area which is blockaded has to be clearly defined, and there has to be clear notification. The blockade must be applied without discrimination (though limited specific exceptions can be permitted).  Humanitarian assistance must be permitted — but not goods which may increase the war capacity of, in this case, Hamas.  If there is a suspicion that a ship is carrying arms or personnel to , in this case, Hamas, Israel may capture, visit, or search a ship that enters the blockaded zone, and can try to persuade them to leave. But, if a ship tries to run the blockade, there is a clear difference between how it is possible to treat a merchant ship (military force can be used) or a warship (only protests are allowed).

Those who oppose this blockade only say that it’s against international law, without saying why, Professor Lapidot said.

UPDATE: In a just-published interview, Greta Berlin of the Free Gaza movement said that “Israel has no right to stop us under international law UNLESS it wants to admit that it occupies Gaza. Since Israel says it no longer occupies Gaza and Gaza is free, they have no right to stop us. In addition, the blockade is collective punishment against a civilian population that is WAY out of line. International law, Amnesty International and the International Red Cross have all said the same thing. Israel’s blockade is illegal”… This is published here.

Professor Lapidot explained at the JCPA discussion that she believed Gaza is a sui generis entity, a special case. Because Gaza was never annexed by Israel, and because Israel does not control the entire territory of Gaza, she argued, it is not occupied. However, since Israel controls the air and sea space [criteria that many if not most other international law experts say are confirmation of an occupation], it has a special responsibility in case of accidents. She noted that the former Israeli Supreme Court head Justice Barak ruled that Israel also has a moral responsibility because it did previously occupy Gaza for so long.

The entire discussion was videotaped, and it is archived on the JCPA website, where it can be viewed  on the website of the JCPA  here. [Go to Institute for Contemporary Affairs, then on either sidebar click on video archive, then select this event]. Here are some excerpts:

Legal aspects of the problem of the blockade of Gaza:

“The situation between Israel + the Hamas is a situation of armed conflict – this is important because this means that the laws of war apply — which means you may control ships going to Gaza, even on the high seas — you may not do it in the territorial sea of third country… not in Cyprus, but on the high seas in time of conflict.

A blockade means that one state prohibits event the entry and exit of both neutral and enemy ships and airplanes to an area which must be defined.  You have to define very clearly what is this area – where are the borders of this area.

There are some other similar institutions in PIL [Public International Law] – there are also exclusion zones and security zones or war zones or neutral zones — on the sea, in laws of war, during time of conflict.
t
But, it was a blockade that was imposed by Israel on the shores of Gaza

What are the sources of the law on blockades?
Until this very day the rules are still customary international law (no international treaty deals with this problem)
A list of documents that mention blockades:
(1) 1856 Declaration of Paris on the Crimean war – but it has only a very short mention;
(2) 1909 London declaration on naval warfare — much more important, and detailed; there was an intention to codify this, but unfortunately the states that participated did not ratify it: so, this has remained a declaration and is not treaty.
Manuals: San Remo (prepared by an international group of expert), and those of the militaries of the UK, US, and Germany — all these manuals say this is binding customary law.

Concerning war on sea, the world still applies the general principles of laws of war (eg: there is a prohibition of starvation of civilians)

Conditions for legality or validity of a blockade
1.) Notification – it has to be declared and notified as clearly as possible to all those who might be affected (nowadays communications much easier)
2.) Effectiveness – a “paper blockade” is not valid: you have to apply and enforce, otherwise it will not be valid; this is a question of fact, there are no clear legal rules.
3.) You must ensure that you do not cut off access to the high seas of the territorial sea of a third state
4.) Equality – it has to be based on equality, applied to everybody in the same way, not just to some states — including Prime Ministers who might be on any of the ships.
5.)  You must permit the passage of humanitarian assistance. (The San Remo manual of 1994 says that you must permit humanitarian assistance, but state applying must decide where, when, and through which port the humanitarian assistance goes. There is the possibility to require that a neutral organization must control to whom the humanitarian assistance goes — eg ICRC, to see if the humanitarian assistant goes to civilians – or, in the case of Gaza, to Hamas)
6.) You may not starve the civilian population.

What can and may be done to ships trying to run the blockade?
A distinction is made between merchant ships (you have the right to capture, visit, search, and if they resist, you may even attack the ship) and warships (you may try to capture, and try to search but not attack a warship unless it is situation of self-defense)

When can you apply and in what kind of waters?  As soon as it is clear a certain ship intends to break the blockade, you can start to deal with it, even if it is on the high seas.

Precedents (modern – after World War Two):
(1) Korean war 1950-53
(2) Bangladesh – 1973, applied by India
(3) Iran-Iraq war – blockade on Shatt al-Arab
(4) There was also a blockade in the 2006 war between Israel and “the terrorists” in Lebanon (nevertheless Israel did give a safe passage between Lebanon and Cyprus for humanitarian assistance.)
[During the 2008 war between Russian and Georgia, there was some discussion - but it was not a real blockade, only a search of ships on the high seas, to look for contraband.]

Excerpts from the Question and Answer segment of the discussion at JCPA:

Q: States are reluctant, prefer to use softer term such as quarantine.  Iran-Iraq war – UNSC resolution prohibits arms therefore blockade and that naval presence in Indian ocean and Red Sea is still there but now to seek out members of al-Qaeda, or carrying weapons

A: Also 1962 quarantine of Cuba – it did not meet all qualifications of blockade

Q: Must a blockade be announced?

A: It has to be announced loudly and clearly to everybody who is involved. Even more, when a ship is trying to get though, you must make sure this specific ship has to have actual knowledge, or presumptive knowledge, of the blockade

Q:  Is Israel in full compliance?

A: Absolutely — I thought it was clear without even mentioning it — all these conditions [are met].  In January 2009, Israel made the notification to the whole world, and therefore we can say that this is a real blockade..

Q: Since the legality of this blockade rests on state of war between Israel and Hamas, doesn’t it mean requiring a full declaration of war?

A: In the past, yes, but nowadays there are wars that break out without declaration. There is no need for a declaration in order for there to be a state of war.  There was a judgment by [Israeli Supreme Court] President Aharon Barak five years ago [after Israel's "unilateral" disengagement] where he explained that the situation [between Israel and Gaza] is so bad that it is a situation of armed conflict.

Q: If it’s so clear, can you explain why do other international experts disagree”

A: This question is very interesting, because they never say why.  They only say that it’s illegal under international law, full stop. They do not say why…

Q: But the boarding was in international water?

A: In time of armed conflict you can search ships even on the high seas…

Q:  Even Israeli newspapers write this: seizing ships in international waters is a violation of international law. Other opinion writers say the laws of war do not apply to Gaza, because it is not a state.

A:  Can Gaza be considered an enemy even though it is not a state? You have things called international conflict.  Also, the laws of war apply to internal conflicts (Common Article 3 of all Geneva Convention gives the minimum that applies). With regard to the status of Gaza is the $64 million dollar question – it was under Ottoman sovereignty 1570-1917, then under Britain till 1948 (Who was sovereign? The most common position is that it was both Britain and the League of Nations0. Then Egypt never annexed, gave Gaza autonomy, but under occupation.   In [1956 and in] 1967, Gaza was occupied by Israel, but not annexed.  I would say it is an area sui generus, which means a special situation — this is the best description, because nobody knows exactly what it is, though others say it is self-governing.

Q: According to UNSC resolution 1860, Gaza is part of Palestinian territory, and that is why is is occupied, not because of “effective control”/

A:  part of other side, under occupation, under its control?  Yes, Gaza is part of Palestinian territory but so far there does not yet exist a Palestinian state, yet. It is a special area which hopefully one day will be part of a Palestinian state.

Q: Part of the notion of assigning a legal status is exactly what negotiations have been about…

A  In both 1993 and 1995 it was agreed that there would be negotiations, but so far negotiations have failed. The Road Map of 2003 specifically says Palestinian state should be established by agreement with Israel.

Q: Can you please explain again the difference in treatment accorded to a merchant ship + a war ship [attempting to break a blockade]

A:  When you see a ship is trying to go to Gaza you can stop it to see what’s going on and to persuade – but if a merchant ship continues you can attack it. If it is a warship, you can only protest…

Q: Whole notion of naval blockade is linked to this notion of sending humanitarian goods to the Gaza Strip “under seige”. What is Israel’s responsibility to this sui generus entity that has two entrances and exits – one via Israel and one via Egypt.

A: Absolutely right there are two ways  There is also the 2005 agreement to send goods through Egypt – so the idea was both Israeli and Rafah crossings should be open to the Palestinians.  There is a very interesting Supreme Court judgment on electricity [n.b. - this was handed down on 28 January 2008 in a case brought by GISHA] – that since the 2005 evacuation, Israel has no responsibility to supply, because in particular there is also Egypt — but because has been in control of Gaza for so many years, Israel has a moral responsibility to help the people of Gaza get what they need for their daily lives.

Q: Is the EU participating in the siege [on the land crossings into Gaza]?

A:  There is no siege now, because Gaza is getting a lot of goods from Israel. Now, even cement goes in (but via the port of Ashdod and with control by independent group to ensure aid goes to civilians, not Hamas). Let me remind you that even during the war of 2008, the border open every day for 1.5 hours…We shouldn’t forget the good things Israel has done.

Q: If Israel had allowed any of the ships in the Flotilla to go it, what would have happened to blockade?

A: The state that applies the blockade can make exceptions. But if all ships are allowed in, then there is no blockade.  But if the state imposing blockade gives certain ships special selected permission — or if ship is in distress — it is ok.  But it should not be the rule, exceptions should not be permanent … Israel may control any ships if there is a suspicion they carry goods which may increase the war capacity of Hamas — the suspicion they are carrying arms or personnel to help Hamas. I think other materials may not justify intervention against the ships. Not all goods justify this search — there must be a real suspicion.  And not all ships on high seas, without any reason…
…
Q: If Gaza is a sui generis territory, what does it mean if it is occupied?

A:  … Gaza’s status is, again, undecided. Some say if Israeli still in control of air space or sea, or territory, then it is occupying. Other opinions say that according to the Hague 1907 regulations – an occupier is only occupier if it controls the whole territory. And Israel does not control the whole territory of Gaza. In my opinion, Israel is not in control of Gaza, therefore we are the occupier, but in the areas it controls [air and sea of Gaza] there Israel is responsible (if there is an accident, eg) … In my opinion, the distinction is between full control of territory, or only part of it.
…
Justice Barak said there is an international conflict and not an internal conflict with Gaza, because it is not part of Israel.  Gaza has never been annexed by Israel, neither has the West Bank …
…
Q:  So, customary international law says that after a search of merchant boat, or there is attempt to capture it –  and it continues — at what point can it be attacked and sunk if it carries civilians or civilian goods?

A.  The idea is to get control of the ship and not to drown it…”

***********************

This entire discussion can be viewed on the JCPA website here. [Go to Institute for Contemporary Affairs, then on either sidebar click on video archive, then select this event.]

Actually, he’s apparently been at Princeton for ten months already.

Mousavian was been Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami [who preceeded the present President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad], then later then deputy head of the Strategic Research Center of Iran’s Expediency Council.

The WSJ wrote that “In September, Mr. Mousavian, 53 years old, arrived at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs as a visiting scholar, where he has been writing on Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy and U.S.-Iranian relations. Neither Princeton nor the Obama administration would comment on the Iranian diplomat’s stay in the U.S., but American and European diplomats engaged in nuclear diplomacy with Iran say they are closely scrutinizing Mr. Mousavian’s work for insights into Tehran’s decision making”.

In the photo below, which was probably taken in 2003, Mousavian (on right side of photo) is seen talking to another Iranian diplomat Amir Zamaniniya (on left).

Mousavian, a former Ambassador of Iran to Germany, and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was instrumental in what was — for those Iranian officials involved — a risky agreement to freeze Iran’s nuclear program in 2003 to allow for negotiations with European states, observed by the U.S. But it did not result in any diplomatic movement. There were American elections first. Then, in 2005, there were Iranian elections, and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad won — radically changing the Iranian political landscape.

The WSJ article continues: “Mr. Mousavian said in his first interview since arriving at Princeton that he wasn’t in the U.S. to rally support for Tehran’s political opposition, known as the Green Movement. He said he is focused on his academic work and recovering from an illness contracted during his imprisonment and subsequent legal battles. He said he intends to return to Tehran at some point. ‘I don’t need asylum from any country, and I would never apply for it’, he said” …

The WSJ article continued: “In addition to Mr. Mousavian, a slew of other senior Iranian bureaucrats, diplomats and opposition figures have either been sidelined or fled to the West since opposition protesters challenged Mr. Ahmadinejad’s re-election a year ago, resulting in a broad government crackdown. Javad Zarif, a pro-engagement former ambassador to the UN, is under virtual house arrest in Tehran, said Western officials. [n.b. - this may have been in effect well before the Green Movement protests] Top aides to Iran’s two leading opposition figures, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, have also been forced to set up political bases overseas … Individuals who have met Mr. Mousavian said he is deeply concerned by the developments inside Iran following last year’s presidential election, which many Iranians claimed was rigged to insure Mr. Ahmadinejad’s re-election, a charge Tehran denies.”

Here, again, the WSJ may be linking two different phenomena — Mr. Mousavian may, for example, be more immediately concerned about developments related to the country’s nuclear program and its implication for policy than with the democracy movement.

As far back as December 2007, one of Iran’s former President, Khatami, did lump Mousavian, Zarif, and Sirous Nasseri together with protesting students — actually, Khatami defended all of them, as we reported earlier here. However, the students were not necessarily working together with the former Iranian diplomats.

As the WSJ story reported: “Mr. Mousavian continues to press for the U.S. to engage Tehran in a bid to reduce regional tensions, according to writings viewed by The Wall Street Journal [papers that have been distributed inside Princeton] … He argues that any Iranian government, even one headed by opposition political leaders, would remain committed to developing the infrastructure to produce nuclear fuel. But he says improved trust between Washington and Tehran could still allow for necessary safeguards to be put in place to guard against Iran building atomic weapons … He also says the U.S. should develop with Tehran a broad security plan for the Persian Gulf that could prove crucial to securing the free flow of energy in and out of the strategic waterway … “Thirty years of hostilities between Tehran and Washington has only served to diminish the security in the region”, [he wrote]. Mr. Mousavian, in spite of his close ties to Mr. Rafsanjani, played down the prospects for any quick leadership change in Tehran and said a move toward democracy could only be stimulated from inside … “Iran is not in a pre-revolutionary state”, Mr. Mousavian writes”. This is posted here.

Iran’s President Ahmadinejad went after Mousavian with particular zeal, interfering to deepen his legal problems [opposing his release on bail in May 2007, and later saying he believed Mousavian was a "spy", despite the acquittal in court on most charges, as we reported here.

Mousavian was arrested in May 2007, released a couple of weeks later on bail, then rearrested and put on trial in November 2007, when he was acquitted on the most serious charges of "spying" and "holding confidential documents", but was apparently found guilty of "engaging in propaganda against the state". On 9 April 2008, Iran's National Nuclear Day, Mousavian was reportedly received a two-year suspended sentence -- and a five-year ban on being named to foreign policy or diplomatic positions, on the grounds that he had harmed national security.

Among our other earlier posts following Mr. Mousavian's ordeal are:

Posted on December 4th, 2007 - here.

Ahmadeinejad threatens to reveal Mousavian’s conversations with “foreigners”
Posted on November 29th, 2007 - here.

Mousavian aquitted of spying – but found guilty of working against system
Posted on November 27th, 2007 - here.

Mousavian rearrested
Posted on November 16th, 2007 - here.

Good news — Mousavian free on bail ($225,000)
Posted on May 9th, 2007 here.

Mousavian remains in Evin Prison, under interrogation for “spying”
Posted on May 6th, 2007 - here.

Hossein Mousavian reported under arrest in Iran
Posted on May 2nd, 2007 here.

Iran’s Dilemma
Posted on March 25th, 2007 - here.

UN Security Council unanimously votes to tighten sanctions against Iran — even before 3pm in NY
Posted on March 24th, 2007 - here.

In the photo below, Mousavian is second from left, participating in an panel discussion on 21 March 2007 at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GSCP):

In his public statement at that meeting in Geneva, Dr. Mousavian said that "Iran's nuclear issue is unduly blown out of proportion and falsely presented as a proliferation challenge. The United States has tried hard to portray Iran's case as an international security crisis, and because of the power it wields at the international level, Chapter VII label, that is: threat to international peace and security, was placed on Iran's case in the Security Council". Instead, he said, "Iran's nuclear issue is one that needs to be resolved through persuasion, cooperation and engagement".

He said in the GCSP discussion that "When and if [the P] 5+1 gain Iran’ confidence, and negotiation would proceed in a mutually agreed direction, Iran should technically be able to demonstrate that it is under no time pressure to begin its commercial-scale enrichment for fabrication of nuclear fuel”.

European negotiators call the P5 [the five Permanent members of the UN Security Council ]+1 [Germany] the 3+3 [meaning 3 Europeans -- Britain, France, and Germany, and 3 others -- the. U.S., Russia, and China].

In a later interview, Mousavian explained that “This, for example can be an idea: If the negotiation can start with good faith in recognizing Iranian rights, and assuring Iran, then Iran can also show the signal of tolerance for time in order to reach commercial production, because Iran has enough time, and we can discuss with the partners, 5+1, to reach industrial scale in a phased approach”.

At the time, we wrote on this blog that “In March 2005, Iran apparently suggested to European negotiators that it might be willing to limit its number of cascaded centrifuges to 3000. But, in Geneva … Dr. Mousavian signalled that Iran intended to go ahead to reach industrial-scale production of (lightly) enriched uranium used to operate civilian nuclear power plants. One problem is that once mastered, the same process could simply be extended to produce the highly-enriched uranium used in the production of nuclear weapons, which is apparently the cause of much international concern. Asked about the doubts many have concerning the possibility of a future weapons program, Mousavian replied that ‘Iranians are only concerned about their rights, discrimination against Iran, and attempts to deprive Iran from their legitimate right. This is the basis for Iranian behavior’. Iran’s right, as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to the full nuclear fuel cycle must be recognized, Dr. Mousavian said. It should not be a question of who takes the first step, he added. ‘Iran should take one step, 5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) at the same time simultaneously should take one step: 5+1 should recognize the right of Iran for fuel cycle in the framework of NPT, the exercise of the right with no discrimination, compared to any other NPT member — this is the step from 5+1. And Iranian side I believe should be cooperative with the IAEA, for transparency, for confidence-building measures, in the framework of international rules and regulations — (but) not beyond. Therefore the two parties should take two steps simultaneously and together”. So far, he acknowledged, this proposal is not yet on the table”.

We also noted that “During the meeting at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, Dr. Mousavian got an earful of reproaches about Iran’s position, along with some suggestions intended to be helpful. The world’s problem with Iran’s nuclear program, said Dr. Patricia Lewis of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), addressing Dr. Mousavian in the discussion, “could be likened to a wife discovering that her husband had been less than honest with her about his time and activities, and that he has perhaps indeed been out with a number of different women. ‘It could all be perfectly innocent’ Dr. Lewis said, ‘But, believe me, Ambassador, it would take more than chocolates and flowers to make up to a wife who is feeling that way’.  Dr. Lewis said that Iran’s case highlighted some of the most difficult issues that must now be dealt with under the NPT: ‘the issue of intent, and the issue of peaceful purposes, and how do we ascertain purpose, and intent, in the international system’, she said. ‘This has really been the crux of the matter vis-a-vis Iran. It was indeed the crux of the matter vis-a-vis Iraq. And, indeed, because of the lack of faith in the intent and purposes that were discovered as a result of what happened in ’91 — the discovery of a very near-nuclear-weapons fulfillment in that time — that led us up to war in 2003. And, make no mistake, we’re not at that stage now, perhaps, but we’re certainly at a very dangerous stage in this negotiation, and this discussion’, Dr. Lewis told the audience [in Geneva in March 2007]. Dr. Lewis said that ‘There is no smoking gun. There is no absolute evidence that Iran is on a path to have nuclear weapons. The problem with this is that Iran is now in a trust deficit’.

Dr. Mousavian replied, at that time [March 2007] in Geneva,  that Iran had only signed [but not ratified] an Additional Protocol, allowing more and more intrusive NPT inspections, in December 2003 — and was therefore not obliged to report these activities prior to that date.

Her article continues: “But how was order created from chaos? … If we take just one small part of the organizing needs of the checkpoint – public transport on it’s northern [Ramallah] side – we might get a sense of what is involved. Walid, in his forties from the [Qalandia refugee] Camp, was a main transport organizer for five years on the Ramallah side of the checkpoint. Like many of the checkpoint workers, he had spent years working in construction in Israel before the checkpoints put him out of work so he began to operate a secondhand unlicensed van. He describes what happened when the checkpoint was made at Qalandiya:

‘In the beginning it was a mess, drivers would come, there was no turn, nowhere to stand, the strong one would eat the weak one. So in the Camp we decided that we should organize it, we made a subcommittee and decided to make a stand, you know for the vans and to try organize the situation of turns. In the beginning it was all voluntary, each day a group of guys from the camp would come down and try and organize. But it didn’t work – drivers didn’t get to know them or build a relationship because it was different guys from day to day. And there were problems happening everyday, you know people fighting for turns– you needed to enforce things. So we said, we have to make a permanent group – nine guys – and they’ll take ten shekels a day from the drivers to use the stand and for the other services – the money was equivalent of half a load of people. We’d pay some to the organizers and the rest we donate to the committee. We got the political organizations in the camp to come down and speak to the drivers, to give us some legitimacy. Abu Wagih the owner of the quarry donated gravel and we fixed up a stand on the empty land about 20 meters from where the soldiers stand. And we made a system, each location together, each one by turn, one of them breaks the rules, jumps his turn and we punish him – he can’t come for a day, he gets in a fight – that’s it, he misses a day two days or he harasses the girls passing we send him off for a week. But it didn’t last – the soldiers kept running us out. strong>The soldiers would come by and start shouting over the microphone and say that’s it all of you move out or we’ll shoot – and it’s a disaster – you can’t move all at once – two three hundred vans, and they’re firing tear gas into the windows, breaking windows. …

Walid’s testimony continues: “We kept going back and it kept happening until we said, enough. And found a place 60 meters away from them. Again, the quarry owner gave them the materials, and they made the next stand despite the army from time to time shooting at the tires of Abu Wagih’s caterpillar. Then after another stand-off they were finally kicked out again and were forced even further away (150 meters from the checkpoint). By the third time, they learnt to build a rubble mound at one end – to provide cover from the soldiers’ shooting. But the next stage took even more tenacity – when the checkpoint was closed completely to West Bank identity card holders and people were forced to smuggle themselves through the quarry that then became dubbed “Tora Bora”. When people had to smuggle through the quarry we moved down there and made a stand that was like a trench – so that it would provide cover for people – it was big enough for a hundred vans. We couldn’t get people all the way to the other side because of the terrain, but we could get them half way and pick those up who came through and run them back. You know they (the soldiers) were always firing randomly down there to stop people from crossing through the quarry. During that period we organizers were working like military duty. Soldiers always came down on hunting trips, on the lookout to stop people – and were always shooting randomly, lots of people got hurt down there – two people died. We had to do lookouts, one person posted on this hill, another one there, the one there calls the one here and says, okay – go it’s clear. We worked like ambulance workers too, carried the sick on our backs, from the ambulance coming from Ramallah over to the other side – that was the worst period when no one could cross the checkpoint, not even an ant could‘.

“In all from the beginning of the checkpoint’s imposition until the creation of the Qalandiya “terminal” in early 2006, Walid and the other organizers made a total of seven different stands within the area of the checkpoint. Each time was done in defiance of the army and always involved intense periods of cat and mouse, punctuated by short periods of relative stability. They also created two alternate routes (the quarry and Rafaat) that the army was unable to completely seal, until the Wall was built. And then for a long period, they became absolutely homeless within the space of the checkpoint – when the building of
the new industrial terminal crossing took all of the remaining land where it would be possible to make a stand. Only during that period, did the transport on the Ramallah side fall again into chaos – because organization was outflanked by the absence of space.

“On the Jerusalem side of the checkpoint, you have a parallel history. There too drivers and organizers over a period of four years engaged in daily battle of will and stealth against the relentless pressure of the military and the ever-dwindling possibility of securing the substance for their work and its organization at the checkpoint – space itself. In other cases, survival has meant making difficult compromises. Where the drivers and their organizers survived through ongoing defiance of the military, the porters’ survival at Qalandiya ultimately became dependent on compliance with them. The porters who arrived
at Qalandiya from the outset were confronted with a set of organizational circumstances in some ways more difficult than the drivers. Some of them had been porters in the vegetable market in the refugee camp, or at al-Ram, still others arrived after working at other checkpoints that had subsequently had been closed or overrun with too much competition. At one point at Qalandiya their numbers reached 35 – many of them kids from the camp coming to work after school. Because there’s little capital investment involved – anyone could get into the business, and since they don’t need space – regulating themselves and creating a system of ‘fairness’ can’t be done through a parking stand as with the vans. Too many disconnected and competing networks came in – and the camp community was not willing to stop the infinite number of its children trying to make some extra cash from it. It was an unsustainable moral economy: Abu Ammar, one of the older porters describes the situation: ‘There was no turn or nothing, only problems, a car would come and everyone would have to jump and whoever got those bags first, and whoever was clever was clever, it was no good. The kids with carts kept ruining us – they’d work for nothing. And so the prices were no good – the customer didn’t like what you asked there were always another three, four who
would give him a better price. But in the case of the porters, unlike the drivers, crises created by the army created the
opportunity to gain a greater measure of control. When they closed the checkpoint for that period – when no one could cross and everyone started to go through the quarry, we went down there. But it was hard, rubble, hills, not anyone could do it – the kids couldn’t do it and some of the others decided to stop. Some, a few of us stayed working there and then they opened the checkpoint and we tried to go back. We went back to the checkpoint but the soldiers sent us away, they said no porters
allowed, you know – security and all of that empty talk. They wanted to take our livelihood away and what do we have – nothing. So some of us, the married ones with kids we decided to go and talk to them – there was a soldier called Captain Ofer, an old man, speaks some Arabic. So me and the guys we got ourselves together about ten or twelve of us and we said
we want to sit with you, one of the guys speaks really good Hebrew so we let him do the talking. So Captain Ofer says, okay come day after tomorrow at 8:00 am – you know how they are – they even give birth at an appointed time. So we went and he said okay what do you want? So we say, listen we used to work here, we are all married guys with children, each one of us has a family to look after, we need our work back. So Ofer goes on about security and how a kid at another checkpoint, they’d found guns or something in his cart. So we said we’re all older, married we have responsibilities and the people need a solution. So he says okay married with children, but I’ll only take five of you. We were twelve – two were unmarried so he turns them away. And we say but we’re still ten and he gets stubborn and says no, only five – and then he picks out two, the one who spoke the good Hebrew and another one he’d remembered from before and he tells them to stand on the side. So he goes one by one – how many kids do you have, the first one says four, the next one says four, I say 7 – I could see what was happening, at the time I had four kids, but it was like the lotto, your going to live by the number. I decided he wouldn’t check it in my identity card and even if he did – I’d say I had my parents and brother living with me – I worked in Israel most of my life so I know a little. So he tells me to stand with the others’.

“Over time, the porters were able to negotiate their numbers up to nine with the Captain. However, the price to keep working in this case, was that the porters inevitably became beholden to the army for continuing to work – they had to pass security checks (which one of them didn’t pass because of a brother in prison), they had to number their carts so the soldiers could differentiate them, they had to keep a good relation even with ‘problematic’ soldiers. At least, they could keep working and they made even more money because they now constituted a monopoly on porting. Worse still was they got a reputation for being collaborators with the military and for a while were relatively shunned by the other workers at the checkpoint. But to compensate for this situation, to buy some moral capital in the community, without jeopardizing their pact with the military they found a compromise – which was to subcontract the longer distance hauling to others up to the actual crossover point where only they could pass. In this way, another six porting jobs were created for men who couldn’t join ‘the army imposed union’. Checkpoints are also a magnets for peddlers. Shopkeepers from communities who could no longer sustain them; villagers selling seasonal fruits from back home; out of work young men trying their luck with some goods on assignment from a merchant or simply starting a stand from scratch with whatever small capital, idea and skill they have.

“Checkpoint environments are de-regulated; there are no municipal vending laws and no fees to pay for stands as in organized market areas in the cities. At the same time, there are literally thousands of potential customers – those stuck idly in cars, those walking in or out of the crossing, or waiting for transport to fill up on either side. There is also an all-day group of customers – the checkpoint workers themselves. At its checkpoint worker apogee, you could eat three meals at Qalandiya – sesame bread or sweet pastry in the morning with your tea and coffee. Sizzling kebab at lunch – but no falafel since its possible for a cook to run from soldiers with a charcoal grill but too dangerous with a pot of boiling oil. For dinner, it was better to go home – unless you like grilled liver and stuffed spleen. And snacking was possible all day. At one point waiting in the hellish pedestrian line to cross – it struck me that almost everyone was chomping on roasted peanuts as if they were at the cinema – the whole area where the soldiers stood was enveloped by the smell of three nut roasters steaming away at the entrance.

“The major problem for peddlers is akin to the drivers – space. A meter, a few feet in a strategic place (that commuters have to walk through, or at a drivers stand) is what fundamentally determines viability. Beyond that is whether vendors can satisfy existing consumer needs or create new ones. But wherever you stand there are risks, benefits and losses. The best side for business according to most peddlers is the exit, or Jerusalem side, based on the psychology of crossing; as one peddler put it,’who wants to buy when they’re about to face hell (the soldiers), but once you pass you want to celebrate’. The
Jerusalem side became so popular – that on the big commute days (Saturday and Thursdays) you’d have up to 200 peddlers operating during good weather. But although Qalandiya is a military zone, the army would call in the Jerusalem municipal police to clear out the stands, making lightening raids, confiscating goods and imposing fines. Thus, on the Jerusalem side peddlers learnt to keep their goods on stands that could be hauled off in a moment.

“On the Ramallah side, it was always safer because the Jerusalem municipality couldn’t be bothered to cross the checkpoint, but it was also less business. But on the plus side there was space for a full-scale exposition on open tables. Peddlers do not need collective systems at the checkpoint like the porters and van drivers; although on the Ramallah side – longstanding relationships built over a few years of peddling there developed into long term forms of cooperation – saving each others stand space everyday, collectively evicting a ‘trouble maker’, and collectively defying the army trying to move them out. But peddlers, though perhaps not contributing to the ‘organization’ of the checkpoint contributed something as important – an atmosphere of normality. In the midst of barbed wire, concrete blocks and guns stood a perfume stand, lingerie flailing in the wind, books to look at, shoes to try on, the smell of coffee, a pile of green almonds, and strawberries, Tupperware, toys and plastic bouquets – all of the sights and smells of a lively urban market, a public space full of the happy diversion of popular consumerism and the social interaction that goes with it. Whenever interviewing commuters about what made them laugh at Qalandiya – it was almost always the same answer – the craziness of the peddlers.

…

“At Qalandiya there was an ideological framework sustaining individual and collective actions – national survival. But what primarily motivated checkpoint workers was necessity – the quest for dignity in the face of the destruction of their regular livelihoods. Thus through daily tactics of survival they crept into the spaces of opportunity that existed between the whims and violence of the military and the various needs of the community. They could not overthrow the checkpoint but they could
‘poach’ it back from being a space of pure brutality and oppression to one in which their own dispossession could be redressed while creating a means to sustain the entire community.

“The strategies and experiences of commuters is another part of the picture – but one too large to be addressed here beyond some basic comments. At checkpoints commuters and informal sector workers are united by the need to survive and mutually depend on each other to do so; workers make livings from providing the means for commuters to keep going; and commuters by continuing to cross create jobs for the workers. But while workers can create systems to help commuters cross – - the experience of crossing itself is beyond organization because of its innate arbitrariness and potential for violence. Who can or
cannot cross, ‘the mood of the soldiers’, an eruption of violence around or in front of you, the inability to predict anything, including the time it will take. As such commuters when facing the checkpoint ultimately face it in a situation of extreme powerlessness, as individuals without the possibility of a collective strategy.

“What people bring to this situation then are individual psychological strategies. Some of these have become part of collective popular discourse, and others remain as discrete individual strategies that vary according to character, as well as gender, age and status. In terms of popular discourse, although people cross by necessity in order to go to work, school, or simply continue with their lives, they imbue this act of survival with a sense of agency and defiance. ‘The checkpoint is not going to defeat me’, ‘the checkpoint is not going to stop me from reaching my work’, ‘I refuse to let the checkpoint control my life’ –
these are the constant statements people make about crossing. This individual reaction has generalized to become the rallying cry of this intifada – al hayat lazim tastamir – life must go on. There is a collective understanding that the checkpoints are there to stop life, to destroy livelihoods and education and ultimately defeat the will of a nation. Thus, simply continuing to cross them becomes encoded not as an individual experience of victimization but as part of a collective act of defiance and ultimately national resistance. Where the much more individualized psychological strategies come in is at the moment of actual interaction with soldiers – at the identity card check. This is the extremely charged moment when as a single individual you are confronted with the bare face of the occupation and it becomes embodied in a person, a soldier who has immense power over your immediate destiny. It is here, in this moment of interaction between pure power and powerlessness that we see individual subjectivity at play in attempting to recode the dynamics and meaning of the interaction and take back some sense of control and its correlate – dignity.

” ‘I never take out my I.D. card – I always make them ask for it’, or ‘I take my I.D. card out before they have a chance to ask for it’: These two opposite micro-strategies to each person means the same thing – they have set the dynamic of the unfolding of the procedure, thus taking ‘control’ of it away from the soldier. Similarly, we have different strategies in terms of verbal interaction with the soldiers; ‘I never get into a conversation with them – if they’re asking about anything other than my I.D. card, anything above what their supposed to be interested in– I shrug or tell them it’s not their business’. And again, you get its opposite, ‘I always take the opportunity to argue with them, tell them what they’re doing is inhumane – I don’t want them for a moment to feel that what they’re doing is right or normal’. But these particular micro-strategies of agency, are one’s that only people with a certain symbolic capital can undertake – all of them with Jerusalem identity cards, who in principle (though not always in fact) can always cross. And in terms of the obviously assertive strategies, it is mostly older professional women (and some men) who can risk them.

“Those who don’t have the right papers don’t have this luxury – people whose only way to cross is to negotiate with the soldier, because they don’t fit the current rule requirements. In these cases the strategy cannot be anger, or reticence, or coldness because you have to elicit pity, or empathy, or credulity, or you have to simply wear them down by not giving up. And in the process of bargaining you must to exert the maximum amount of self-control – not to lose your temper, not to react in anger at being subject to a situation which is the essence of humiliation. When people in these circumstances
describe what they do, they tend to re-code the humiliation of the encounter as a consummate act of bargaining – the skill of outsmarting the soldier. ‘The occupation forces us all to be liars’, is how one person described it — meaning that since the point of the checkpoint is to make all normal human activities illegal – one has to invent extraordinary stories in order to convince a soldier to let you through.

“In general, men, especially young men are less capable of negotiating than women – as evinced by the case of the young man in my opening description. On the one hand, they start from a position of being the most vilified of all Palestinians by Israel, thus the distance they must close in terms of convincing soldiers to let them pass is the greatest. At the same time, their masculine selves are often at odds with the patient, subservient dispositions necessary to close the gap. One of the worst experiences standing in line, one that everyone mentions because it is so ubiquitous, is of the young man refusing to move and being beaten. But what is also extraordinary is how often the young men hit back. Women are the most skilled at bargaining their way through, or patiently wearing soldiers down. On the one hand their gender identity is a form of symbolic capital they can exploit (especially as mothers and grandmothers) but also because living in a patriarchal society – everyday female agency is very much about patience and tactical bargaining in order to get around male power.

“Ask any soldier what he is doing at Qalandiya and you are likely to get one of two answers: ‘I’m just doing my job’ or ‘I’m protecting the state of Israel’.

“The second reason reflects the logic of any security regime, be it protecting a wealthy neighbourhood from crime, a border from infiltrators and drug smugglers, or a nation from suicide bombers. It doesn’t ask why – why do people steal, infiltrate or bomb but naturalizes them as part of human existence and generalizes them onto the population they are trying to police. It inevitably turns who you police, the whole population, into a spectre of criminality – people who cannot act like you, feel like you or have the same needs and longings.

“If we return to Qalandiya, what we see in the military’s reaction to the van drivers, the peddlers and even the porters – is the active criminalization of their basic livelihoods. In terms of the commuters who were ‘breaking the rules’ by smuggling through the quarry, we are talking about students and teachers trying to get to school, fathers trying to make a living and probably in some cases, young men simply wanting to see the wider world. People are forced to ‘misbehave’ to get around arbitrary and unjust systems and then the fact of their misbehavior becomes the justification for the system itself.

Postscript:
“In early 2006, Qalandiya checkpoint was reborn as the Qalandiya ‘Terminal crossing’, one of eleven high tech [sic - this is a relative concept] crossings Israel has constructed at various points across the West Bank Separation Wall. The ‘Terminal’, which from the outside looks as innocuous as an aircraft hangar and bearing signs with uplifting ditties in Arabic like, ‘Our Hope Together’ is touted as more humane and efficient by Israeli government and military propagandists in contrast to its dusty ad hoc predecessors. Inside it is a showcase of every conceivable form of Israeli high and low security technology exported around the world including: magnetic spindle gates, high speed x-ray machines, and biometric scanning devices.

“Now crossing involves navigating through a warren of cage-like pens, between turnstiles that automatically shut or open by remote control, all to the disembodied din of soldiers screeching through a pa [public address] system. Multiple public and private security personnel run the ‘Terminal’ including the usual suspects such as the Israeli military police and border guards, but also private security firms and the Israel Airports Authority. Dozing soldiers now ‘process’ you while gazing at computer screens sitting in booths behind bullet-proof glass – and what communication is possible takes place through remote speaker systems. Indeed, if the ‘Terminal’ has been more humane for anyone, it has been for the soldiers manning it.

“The configuration of the ‘Terminal’ as well as the re-routing of traffic in relation to the Wall, all brought to an end the huge informal infrastructure that had developed to deal with the old checkpoint system. Peddlers cannot get near their once lucrative positions on the Jerusalem exit side from the checkpoint; the narrow cages and turnstiles inside the terminal are barely wide enough for a human body – let alone a porter cart. And with the rerouting of West Bank traffic through the Jaba Road, and Israel’s re-imposition of old East Jerusalem bus companies on Palestinian public transport in and out of the city, even
the main transport stands have returned to their natural homes in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

And despite the overwhelming power of the new system, people continue to find ways to get through and around it”.

Rema Hammami is Professor at the Institute for Women’s Studies at Birzeit University and on the Advisory Board of JQ [Jerusalem Quarterly]. Her article can be viewed in full in the Spring 2010 issue of Jerusalem Quarterly here.

The Haaretz article continues: “Abu Mazen’s uncompromising position on freezing construction in settlements reflects the difficulty of deviating in the slightest from the Palestinian consensus … The formula of the Palestinian state within temporary borders that the prime minister has raised in recent days is meant to extricate Israel from its diplomatic straits. But in its current format, there is no chance that the other side will respond positively to the prime minister’s proposal. It is based on the same logic as the Oslo Accords; in other words, steps to expand Palestinian sovereignty one stage at a time to let the sides get used to the advantages and shortcomings of the process. Like the Oslo Accords, a Palestinian state in temporary borders, in the proposed format, offers a partial arrangement that lacks a horizon of a final-status solution that will end the conflict”.   This article can be read in full here.

The authors are identified as Prof. Shaul Mishal, who teaches political science at Tel Aviv University, and Doron Mazza, a research student in the Department for Middle Eastern Studies at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Less than two weeks ago, U.S. Special Envoy George Mitchell completed the first round of these talks, and a statement was issued in Washington (9 May) that is now posted on the State Department website, saying that “Both parties are taking some steps to help create an atmosphere that is conducive to successful talks, including President Abbas’ statement that he will work against incitement of any sort and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement that there will be no construction at the Ramat Shlomo project for two years. They are both trying to move forward in difficult circumstances and we commend them for that. We have received commitments from both sides, and we have made assurances to both sides, that are enabling us to move forward. The full scope of these discussions will remain private. As both parties know, if either takes significant actions during the proximity talks that we judge would seriously undermine trust, we will respond to hold them accountable and ensure that negotiations continue”.  This statement is posted here.

On 18 May, the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Robert H. Serry, said in his monthly update to an open meeting of the UN Security Council in New York that “Both parties have made specific commitments, and received certain assurances, which have enabled proximity talks to begin.  Some of these remain confidential.  These commitments must be respected, as must obligations under the Roadmap and international law. We welcome US President Obama’s reaffirmation that both parties would be held accountable for actions that undermine trust during the talks … While the issues are complex and sensitive, the goal of the effort underway is clear, as stated by the Quartet on 19 March in Moscow: the resolution of all core issues; an end to the 1967 occupation; and two States living side-by-side in peace and security”.

While some Israeli sources who follow the negotiations closely say with great confidence that there will be no announcements of settlement expansion, even in Jerusalem, during these talks, the only public Israeli concession, presented to the U.S., was “no construction at the Ramat Shlomo project for two years”.   However, Israeli analysts point out with some cynicism that no actual construction could begin for two years in any case, due to the exigencies of the permissions and planning process.

Hours after Mitchell left after the second round of these talks this past Thursday (20 May), no U.S. statement was issued.

Haaretz’s Barak Ravid noted, pointedly, in an article published on Thursday that “The first part of the meeting centered on the confidence-building steps the United States expects Israel to take toward the Palestinian Authority. ‘Israel will consider making goodwill gestures toward the Palestinians during the proximity talks’, the Prime Minister’s Office said. Netanyahu also made clear to Mitchell that he expects the PA to work to create a positive atmosphere in the talks and not conduct international campaigns against Israel such as protests against the country’s joining the OECD”.  This article can be read in full here.

A day or so earlier, Barak Raviv reported in Haaretz that “Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman says in a classified document that despite the indirect talks with the Palestinian Authority, the PA is expected to conduct a diplomatic struggle against Israel abroad. Lieberman makes his case in the document handed out to the forum of seven senior ministers. The report also states that the Palestinians will seek to use the so-called proximity talks to increase American pressure on Israel so the freeze on settlement construction will continue well beyond its September deadline … The report was distributed to the ministers on May 6 and was prepared at the Foreign Ministry’s Center for Political Research by the head of the Palestinian affairs team. The department, the ministry’s intelligence branch, is responsible for political assessments – first and foremost on the peace process. One of the report’s messages is that the main reason the Palestinians agreed to indirect talks is their wish to test the seriousness of Israel’s intentions. ‘The Palestinians are embarking on talks with no faith in their outcome, virtually with the expectation that they will fail’, the report says. Foreign Ministry analysts say the basic Palestinian positions on the core issues – borders, Jerusalem, security, refugees, water and settlements – have not changed since the days of past negotiators Ehud Barak, Tzipi Livni and Ehud Olmert. ‘In our assessment, the Palestinians will not reveal any area of flexibility, especially not on issues of borders and territory exchanges, because in their view the Israeli government is not genuinely interested in carrying out effective negotiations’, the report says … The possibility is also raised that the Palestinians will turn to the United Nations Security Council to seek backing for a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. They would concentrate efforts on the United States so it does not veto the initiative.    This report is posted here.

Meanwhile,  the Associated Press reported on Friday that “Nearly 200,000 Jews have moved to east Jerusalem since Israel captured the city in 1967, the vast majority living in Jewish neighborhoods built since that time [but some in Palestinian neighborhoods] … Israel’s government rules out relinquishing sovereignty in any part of the city, and Jewish expansion in east Jerusalem was at the center of a recent diplomatic row between the Obama administration and Israel’s hawkish government. Palestinians demand a total halt to Jewish construction in both east Jerusalem and the West Bank, areas they claim for a future state.  Both the settlers and their critics agree on the ultimate goal of their presence here.   ‘The main objective is to prevent a two-state solution and to prevent the possibility that  these areas will become the capital of a Palestinian state’, said Hagit Ofran of the Israeli anti-settlement watchdog Peace Now.  Palestinian government spokesman Ghassan Khatib called these residents ‘the most dangerous factor’ preventing an agreement with Israel.   But plans are underway to strengthen their presence.  At a complex in the neighborhood of Ras al-Amud now housing 50 Jewish families, a sign boasts of 60 new units to be complete by the end of the year.  Last week, Peace Now reported dozens of new houses for Jews in Arab east Jerusalem: 20 units in one neighborhood, 24 in another and renovations having started to turn an old police station in Ras al-Amud into a 14-unit apartment building.  ‘If you look at 2009 and 2010, you understand what the trend is here. The trend is massive expansion’, said Arieh King, who runs a group that buys land for Jews in east Jerusalem and other areas.  He said his organization’s goal is to create ‘Jewish continuity’ from Jerusalem to settlements in the West Bank, making it harder to eventually disconnect the two.  Israel annexed east Jerusalem immediately after capturing it from Jordan during the 1967 Middle East war, a move the international community does not recognize.  The Jews living in Arab neighborhoods are there in keeping with Israeli law, often in houses purchased from Arab residents directly or through organizations that buy land for Jewish settlement. To the Palestinians, however, it’s pure provocation.  The neighborhoods are prone to conflict. Riots broke out in March as Palestinians, angered by plans for more Jewish housing in east Jerusalem, hurled rocks and set tires ablaze.  Signs of Jewish entrenchment in these neighborhoods are everywhere, beginning with the security equipment and personnel the Israelis bring with them. Israeli police are on constant patrol. Israeli flags fly from several rooftops. Thick metal grates protect the windows of Jewish homes and visitors with no invitation are turned away by security guards …  Neighborly relations between Arabs and Jews are nearly nonexistent. In the neighborhood of Jabel Mukaber, Palestinian homes overlook a giant 91-unit apartment block for Jews.  The only contact between the residents is when Jews stop at the local shop to buy milk. ‘We don’t spend time together. We don’t hang out together. I personally support that separation’, said Uri Dopelt, an Israeli who has lived in these Arab neighborhoods for the last decade.  In another neighborhood, Sheikh Jarrah, Israeli police acting on a court order evicted Palestinian families and allowed Jewish settlers to move into their homes, which [the settlers claim] had been owned by Jews before Israel’s independence in 1948.  Palestinians cannot similarly reclaim lost property in the city’s western sector.  Another flashpoint is a seven-story building in Silwan built by an ultranationalist settler group in 2004. The imposing structure houses eight families who live there under 24-hour government guard.  While the government vows never to give up east Jerusalem, the Jews who have moved into the Arab districts mistrust its resolve.  ‘The government is feeling American pressure’, said Dopelt. ‘People like us in these neighborhoods are the last line in protecting what is ours’.”  This AP article can be viewed in full here.

In the interview, Chomsky tells Al-Jazeera that he is “not angry, but disappointed and surprised”.

Asked to comment on the Israeli Ministry of Interior spokesperson’s remark that it was a “misunderstanding, Chomsky said “I can’t see anything to misunderstand”.

He explained that he had been invited by Bir Zeit University, the first Palestinian university, located near Ramallah, the de facto capital of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, on topics related to “American Foreign and Domestic Policy”. And, he said, “the facts were completely clear to everyone — there was no basis for misunderstanding … It was a decision by the [Israeli] Ministry of Interior”.

Chomsky added that “I can only say what was conveyed to me” by the official conducting the interrogation at Allenby Bridge, the only crossing for Palestinians between the West Bank and the rest of the world, via Jordan. “There were two basic points”, Chomsky explained: “(1) the Government of Israel doesn’t like the things I say (which puts them into the category, I would say, of every other government in the world), and (2) I was taking an invitation from Bir Zeit University, and I had no plans to go to speak at an Israeli University”.

Chomsky noted that in the past he had, in fact, spoken at Israeli universities.

Haaretz’s correspondent in the West Bank, Amira Hass, who broke the news about Chomsky’s denial of entry yesterday, has written today that she spoke by phone yesterday evening with a clearly more irritated Chomsky, who said that he found it hard to think of a similar case — except “perhaps only in Stalinist regimes”.

He also told Hass that, as she reported, “Israel’s behavior today reminds him of that of South Africa in the 1960s…”

His last visit was to both Israel and Palestinian territory, in 1997, he told Hass.

And, Hass reported, Chomsky said that Israel’s decision to deny him entry was “tantamount to a boycott of Bir Zeit University”.

Chomsky had intended to deliver several lectures at Bir Zeit, and to visit Bil’in (site of a weekly demonstration against The Wall, from which the Israeli military has banned anyone who is not an inhabitant of the village every Friday from 8am until 8 pm), and Hebron, where the center of the city has effectively been shut down and put under military curfew to protect religious-nationalist Jewish settlers who have moved there to recreate a Jewish center that was destroyed, and many Jews were massacred, in communal riots under the British Mandate in 1929.

Chomsky was also due to meet Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.

Hass’ report in Haaretz contains an interesting and more complete account of the questions he was asked during his interrogation at Allenby Bridge.

And, Hass also notes that Interior Spokeswoman Sabine Haddad said: “Because he entered the Palestinian Authority territory only, his entry is the responsibility of the Office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories [COGAT] at the Defense Ministry. There was a misunderstanding on our side, and the matter was not brought to the attention of the COGAT”. And, Hass adds, “Haddad told Haaretz that ‘the minute the COGAT says that they do not object, Chomsky’s entry would have been permitted’.

The Israeli Ministry of Defense rules the West Bank, and COGAT operates without transparency and with no apparent political or public oversight. See our earlier post, published last night, here.

Amira Hass’ report in Haaretz today can be viewed in full here.

Didi Remez has posted the English-language translations of two articles from the Hebrew-language Israeli press commenting on the Chomsky affair.

One, written by retired Judge Boaz Okron, the legal editor of Yediot Ahronot, the best-selling Israeli newspaper, says
“The decision to expel Prof. Noam Chomsky from the border terminal in order to prevent him from lecturing at Bir Zeit University is an act of folly, part of a large series of follies in the recent period, which together could mark the end of Israel as a freedom-loving state of law, or at least pose a large question mark over this. This decision is first of all patently illegal, since it stands in stark contrast to the most important ruling of the Supreme Court in the Kol Haam affair, in which it was determined that restricting freedom of speech is only legal if the statement is of a kind that could pose a clear and immediate danger to state security. Truth is not dictated from on high and opinions and ideas cannot be supervised. The best ‘test of truth’ is the power of an idea to be accepted in the marketplace of ideas. But in Israel, the government has already started to threaten freedom, at least the freedom of those who are perceived as ‘others’. We have ceased to take an interest in what the ‘others’ have to say, not to mention their rights to live here in a normal fashion. We want them to get out of our sight. We hound the ‘others’ on the basis of generalizations, suspicions, prejudice or just because they are annoying … There is a worrying common denominator here. When freedom disappears — it comes first of all at the expense of the weak, the marginal groups or the minorities. But it does not end there. Now it is also reaching intellectuals with a worldwide reputation. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the decision to shut up Prof. Chomsky is an attempt to put an end to freedom in the State of Israel. I am not talking about the stupidity of supplying ammunition to those who say that Israel is fascist, but rather about our concern that we may be becoming fascists”. This English-language translation of the Yediot Ahronot article is posted here.

The other article, also translated by Didi Remez and posted on his Coteret website, is from today’s Maariv newspaper, which reported that “A security source reported that ‘his [Chomsky's] request to enter Bir Zeit University for the purpose of a lecture that could agitate the atmosphere apparently reached the ears of the Interior Ministry personnel. Someone there apparently decided arbitrarily that his entry was unnecessary, and therefore decided to ban him from entering. As it appears now, this decision caused more harm than good, and it looks like he will ultimately enter’.” This English-language translation of the Maariv article is posted here.

(This article also reported that “The official involved in the border crossings in the Interior Ministry was the one who gave the instructions not to let in Chomsky. Interior Ministry sources said the official overstepped her authority and was reprimanded. Sources in the Interior Ministry noted that the official made the decision on the basis of her familiarity with the person’s activity and the fact that he is considered “extreme leftist”. When a person requests to enter Judea and Samaria [i.e., the West Bank] directly, the request is not handled by the Interior Ministry but by the army”…)

Noam Sheizaf wrote yesterday, here, on his blog, the Promised Land, that: “According to Chomsky, what bothered Israeli officials at the Allenby crossing was not only his views, but the fact that he intends to visit the West Bank, and not Israel. Later it was said that the IDF authority might end up granting him a visa. But whatever way this affair ends, it is clear that Chomsky made a better case against Israel today than in anything he said or wrote. He practically proved that the Palestinians are far from being autonomous, and that the West Bank is in reality under siege, with Israel dictating who and what might leave or enter.When the Spanish clown Ivan Pedro was denied entry by the Shin Beit into the West Bank, some people tried to make a national security case out of it, claiming Pedro refused to submit information regarding his contacts in the West Bank. I hope nobody is planning the same line with the Chomsky. Israel simply decided not to let him in because he is pro-Palestinian, like it does every day to many others. The only difference is that in those cases nobody alerts Reuters. There is no arguing that Israel is now viewing certain ideas, not just actions, as existential threat, and is willing to make use of its powers in order to suppress them. It is important to understand this point: Some people think that the state made a stupid mistake today [Sunday], when it chose to refuse Chomsky a visa. But That’s only true if you judge the affair in terms of actual security – then you conclude that making such a fuss over a speech in Ramallah by an aging linguistic that no one would even notice is pure madness. But if you are obsessed with the persecution of ‘dangerous ideas’ and constantly searching for ideological menaces, then Chomsky is a threat. In this context, not allowing him to enter your country might be logical and even legal – again, if you consider Israel’s control of all entrances to the West bank legal – but it is also scary as hell”.