Professor Ruth Lapidot, a former legal adviser to Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is one of — if not the – preeminent Israeli expert on international law [also known as public international law]. Her views are taken extremely seriously in official Israeli circles.

She recently [on 16 June] discussed Israel’s announced naval blockade of Gaza’s maritime space in a meeting with diplomats and journalists at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs [run by Israel's former Ambassador Dore Gold.

Some of the more interesting things she said are: Israel has declared a formal naval blockade of Gaza's coastline, in January 2009 [as we have reported here]. The area which is blockaded has to be clearly defined, and there has to be clear notification. The blockade must be applied without discrimination (though limited specific exceptions can be permitted).  Humanitarian assistance must be permitted — but not goods which may increase the war capacity of, in this case, Hamas.  If there is a suspicion that a ship is carrying arms or personnel to , in this case, Hamas, Israel may capture, visit, or search a ship that enters the blockaded zone, and can try to persuade them to leave. But, if a ship tries to run the blockade, there is a clear difference between how it is possible to treat a merchant ship (military force can be used) or a warship (only protests are allowed).

Those who oppose this blockade only say that it’s against international law, without saying why, Professor Lapidot said.

UPDATE: In a just-published interview, Greta Berlin of the Free Gaza movement said that “Israel has no right to stop us under international law UNLESS it wants to admit that it occupies Gaza. Since Israel says it no longer occupies Gaza and Gaza is free, they have no right to stop us. In addition, the blockade is collective punishment against a civilian population that is WAY out of line. International law, Amnesty International and the International Red Cross have all said the same thing. Israel’s blockade is illegal”… This is published here.

Professor Lapidot explained at the JCPA discussion that she believed Gaza is a sui generis entity, a special case. Because Gaza was never annexed by Israel, and because Israel does not control the entire territory of Gaza, she argued, it is not occupied. However, since Israel controls the air and sea space [criteria that many if not most other international law experts say are confirmation of an occupation], it has a special responsibility in case of accidents. She noted that the former Israeli Supreme Court head Justice Barak ruled that Israel also has a moral responsibility because it did previously occupy Gaza for so long.

The entire discussion was videotaped, and it is archived on the JCPA website, where it can be viewed  on the website of the JCPA  here. [Go to Institute for Contemporary Affairs, then on either sidebar click on video archive, then select this event]. Here are some excerpts:

Legal aspects of the problem of the blockade of Gaza:

“The situation between Israel + the Hamas is a situation of armed conflict – this is important because this means that the laws of war apply — which means you may control ships going to Gaza, even on the high seas — you may not do it in the territorial sea of third country… not in Cyprus, but on the high seas in time of conflict.

A blockade means that one state prohibits event the entry and exit of both neutral and enemy ships and airplanes to an area which must be defined.  You have to define very clearly what is this area – where are the borders of this area.

There are some other similar institutions in PIL [Public International Law] – there are also exclusion zones and security zones or war zones or neutral zones — on the sea, in laws of war, during time of conflict.
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But, it was a blockade that was imposed by Israel on the shores of Gaza

What are the sources of the law on blockades?
Until this very day the rules are still customary international law (no international treaty deals with this problem)
A list of documents that mention blockades:
(1) 1856 Declaration of Paris on the Crimean war – but it has only a very short mention;
(2) 1909 London declaration on naval warfare — much more important, and detailed; there was an intention to codify this, but unfortunately the states that participated did not ratify it: so, this has remained a declaration and is not treaty.
Manuals: San Remo (prepared by an international group of expert), and those of the militaries of the UK, US, and Germany — all these manuals say this is binding customary law.

Concerning war on sea, the world still applies the general principles of laws of war (eg: there is a prohibition of starvation of civilians)

Conditions for legality or validity of a blockade
1.) Notification – it has to be declared and notified as clearly as possible to all those who might be affected (nowadays communications much easier)
2.) Effectiveness – a “paper blockade” is not valid: you have to apply and enforce, otherwise it will not be valid; this is a question of fact, there are no clear legal rules.
3.) You must ensure that you do not cut off access to the high seas of the territorial sea of a third state
4.) Equality – it has to be based on equality, applied to everybody in the same way, not just to some states — including Prime Ministers who might be on any of the ships.
5.)  You must permit the passage of humanitarian assistance. (The San Remo manual of 1994 says that you must permit humanitarian assistance, but state applying must decide where, when, and through which port the humanitarian assistance goes. There is the possibility to require that a neutral organization must control to whom the humanitarian assistance goes — eg ICRC, to see if the humanitarian assistant goes to civilians – or, in the case of Gaza, to Hamas)
6.) You may not starve the civilian population.

What can and may be done to ships trying to run the blockade?
A distinction is made between merchant ships (you have the right to capture, visit, search, and if they resist, you may even attack the ship) and warships (you may try to capture, and try to search but not attack a warship unless it is situation of self-defense)

When can you apply and in what kind of waters?  As soon as it is clear a certain ship intends to break the blockade, you can start to deal with it, even if it is on the high seas.

Precedents (modern – after World War Two):
(1) Korean war 1950-53
(2) Bangladesh – 1973, applied by India
(3) Iran-Iraq war – blockade on Shatt al-Arab
(4) There was also a blockade in the 2006 war between Israel and “the terrorists” in Lebanon (nevertheless Israel did give a safe passage between Lebanon and Cyprus for humanitarian assistance.)
[During the 2008 war between Russian and Georgia, there was some discussion - but it was not a real blockade, only a search of ships on the high seas, to look for contraband.]

Excerpts from the Question and Answer segment of the discussion at JCPA:

Q: States are reluctant, prefer to use softer term such as quarantine.  Iran-Iraq war – UNSC resolution prohibits arms therefore blockade and that naval presence in Indian ocean and Red Sea is still there but now to seek out members of al-Qaeda, or carrying weapons

A: Also 1962 quarantine of Cuba – it did not meet all qualifications of blockade

Q: Must a blockade be announced?

A: It has to be announced loudly and clearly to everybody who is involved. Even more, when a ship is trying to get though, you must make sure this specific ship has to have actual knowledge, or presumptive knowledge, of the blockade

Q:  Is Israel in full compliance?

A: Absolutely — I thought it was clear without even mentioning it — all these conditions [are met].  In January 2009, Israel made the notification to the whole world, and therefore we can say that this is a real blockade..

Q: Since the legality of this blockade rests on state of war between Israel and Hamas, doesn’t it mean requiring a full declaration of war?

A: In the past, yes, but nowadays there are wars that break out without declaration. There is no need for a declaration in order for there to be a state of war.  There was a judgment by [Israeli Supreme Court] President Aharon Barak five years ago [after Israel's "unilateral" disengagement] where he explained that the situation [between Israel and Gaza] is so bad that it is a situation of armed conflict.

Q: If it’s so clear, can you explain why do other international experts disagree”

A: This question is very interesting, because they never say why.  They only say that it’s illegal under international law, full stop. They do not say why…

Q: But the boarding was in international water?

A: In time of armed conflict you can search ships even on the high seas…

Q:  Even Israeli newspapers write this: seizing ships in international waters is a violation of international law. Other opinion writers say the laws of war do not apply to Gaza, because it is not a state.

A:  Can Gaza be considered an enemy even though it is not a state? You have things called international conflict.  Also, the laws of war apply to internal conflicts (Common Article 3 of all Geneva Convention gives the minimum that applies). With regard to the status of Gaza is the $64 million dollar question – it was under Ottoman sovereignty 1570-1917, then under Britain till 1948 (Who was sovereign? The most common position is that it was both Britain and the League of Nations0. Then Egypt never annexed, gave Gaza autonomy, but under occupation.   In [1956 and in] 1967, Gaza was occupied by Israel, but not annexed.  I would say it is an area sui generus, which means a special situation — this is the best description, because nobody knows exactly what it is, though others say it is self-governing.

Q: According to UNSC resolution 1860, Gaza is part of Palestinian territory, and that is why is is occupied, not because of “effective control”/

A:  part of other side, under occupation, under its control?  Yes, Gaza is part of Palestinian territory but so far there does not yet exist a Palestinian state, yet. It is a special area which hopefully one day will be part of a Palestinian state.

Q: Part of the notion of assigning a legal status is exactly what negotiations have been about…

A  In both 1993 and 1995 it was agreed that there would be negotiations, but so far negotiations have failed. The Road Map of 2003 specifically says Palestinian state should be established by agreement with Israel.

Q: Can you please explain again the difference in treatment accorded to a merchant ship + a war ship [attempting to break a blockade]

A:  When you see a ship is trying to go to Gaza you can stop it to see what’s going on and to persuade – but if a merchant ship continues you can attack it. If it is a warship, you can only protest…

Q: Whole notion of naval blockade is linked to this notion of sending humanitarian goods to the Gaza Strip “under seige”. What is Israel’s responsibility to this sui generus entity that has two entrances and exits – one via Israel and one via Egypt.

A: Absolutely right there are two ways  There is also the 2005 agreement to send goods through Egypt – so the idea was both Israeli and Rafah crossings should be open to the Palestinians.  There is a very interesting Supreme Court judgment on electricity [n.b. - this was handed down on 28 January 2008 in a case brought by GISHA] – that since the 2005 evacuation, Israel has no responsibility to supply, because in particular there is also Egypt — but because has been in control of Gaza for so many years, Israel has a moral responsibility to help the people of Gaza get what they need for their daily lives.

Q: Is the EU participating in the siege [on the land crossings into Gaza]?

A:  There is no siege now, because Gaza is getting a lot of goods from Israel. Now, even cement goes in (but via the port of Ashdod and with control by independent group to ensure aid goes to civilians, not Hamas). Let me remind you that even during the war of 2008, the border open every day for 1.5 hours…We shouldn’t forget the good things Israel has done.

Q: If Israel had allowed any of the ships in the Flotilla to go it, what would have happened to blockade?

A: The state that applies the blockade can make exceptions. But if all ships are allowed in, then there is no blockade.  But if the state imposing blockade gives certain ships special selected permission — or if ship is in distress — it is ok.  But it should not be the rule, exceptions should not be permanent … Israel may control any ships if there is a suspicion they carry goods which may increase the war capacity of Hamas — the suspicion they are carrying arms or personnel to help Hamas. I think other materials may not justify intervention against the ships. Not all goods justify this search — there must be a real suspicion.  And not all ships on high seas, without any reason…
…
Q: If Gaza is a sui generis territory, what does it mean if it is occupied?

A:  … Gaza’s status is, again, undecided. Some say if Israeli still in control of air space or sea, or territory, then it is occupying. Other opinions say that according to the Hague 1907 regulations – an occupier is only occupier if it controls the whole territory. And Israel does not control the whole territory of Gaza. In my opinion, Israel is not in control of Gaza, therefore we are the occupier, but in the areas it controls [air and sea of Gaza] there Israel is responsible (if there is an accident, eg) … In my opinion, the distinction is between full control of territory, or only part of it.
…
Justice Barak said there is an international conflict and not an internal conflict with Gaza, because it is not part of Israel.  Gaza has never been annexed by Israel, neither has the West Bank …
…
Q:  So, customary international law says that after a search of merchant boat, or there is attempt to capture it –  and it continues — at what point can it be attacked and sunk if it carries civilians or civilian goods?

A.  The idea is to get control of the ship and not to drown it…”

***********************

This entire discussion can be viewed on the JCPA website here. [Go to Institute for Contemporary Affairs, then on either sidebar click on video archive, then select this event.]

Actually, he’s apparently been at Princeton for ten months already.

Mousavian was been Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami [who preceeded the present President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad], then later then deputy head of the Strategic Research Center of Iran’s Expediency Council.

The WSJ wrote that “In September, Mr. Mousavian, 53 years old, arrived at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs as a visiting scholar, where he has been writing on Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy and U.S.-Iranian relations. Neither Princeton nor the Obama administration would comment on the Iranian diplomat’s stay in the U.S., but American and European diplomats engaged in nuclear diplomacy with Iran say they are closely scrutinizing Mr. Mousavian’s work for insights into Tehran’s decision making”.

In the photo below, which was probably taken in 2003, Mousavian (on right side of photo) is seen talking to another Iranian diplomat Amir Zamaniniya (on left).

Mousavian, a former Ambassador of Iran to Germany, and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was instrumental in what was — for those Iranian officials involved — a risky agreement to freeze Iran’s nuclear program in 2003 to allow for negotiations with European states, observed by the U.S. But it did not result in any diplomatic movement. There were American elections first. Then, in 2005, there were Iranian elections, and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad won — radically changing the Iranian political landscape.

The WSJ article continues: “Mr. Mousavian said in his first interview since arriving at Princeton that he wasn’t in the U.S. to rally support for Tehran’s political opposition, known as the Green Movement. He said he is focused on his academic work and recovering from an illness contracted during his imprisonment and subsequent legal battles. He said he intends to return to Tehran at some point. ‘I don’t need asylum from any country, and I would never apply for it’, he said” …

The WSJ article continued: “In addition to Mr. Mousavian, a slew of other senior Iranian bureaucrats, diplomats and opposition figures have either been sidelined or fled to the West since opposition protesters challenged Mr. Ahmadinejad’s re-election a year ago, resulting in a broad government crackdown. Javad Zarif, a pro-engagement former ambassador to the UN, is under virtual house arrest in Tehran, said Western officials. [n.b. - this may have been in effect well before the Green Movement protests] Top aides to Iran’s two leading opposition figures, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, have also been forced to set up political bases overseas … Individuals who have met Mr. Mousavian said he is deeply concerned by the developments inside Iran following last year’s presidential election, which many Iranians claimed was rigged to insure Mr. Ahmadinejad’s re-election, a charge Tehran denies.”

Here, again, the WSJ may be linking two different phenomena — Mr. Mousavian may, for example, be more immediately concerned about developments related to the country’s nuclear program and its implication for policy than with the democracy movement.

As far back as December 2007, one of Iran’s former President, Khatami, did lump Mousavian, Zarif, and Sirous Nasseri together with protesting students — actually, Khatami defended all of them, as we reported earlier here. However, the students were not necessarily working together with the former Iranian diplomats.

As the WSJ story reported: “Mr. Mousavian continues to press for the U.S. to engage Tehran in a bid to reduce regional tensions, according to writings viewed by The Wall Street Journal [papers that have been distributed inside Princeton] … He argues that any Iranian government, even one headed by opposition political leaders, would remain committed to developing the infrastructure to produce nuclear fuel. But he says improved trust between Washington and Tehran could still allow for necessary safeguards to be put in place to guard against Iran building atomic weapons … He also says the U.S. should develop with Tehran a broad security plan for the Persian Gulf that could prove crucial to securing the free flow of energy in and out of the strategic waterway … “Thirty years of hostilities between Tehran and Washington has only served to diminish the security in the region”, [he wrote]. Mr. Mousavian, in spite of his close ties to Mr. Rafsanjani, played down the prospects for any quick leadership change in Tehran and said a move toward democracy could only be stimulated from inside … “Iran is not in a pre-revolutionary state”, Mr. Mousavian writes”. This is posted here.

Iran’s President Ahmadinejad went after Mousavian with particular zeal, interfering to deepen his legal problems [opposing his release on bail in May 2007, and later saying he believed Mousavian was a "spy", despite the acquittal in court on most charges, as we reported here.

Mousavian was arrested in May 2007, released a couple of weeks later on bail, then rearrested and put on trial in November 2007, when he was acquitted on the most serious charges of "spying" and "holding confidential documents", but was apparently found guilty of "engaging in propaganda against the state". On 9 April 2008, Iran's National Nuclear Day, Mousavian was reportedly received a two-year suspended sentence -- and a five-year ban on being named to foreign policy or diplomatic positions, on the grounds that he had harmed national security.

Among our other earlier posts following Mr. Mousavian's ordeal are:

Posted on December 4th, 2007 - here.

Ahmadeinejad threatens to reveal Mousavian’s conversations with “foreigners”
Posted on November 29th, 2007 - here.

Mousavian aquitted of spying – but found guilty of working against system
Posted on November 27th, 2007 - here.

Mousavian rearrested
Posted on November 16th, 2007 - here.

Good news — Mousavian free on bail ($225,000)
Posted on May 9th, 2007 here.

Mousavian remains in Evin Prison, under interrogation for “spying”
Posted on May 6th, 2007 - here.

Hossein Mousavian reported under arrest in Iran
Posted on May 2nd, 2007 here.

Iran’s Dilemma
Posted on March 25th, 2007 - here.

UN Security Council unanimously votes to tighten sanctions against Iran — even before 3pm in NY
Posted on March 24th, 2007 - here.

In the photo below, Mousavian is second from left, participating in an panel discussion on 21 March 2007 at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GSCP):

In his public statement at that meeting in Geneva, Dr. Mousavian said that "Iran's nuclear issue is unduly blown out of proportion and falsely presented as a proliferation challenge. The United States has tried hard to portray Iran's case as an international security crisis, and because of the power it wields at the international level, Chapter VII label, that is: threat to international peace and security, was placed on Iran's case in the Security Council". Instead, he said, "Iran's nuclear issue is one that needs to be resolved through persuasion, cooperation and engagement".

He said in the GCSP discussion that "When and if [the P] 5+1 gain Iran’ confidence, and negotiation would proceed in a mutually agreed direction, Iran should technically be able to demonstrate that it is under no time pressure to begin its commercial-scale enrichment for fabrication of nuclear fuel”.

European negotiators call the P5 [the five Permanent members of the UN Security Council ]+1 [Germany] the 3+3 [meaning 3 Europeans -- Britain, France, and Germany, and 3 others -- the. U.S., Russia, and China].

In a later interview, Mousavian explained that “This, for example can be an idea: If the negotiation can start with good faith in recognizing Iranian rights, and assuring Iran, then Iran can also show the signal of tolerance for time in order to reach commercial production, because Iran has enough time, and we can discuss with the partners, 5+1, to reach industrial scale in a phased approach”.

At the time, we wrote on this blog that “In March 2005, Iran apparently suggested to European negotiators that it might be willing to limit its number of cascaded centrifuges to 3000. But, in Geneva … Dr. Mousavian signalled that Iran intended to go ahead to reach industrial-scale production of (lightly) enriched uranium used to operate civilian nuclear power plants. One problem is that once mastered, the same process could simply be extended to produce the highly-enriched uranium used in the production of nuclear weapons, which is apparently the cause of much international concern. Asked about the doubts many have concerning the possibility of a future weapons program, Mousavian replied that ‘Iranians are only concerned about their rights, discrimination against Iran, and attempts to deprive Iran from their legitimate right. This is the basis for Iranian behavior’. Iran’s right, as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to the full nuclear fuel cycle must be recognized, Dr. Mousavian said. It should not be a question of who takes the first step, he added. ‘Iran should take one step, 5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) at the same time simultaneously should take one step: 5+1 should recognize the right of Iran for fuel cycle in the framework of NPT, the exercise of the right with no discrimination, compared to any other NPT member — this is the step from 5+1. And Iranian side I believe should be cooperative with the IAEA, for transparency, for confidence-building measures, in the framework of international rules and regulations — (but) not beyond. Therefore the two parties should take two steps simultaneously and together”. So far, he acknowledged, this proposal is not yet on the table”.

We also noted that “During the meeting at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, Dr. Mousavian got an earful of reproaches about Iran’s position, along with some suggestions intended to be helpful. The world’s problem with Iran’s nuclear program, said Dr. Patricia Lewis of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), addressing Dr. Mousavian in the discussion, “could be likened to a wife discovering that her husband had been less than honest with her about his time and activities, and that he has perhaps indeed been out with a number of different women. ‘It could all be perfectly innocent’ Dr. Lewis said, ‘But, believe me, Ambassador, it would take more than chocolates and flowers to make up to a wife who is feeling that way’.  Dr. Lewis said that Iran’s case highlighted some of the most difficult issues that must now be dealt with under the NPT: ‘the issue of intent, and the issue of peaceful purposes, and how do we ascertain purpose, and intent, in the international system’, she said. ‘This has really been the crux of the matter vis-a-vis Iran. It was indeed the crux of the matter vis-a-vis Iraq. And, indeed, because of the lack of faith in the intent and purposes that were discovered as a result of what happened in ‘91 — the discovery of a very near-nuclear-weapons fulfillment in that time — that led us up to war in 2003. And, make no mistake, we’re not at that stage now, perhaps, but we’re certainly at a very dangerous stage in this negotiation, and this discussion’, Dr. Lewis told the audience [in Geneva in March 2007]. Dr. Lewis said that ‘There is no smoking gun. There is no absolute evidence that Iran is on a path to have nuclear weapons. The problem with this is that Iran is now in a trust deficit’.

Dr. Mousavian replied, at that time [March 2007] in Geneva,  that Iran had only signed [but not ratified] an Additional Protocol, allowing more and more intrusive NPT inspections, in December 2003 — and was therefore not obliged to report these activities prior to that date.

Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, told a special session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg today, concerning the situation in Gaza, that “It will not be easy to find an agreed way to lift the blockade”…

Ashton continued: “It [lifting the blockade] needs the cooperation of both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The EU and many others have long called for an end to the blockade. But the political parameters have changed. The circumstances now are different.
First, we need to open the crossings so that humanitarian aid, commercial goods and civilians can enter and exit Gaza normally. This is in line with our well established position and Security Council resolutions. But most importantly, it was laid down in the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access agreed between Israel the Palestinian Authority in 2005. This agreement is the key framework.
Second, instead of a list of a very restricted number of products that are allowed in, there should be a short, agreed list of prohibited goods where Israel has legitimate security concerns. According to my own discussions, it seems we are moving in this direction on both crossings and goods.
Third, the EU has people and a mission in Rafah that could be reactivated [n.b. - actually, the people were based the Israeli coastal city of Ashkelon, Israel, and were driven around Gaza's perimeter to Rafah to work every day.] And we are ready to support in the opening of other land crossings for goods and people, recalibrating our Mission or developing a new one. There may also be a possibility of a more complex maritime option for a CSDP [EU Common Security and Defense Policy] mission. [n.b. - The dormant Rafah observation mission is one EU CSDP mission, and the EU COPPS police support mission now based in Ramallah is the second CSDP mission here...]”

Ashton continued: “We are working hard on all action tracks … We will send an exploratory mission shortly to see how we can best contribute to a solution that works for the people of Gaza while addressing the concerns of Israel. The wider issue here is that a lifting of the blockade should help to bring peace. Gaza is an integral part of the future Palestinian state. So we need to work on re-unifying the West Bank with Gaza in the same way that we must help the reconciliation of the Palestinian people. These are all essential ingredients for the two-state solution that remains our goal. It is positive that we have succeeded in preserving the Israel-Palestinian proximity talks and our Arab partners deserve credit for this. The Quartet should play an important role in engaging the parties and setting the direction for our collective efforts: to end Gaza’s dangerous isolation and to work for peace in the region”.

Ashton also said that “What happened on the seas outside Gaza was unacceptable. We said so immediately, loud and clear.
Nine people died in international waters under circumstances that demand an inquiry. This must be an inquiry that Israelis, Palestinians and above all the people of Turkey can believe in. Israel has announced the creation of an independent Commission with the participation of 2 senior international members as observers. This is a step forward. But the EU will follow closely the conduct and findings of the Commission before drawing further conclusions. The military attack on the flotilla has captured the world’s attention. The loss of life has been tragic. But we need to remind ourselves why the flotilla was heading for Gaza in the first place. That underlying cause is the terrible plight of Gaza, which is now back on peoples’ radar. I have seen it myself, three months ago, as the first politician allowed to enter into Gaza from Israel for more than a year. What I saw was shocking”…

One of Ashton’s predecessors in her new EU role, Chris Patten, wrote in the FT this week [as we reported earlier here] that “Sensible Europeans accept that the US, the precise terms of whose engagement have become increasingly unclear in the months since President Barack Obama’s pellucid Cairo address, has the lead role in trying to mobilise activity leading to a settlement. But that does not mean Europeans should fail to tell the US where they stand. Baroness Ashton, the new high representative for Europe’s common foreign and security policy, should encourage Washington to support the EU statement or make clear where there are differences of opinion. In particular, the importance of setting a time frame for progress should be underlined. Lady Ashton will presumably now be the EU’s sole representative in the ‘quartet’ (which used to have three EU members) – the organisation joining the US, UN, Russia and the EU in support of a peace process”.

Al-Maliki has been a frequent flyer in the past ten days — he’s back in Ramallah for two days from trips between UN headquarters in New York and France, then Syria, then back to New York, then Libya — since the diplomatic fiasco at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva when Palestinian support was withdrawn for an immediate discussion of the report submitted by the Fact-Finding Mission headed by South Africa’s Justice Richard Goldstone.

The Palestinian delegation in Geneva instead asked its supporters on the UN Human Rights Council to submit a motion calling for discussion of the Goldstone report in five months’ time, that is, in March 2010, and this resolution was adopted on Friday, 2 October.

It is still not clear how or even why this was done. The only explanation at the time, given in the media, was that there had been strong pressure from the United States.

On Sunday, 4 October, after an outburst of criticism from almost all segments of the Palestinian people, Abbas announced that he had appointed a commission of inquiry to look into what happened — then he travelled to Yemen.

This Sunday night, after his return from his own travels to Europe and elsewhere, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas added, in a rather late speech to his people, that the Palestinian delegation had worried that a resolution they had been working on, to support the Goldstone report and refer it to the UN General Assembly, might not get enough votes.

In his speech, Abbas confirmed that he has now authorized the Palestinian Ambassador in Geneva, Ibrahim Khreishi, to make a 180 degree turn and ask the UN Human Rights Commission to discuss the Goldstone report now, after all.

Al-Maliki said on Monday afternoon that the efforts will be running on two parallel tracks: He said that (1) the Palestinian Ambassador started this morning efforts to gather the 16 signatures necessary (from among the Human Rights Council’s 47 members) to — as a first step — convene a special session and at the very least discuss the Goldstone report. “He’s really trying his best”, Al-Maliki said (suggesting that it is not going easily). “It’s up to the members of the Human Rights Council to decide what to do, the Council has the full authority to decide the future steps”, Al-Maliki said, “but, yes, we’d like to see the recommendations of the report accepted and approved”. And, Al-Maliki said, (2) “I will leave early tomorrow morning for New York to attend the Security Council session on the 14th of October, Wednesday, which will be an open debate on the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question … Palestine and Israel will take part … and it will be up to UN member states to mention the Goldstone report in their statements. We are asking all UN Member States to take part”.

The Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister said that “we have also been talking to the President of the UN General Assembly to see if it can also meet to discuss the Goldstone report”. He noted that there are two possibilities for that: (a) to go directly to the General Assembly’s Third Committee, where an item on the human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territory is already on the agenda, under which the Goldstone report can be discussed. “If there is no problem”, Al-Maliki said, “then it can be passed to the UN General Assembly for discussion — but this could take time, and there could be procedural difficulties from certain countries”. Alternatively, Al-Maliki said, “we can, with the support of the non-aligned movement, the African group and others”, go directly to the re-convening of the General Assembly’s Tenth Special Session, which has been meeting on and off for many years to discuss the Question of Palestine. This Tenth Special Session is not closed, but merely suspended each time, because the Palestinian question is not yet resolved — and this makes it easier to reconvene. Without saying so explicitly, Al-Maliki seemed to be suggesting that this might offer an alternative solution, in case there are difficulties in getting 16 signatures among the 47 members of the Human Rights Council now. He said that “the UN General Assembly could meet and could ask the Human Rights Council to convene to discuss the Goldstone report in a certain period of time — we will see how things will go”.

Al-Maliki said: “We’re looking for the Goldstone report to be discussed, and to be given the space and time it needs, and to see how the UN General Assembly will discuss it. We are doing our best”.

He suggested that in the discussion, “We’ll try to look at the development of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a legal direction, and see if, after 60 years, there is a way to take an effective view at the situation and offer procedures”.

He noted that “the Goldstone report not only condemns Israel, but also Hamas, and it will be difficult for Palestinians to follow up if it condemns the Palestinian side”.

The Goldstone report, which was circulated to members of the UN Human Rights Council on 15 September, recommends that if either Israel or the Hamas authorities in Gaza have failed to launch independent investigations within six months’ time into the findings contained in the report, then the UN Security Council should consider referring the matter to the International Criminal Court in the Hague.

Al-Maliki said that he was summoned this morning by the Palestinian Investigative Committee on the Goldstone report, named by Abbas, “to answer questions and give my part of the story about how things evolved”. The Investigative Committee interviewed many officials today, Al-Maliki said, and “is taking its mission very seriously to understand the background, and how the decision was taken”. They will be working ’till late on Monday and in the coming days, he said.

He said that Hamas has been looking to use the Goldstone report to cover their refusal of the reconciliation efforts that Egypt has been painstakingly negotiating for months. “Last night we received the last version (of the reconciliation document) from Egypt”, Al-Maliki said. “We are ready to go to Egypt, and even to sign that document — it seems that Hamas will be the one absent … Hamas wants to exert full control in Gaza”, he added.

The Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister said that he had been present during the trilateral meeting convened by the U.S. President Barack Obama between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. And, in that meeting, according to Al-Maliki, “Netanyahu raised a question about the legitmacy of the Palestinian partner, and wondered if there were a Palestinian partner”.

Al-Maliki was not upbeat about the prospects for resuming negotiations. He said that the latest effort of U.S. Special Envoy George Mitchell, who was in the region this past weekend, “didn’t produce much, and there has been no change in the Israeli position”.

Israel’s YNet news reported this evening that in the opening of the winter session of the Israeli parliament (Knesset) today, Israel’s former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who now leads the opposition because her political party (Kadima) beat Netanyahu’s (Likud) by the narrowest of margins in Israeli elections last February, but she was not asked to form the new government, “accused Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of being responsible for the uproar created by the United Nations report into the Israeli operation in Gaza. She hinted that Israel was the one who revealed that the Palestinians had deferred a Human Rights Council vote on the report, because the prime minister ‘had to boast of his performance … You have caused Israel to be in the corner and lost more and more strongholds of support and understanding every day, but who’s counting? You have managed to beat the president of the United States, Israel’s greatest friend, or at least this is the impression you and your people tried to convey after the meeting. You have managed to humiliate the only partner for a peace settlement Israel has. In short: We have beaten America, humiliated the Palestinians, [and] isolated ourselves”. This story can be read in full here.

In response, Netanyahu said in the Knesset meeting that “We will not let Ehud Olmert, Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak, who sent our sons to war, reach the Hague International Criminal Court”. He reportedly said that Israel intended to block UN Human Rights Council consideration of the Goldstone report.

Meanwhile, an official in the Palestinian Ministry of Information confirmed that Palestinian Authority Economy Minister Basem Khoury, who had reportedly resigned because of the withdrawal of Palestinian support for the Human Rights Council’s consideration of the Goldstone report, had changed his mind. According to the official, Khoury sent an SMS to Prime Minister Salam Fayyad saying that he preferred to resign in the circumstances, but he was later told there would be an Investigative Committee and asked to withdraw his resignation — which he did. Despite his refusal to confirm this to media outlets including the Ma’an News Agency in Bethlehem, he reportedly did make the confirmation in a letter sent recently to the Deputy Minister of Information, the ministry official said. Khoury has recently been in Europe to work on re-convening the Human Rights Council — but it is not clear how, exactly, he was given this mandate, or by whom.

QUESTION: Can I ask about the Goldstone report? On Friday, the Palestinian Authority agreed in Geneva to go ahead and put – defer a vote for it to go to the Human – UN Human Rights Council. What role specifically did the United States play in pressuring the Palestinian Authority to make that decision?

MR. KELLY: Well, I don’t know if I would accept your characterization of pressuring. I think that we recognized that we had serious concerns with the recommendations and some of the allegations. We felt very strongly that while these investigations should be investigated and addressed, that we thought on the one hand that Israel had the kind of institutions that could address these allegations. And of course, we urged Israel to address these very serious allegations. But I think we had a broader concern that we didn’t want the report to distract us from our ultimate goal, which was to address the root causes of the tragic events of last January, and that’s the lack of a regional and lasting peace between the two parties – between the Israelis and the Palestinians. So we were concerned that we stay focused on that ultimate goal. And we are not saying that the allegations in the report – we’re not saying that they should be ignored. We simply do not want the report itself to become any kind of impediment to this ultimate goal. We appreciate the seriousness with which the Palestinians approach this very, very difficult issue, and we respect this decision to defer discussion of the report to a later date for the reasons that I just stated – that we want to make sure that we stay focused on the ultimate goal here.

QUESTION: You say you respect the Palestinians’ decision?

MR. KELLY: Yes.

QUESTION: Is that what was sort of discussed in the meeting between Abu Mazen and the U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem? That’s what’s being reported, that he strictly, specifically said that a message from Secretary Clinton is that he is to defer that report going to the UN Human Rights Council so that the Middle East peace process does not veer off track.

MR. KELLY: Well, in all honesty, I’m not aware of that meeting, and so I can’t comment on it. I’m not sure that we would comment on a meeting – on a confidential, diplomatic exchange between one of our diplomats and a representative of the Palestinian Authority. I’m just saying that we have been very frank about where we think the focus should be, and that should be on resolving this longstanding conflict.

QUESTION: Do you agree with Prime – with Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement that this report, if it had gone to the Human Rights Council, would have dealt a fatal blow to the peace process? Do you agree with that assertion?

MR. KELLY: Well, I – that’s an assertion by the – by Mr. Netanyahu. Our – as I say, our priorities were that this process goes forward so we’re able to address the underlying causes. We are focused on that, and that is the most – that is our priority right now in dealing with the issues related to the Middle East.
…
QUESTION: You’re saying that there was no U.S. pressure on the Palestinians? That is a bit disingenuous, I think … Did you not – did you not discuss with the Palestinians the fact that you didn’t think that it was a good idea for it to go – for them to go ahead with this resolution?

MR. KELLY: I think we have said it publicly that we do not want –

QUESTION: Did you tell the Palestinians that?

MR. KELLY: — to have impediments on –

QUESTION: Exactly. Did you tell the Palestinians that?

MR. KELLY: Well, we’ve said it publicly.

QUESTION: Did you tell –

MR. KELLY: I’m saying it right now.

QUESTION: Yeah, but did you tell the Palestinians that?

MR. KELLY: Well, I’m not going to get into the details of our diplomatic conversations.

QUESTION: Well, I mean, you’re talking – you’re saying it publicly right now that you didn’t – so it stands to reason that you told the Palestinians what you thought.

MR. KELLY: Not going to get into the details of a diplomatic conversation.

QUESTION: I don’t – I’m not aware of what my colleague asked about this meeting of the consul general and Abbas. But it’s my understanding this came up during the UN – at the UN with the Palestinians. Is that not correct?

MR. KELLY: Well, again, I’m not going to get into –

QUESTION: I mean in New York, not out in –

MR. KELLY: I think that this was something that was in the interests of all sides, and I don’t accept the characterization that we necessarily put pressure on anybody to – I think what we wanted to do was highlight that it was in the interests of all parties involved to set the sort of context that we’re looking for to start the negotiations.

QUESTION: Well, but leaving aside whether you pressured them or not, you did discuss it with them, didn’t you? I mean, you discussed it with the Israelis. It came up during the meeting with Secretary Clinton and the Secretary General –

MR. KELLY: Well, I’m certain we discussed it with them in Geneva as well. But I’m not going to get into the substance of the discussions.
…
QUESTION: Do you have anything on Senator Mitchell’s trip to the Middle East this week?

MR. KELLY: I don’t have anything to announce, but we will very soon. It’s going to happen this week, so I would imagine that today or tomorrow we’ll be able to announce something. But I have nothing right now.

QUESTION: So you’re waiting for him to actually leave tomorrow before you announce it?

MR. KELLY: I hope it’s before he leaves.

Five days ago, we reported here that a clearly nervous and less-experienced-with-the-media Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs in the State Department, Dr. Esther Brimmer, confirmed the U.S. diplomatic intervention in the Human Rights Council deliberations.

Dr. Brimmer told journalists that “We discussed with [Human Rights] council members – and in particular, we discussed with council members and the state of Israel, as well as the Palestinian Authority – how to approach the Goldstone report … We appreciate the decision to defer consideration of the Goldstone report, and we’ll continue to focus on working with Israel and the Palestinian Authority to re-launch permanent status negotiations as soon as possible. We also encourage domestic investigations of credible allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”

It seems that the Palestinian leadership clearly thought, last week, that it was in its interest to defer consideration of the Goldstone report until next March, 2010. According to reports in the Arabic-language media, this was also indicated by the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference Organization (OIC), Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, who was in Washington meeting U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton, just as the moves to put off the Goldstone report was made by representitives of the Islamic Conference group in Geneva (headed there by Pakistan’s representative to the UN Human Rights Council).

This embarrassing, but revealing, exchange between journalists and Assistant Secretary of State Dr. Esther Brimmer in Washington last Friday, 2 October seems to indicate that the OIC was not very perturbed by the change in strategy in accordance with the Palestinian leadership’s request in the UN Human Rights Council:

QUESTION: I’m sorry, can I go back to my – the last question I had on the – which was, did the Goldstone resolution come up in the meeting with the OIC Secretary General?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: I think all members were – all members and people watching the Human Rights Council were pleased to see that there was a constructive approach to the Human Rights Council, and I think all observers watching the events in Geneva were satisfied to see that.

QUESTION: Did you hear the question correctly?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: I did hear the question.

QUESTION: Did the subject of the Goldstone resolution – report and resolution come up in the meeting this morning between Secretary Clinton and the head of the – and the Secretary General of the OIC?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: I think both of them were happy to see the progress made in Geneva.

QUESTION: So that’s a yes?

QUESTION: So it –

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: My understanding is that they were both happy to see the progress made in Geneva, as were, I think, many observers who watched the situation in Geneva.

QUESTION: Well, okay. That’s fine. Was it discussed in the meeting?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: I think they looked at a whole range of issues where they said the cooperation between the United States and the OIC –

QUESTION: Well, I’m not saying that they didn’t look at anything else. I’m just asking if they – did they talk about the Goldstone report?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: My understanding was that they were satisfied to see what – the progress in Geneva. That was my understanding of the discussion.

QUESTION: Well, that’s fine, but did they talk about it?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: I can tell you what my understanding is of where the –

QUESTION: Well, I mean –

MR. CROWLEY: Let me help out a little bit. The Secretary General did bring it up during the meeting and did just underscore it was from the OIC standpoint, as well as from Secretary Clinton’s standpoint, a favorable step to take”.

At another point in the briefing, Dr. Brimmer said this — evading the question of U.S. “pressure”, and suggesting that everything occured according to a Palestinian decision:

QUESTION: On the Goldstone referral, how much pressure did the U.S. put on the Palestinians to defer this? And what do you hope to get from the deferral? Are you looking for Israel maybe to put a select number of people on trial? And it’s going to be six – a six-month delay. You expect – you really expect Hamas to do anything on their side in that six months?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: Well, I’d say we appreciate the seriousness with which the parties addressed this issue, and the way they addressed it, really, during the session of the Human Rights Council. We’ve always said that the issue should be discussed in a constructive and non-divisive manner, and we’re grateful that that’s the approach that was taken by the parties to the report at this point. And the parties will now continue to look at it and prepare for the next session in March.
…
QUESTION: Quickly I got one more on Goldstone. This has just occurred to me. And that is, it’s my understanding that the United States had actually prepared an alternate draft for the Palestinians if they would withdraw their original resolution. Is that correct? Did – if it is correct, did the Israelis tell you that that also would not be acceptable to them?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: We were prepared to, in case – first, in case the resolution – the Palestinian resolution came to the floor. We also did talk closely both to the Palestinians and to the Israelis about our main concerns of the report, what we would think a positive resolution – what it might look like. But clearly, it was the Palestinian resolution that was actually brought to the floor, so that’s what actually moved ahead”.

This briefing can be read in full here.

In other words, even if the strategy might not have been the Palestinian leadership’s own idea, they were at the very least happy with it.

The Palestinian Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Ibrahim Khraishi, indicated at the time that the Goldstone report would have allowed six months, anyway, for Israel (and Hamas) to launch their own independent investigations into the Fact-Finding Mission’s recommendations on the Gaza war. That, he said, will take us, more or less, to March 2010.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said, in similar words at the beginning of this week, that it’s not such a big deal to wait until March 2010. Be patient, he said, even after the storm had already broken out back in Ramallah.

Meanwhile, as the Jerusalem Post reported today, “the head of the special commission of inquiry that was formed by Abbas [on Sunday] to study the circumstances that led to his controversial decision said on Tuesday that he still hasn’t received an official notice from the PA regarding his mission. Hana Amireh, member of the PLO Executive Committee, said he would decide whether to accept the appointment after hearing from Abbas about the commission’s mandate“. This can be found here.

So, the investigative committee named by Abbas hasn’t even started to work

Today, nearly one week after news that the Palestinian Ambassador to the UN in Geneva had been instructed to withdraw support from the draft resolution in support of the Goldstone resolution that he had been pushing, it has just been reported that Yasser Abed Rabbo, who is Secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, said on Wednesday that “we have the courage to admit there was a mistake”. This was reported on Israel’s YNet news website here and in the Jerusalem Post today, here.

Is Abed Rabbo trying to set an example for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas? He is not, in any case, the first to say this.

Nasser Al-Qudwa, former Palestinian Foreign Minister when his uncle, Yasser Arafat, was alive has been saying since the weekend that this decision was a mistake — and that it should be rectified.

Haaretz reported that “The United Nations Security Council is scheduled to meet Wednesday [n.b. - in a closed-door session] to discuss Libya’s request for an emergency session on a report that accused Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas of committing war crimes during Israel’s offensive in Gaza … Libya holds two key positions in the UN which make it easier for the country to initiate a session on the report – it is a member of the Security Council, and one of its representatives is currently serving as the president of the General Assembly … If the Security Council session on the Goldstone report ends without a resolution or [with] an American veto, Libya could convene the General Assembly, whose vote cannot be vetoed. [n.b. - it's still not so easy. There needs to be a majority of members in the UNGA who will agree to this] … A senior Western diplomat told Haaretz that in principle, Libya could convene a General Assembly session on the Goldstone report, but that he thought that ‘Libya will hesitate to take such an initiative as long as the Palestinian Authority is not interested in such a UN session. Libya will appear ridiculous if the involved party doesn’t want a session, and it calls for one’.” The Haaretz report is here

YNet added that “The PA is expected to send Foreign Minister Riad al-Malki to the UN in order to support the Libyan request that the Security Council consider the report”.

Haaretz noted that “Another arena where the Goldstone report could come up for vote in the UN’s fourth committee, which deals with political issues and holds sessions within the framework of the General Assembly”. This is not so easy, either. There is an agenda agreed for the Fourth Committee when it started its work in September, and to propose an addition might be difficult and complicated. One argument against a move of this sort is that the Third Committee will — eventually — receive the report of the Goldstone commission as part of the annual report of the UN Human Rights Council through the UN’s Economic and Social Council, which will meet next summer…

Another Haaretz report stated that “If Israel does not soften its positions on the peace process, the Palestinian Authority will resume pushing to get the Goldstone report moved to the Security Council, and thence to the International Criminal Court, an associate of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas told Haaretz Tuesday”. It is extraordinary how out of touch these “advisers” and “senior associates” are — the Palestinians should know from long experience that they cannot just get what they want by snapping their fingers.

As this Haaretz story notes, “The PA initially proposed that the HRC pass the report onto the Security Council, which has the power to ask the International Criminal Court to open a criminal case, but then withdrew its motion under pressure from the United States, which feared that such a move would derail Washington’s drive to restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Abbas’ decision to comply with U.S. pressure and withdraw the motion sparked a storm of criticism against him from within the PA, as well as from Gaza and even Israeli Arabs, and since then, he has been busy with damage control. Abbas’ associate said that not only the U.S., but also Britain and China vehemently opposed the PA’s original motion. And since all three have veto power in the Security Council, referral to the Security Council would have accomplished nothing except to antagonize three major powers, he explained. Several Arab states also urged Abbas to withdraw the motion, after they too, came under pressure from Washington, he said“. What does this “senior associate” think will happen if the Palestinians try the same maneuver now?

Meanwhile, Israelis and Palestinians have been accusing each other of using this issue to deflect attention from what is going on in East Jerusalem, which is also very serious and dangerous.

Haaretz said in that report that “The growing criticism of Abbas’ decision is apparently what prompted him to publicly demand Tuesday that Arab states fight what he termed an Israeli takeover of Jerusalem, even though privately the PA is worried by the possibility of a conflagration in the city: It was an effort to divert attention from the Goldstone issue”. This Haaretz report is published here Palestinians say they suspect that Israeli officials are stoking tensions in East Jerusalem ias a tactic to distract attention and thus help avoid pressure from the American administration (!) for Israeli concessions.

The Goldstone report decision, however, has done something of another order of magnitude entirely: it has brought the political legitimacy of this Palestinian leadership into question. Aside from the usual Palestinian hesitation, driven by fragmentation, exhaustion, rivalries, and the need to calculate how this situation can evolve in such a way that might stop various and respective rivals from achieving their goals, there is also something much more going on here. It as if there is a collective holding of breath.

There is no evident legitimate replacement for the current leadership. And, everyone in Ramallah seems to be afraid that if the current leadership falls, there will be a free-for-all in the struggle to grab what is left, or what can be taken. Acquired privileges, rare and valuable in the midst of the vast torment of a people under a long-term belligerent military occupation, are at stake. It is like 1789. Think Mme. Desfarges…

For these reasons, every effort will be made within traditional Palestinian patterns of political and social concession to avoid the total collapse that can be seen in the abyss that has now opened up before everyone’s eyes.

The draft resolution would have called for support of the report submitted by South Africa’s Justice Richard Goldstone, who was appointed to head the Human Rights Council’s Fact-Finding Mission on last winter’s Gaza. The resolution would also have referral the Goldstone report to the UN General Assembly for action. Instead, another resolution was adopted to postpone consideration of the report’s findings.

The news was leaked by Israeli media on Thursday evening. On Friday afternoon in Geneva it become official: the Human Rights Council members agreed to “postpone” consideration of the report’s conclusions until next March, 2010.

Even though Friday is the normal Palestinian weekend day off, there was no effort to explain to the Palestinian people why their leadership “withdraw” backing for an immediate vote by the UN Human Rights Council.

Instead, there was confusion and disarray.

On Friday morning, Palestinian negotiator Sa’eb Erekat (newly elected member of the Fatah Central Council and of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Executive Committee) denied that the draft resolution would be withdrawn. There was some suggestion that the Arab and Islamic members of the Human Rights Council would go ahead and table the draft resolution, anyway. The Palestine Observer mission is not a member, after all, but only an observer. But, within minutes, “close aides” to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas contradicted Erekat, and announced that the Palestinians had indeed withdrawn support for the resolution.

The Agence France Presse (AFP) news agency confirmed that Arab and Islamic members did indeed line up in support of the alternative proposal. “Friday’s move followed a request by Pakistan, on behalf of Arab, African, Non Aligned and Muslim states that supported the report, to defer endorsement, according to documents filed with the Council”. This AFP report can be read in full here.

The only explanation came from media reports — it was a result of U.S. pressure.

Does that mean we will soon see the Quid Pro Quo — whatever it is that the Palestinians may stand to gain by this enormous and otherwise humiliating concession?

Or was it just a complete cave in?

(Or, maybe the Palestinian leadership factually read the Goldstone report, with its criticism of the human rights situation throughout the occupied Palestinian territory — and that might have made it easier for them to take this move.)

The Associated Press (AP) reported — without further details — that “Palestinian officials said the leadership in Ramallah was bitterly divided over the issue”,

AP added that Shawan Jabareen, the head of the Palestinian human rights group, Al Haq, said: “We did not expect that the Palestinian Authority itself would go against justice, and not uphold the universal application of international human rights law for its own people”. AP added that “Jabareen said human rights groups met earlier this week with the Palestinian prime minister, Salam Fayyad, and were assured by him that the Palestinians would continue to seek a war crimes investigation”. This AP report can be read in full here.

But, an earlier AP report noted that “A senior U.S. official, also speaking on condition of anonymity, said the Palestinian decision came after ‘intense diplomacy’ by Washington to convince the Palestinian leadership that going ahead with the resolution would harm the Middle East peace process. ‘The Palestinians recognized that this was not the best time to go forward with this’, the U.S. official said”. This AP report is posted here.

Netanyahu, who reportedly was considering establishing an independent investigation, returned to a harder line on Thursday, as it became clear that the pressure exerted on the Palestinian leadership had been successful. Netanyahu told the Israeli cabinet on Thursday that the draft resolution, if adopted, would deal a mortal blow to the peace process — which itself was suspended by the Palestinian leadership when Israel launched its 22-day military offensive against Gaza last winter.

The Palestinian leadership has not yet agreed to resume peace negotiations with Israel, but U.S. Special Envoy George Mitchell did hold separate meetings in Washington this week with Israel and Palestinian envoys to see if there would be a way to re-start peace talks. On 22 September, after repeated Palestinian indications that they would refuse to meet with the Israeli government unless it stopped its settlement activities, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas indicated he could not refuse an invitation from U.S. President Barack Obama for a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly’s annual high-level debate which went from a bilaterial to a trilateral format, involving Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu.

The Israeli military has dismissed many of the allegations made against its Gaza offensive, but it has reported that the military is conducting its own investigations into some particular — but so far unspecified — matters that occurred in the Gaza war.

The problem with that, according to human rights experts and to Justice Goldstone himself, is that there should be a completely independent investigation.

The only Palestinian official whose fingerprints were on this decision was the head of the Palestinian Observer Mission to the UN in Geneva, Ibrahim Khraishi.

Palstinian television ran an interview with Khraishi on Friday night in which he suggested that the five-month period until next March, added to the nearly three weeks since the Goldstone report was issued on 15 September, can be seen as the six-month period suggested in the Goldstone report to allow both Israel and the Hamas authorities in Gaza to carry out their own independent investigations into the report’s findings.

The New York Times reported that Khraishi said by telephone from Geneva:“We don’t want to create an obstacle for them”. (It is not clear from the text of the article what is the exact prior reference for “them” — American diplomats? Peace negotiations? Or the promised Israeli and Hamas investigations. ) This NYTimes report is published here.

Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri, in Gaza, told Ma’an News Agency that “This move is reflective of the conspiracy between the PA in Ramallah and the Israeli occupation”.

The Jerusalem Post’s correspondent specializing in Palestinian affairs, Khaled Abu Toameh, reported in an article published Friday that “Palestinian officials, including some of Mahmoud Abbas’s top aides, did not hide their disappointment when the war ended without the removal or collapse of Hamas. As soon as the war ended, the same Palestinian Authority that had urged Israel to ‘finish off the job’, and that had provided Israel with vital information about Hamas figures and installations in the
Gaza Strip, started accusing Israel of committing ‘war crimes’. The PA even appealed to The Hague court to launch an investigation into the alleged war crimes”. Khaled Abu Toameh’s article can be read in full here.

The Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister went to the Hague during the Israeli military operation last winter, and the Palestinian Authority Justice Minister made a fmore recent ollow-up visit to the Hague, asking the International Criminal Court to investigate allegations of war crimes during Operation Cast Lead.

Some Palestinians in Jerusalem on Friday were scornfully amused. Others were angry and depressed. “They are liars”, said one. “But nothing will happen, It’s not the first time they’ve done something like this”.

On Friday evening, Amnesty International issued a statement calling on “the UN Secretary-General to refer the report to the UN Security Council without delay”.

That, it can safely be predicted, will not happen.

Human Rights Watch issued a statement saying that “The decision at the UN Human Rights Council to defer a vote on the Goldstone Gaza report until March 2010 obliges the United States and other governments blocking action at the council to press Israel and Hamas to commence credible investigations … Given its responsibility for forcing a deferral of the vote and its criticism of the mission led by Justice Richard Goldstone, the United States bears a special responsibility to ensure that Israel commences investigations that are credible, impartial and meet international standards” … Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East Director of Human Rights Watch, said that “The United States won Israel a reprieve on the Goldstone report, so now it must ensure that Israel genuinely investigates allegations of abuse … If this doesn’t happen by March, then the US should endorse the Goldstone report’s call for international mechanisms of accountability.” She also said that “The failure of the US and European states to endorse the Goldstone report sent a terrible message that serious laws-of-war violations by allied states would be tolerated” .

And, a group of Palestinian human rights organizations, including Al-Haq, issued a joint statement on Friday afternoon saying that “Were the UN General Assembly to remain inactive in light of the Goldstone findings and recommendations it will be a clear message to Israel, as well as to other states, that even the most manifest and egregious violations of international law will be tolerated by the UN, suggesting therefore that international law has no meaningful role to play in the resolution of conflict … The General Assembly has a historic, moral, and legal obligation in ensuring that Israel abides by international law and a corresponding duty to safeguard Palestinian rights: it was General Assembly resolutions that recommended the partition of Mandate Palestine and admitted Israel to the UN”. The Palestinian human rights groups urged “(1) that the General Assembly recommends to member states of the UN, and to the Security Council, that the basis of any negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians must be grounded in international law, and (2) that UN member states adopt a principled and determined stance, using the powers granted to the General Assembly under Resolution 377 A (V): ‘Uniting for Peace’ to: (1) recommend that Israel be subjected to the full weight of collective measures until its occupation of the OPT is ended and the rights of the Palestinian people are achieved; and (2) ensure that the recommendations of the Goldstone Report are followed in full in order to ensure that there is full accountability for the crimes committed in Gaza”.

However, in the UN’s customary practice, the UN General Assembly only resorts to the “Uniting for Peace” resolution after the UN Security Council has failed to act due to the negative vote (or veto) cast by any one of the five Permanent Members (who include the U.S., UK, France, Russia and China).

In Washington on Friday, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Dr. Esther Brimmer, confirmed the U.S. diplomatic intervention in the Human Rights Council deliberations, telling journalists that “We discussed with [Human Rights] council members – and in particular, we discussed with council members and the state of Israel, as well as the Palestinian Authority – how to approach the Goldstone report. As you know, the United States has reviewed the Goldstone report carefully. We have serious concerns about the report’s unbalanced focus on Israel, its sweeping factual and legal conclusions, and many of its recommendations; however, the issues are difficult and the stakes are high, linked as they are to fundamental goals of security and peace for both Israel and the Palestinians. Israel’s right to self-defense and security must never be diminished. We must do everything in our power to end the suffering of innocent Israeli and Palestinian civilians. We appreciate the decision to defer consideration of the Goldstone report, and we’ll continue to focus on working with Israel and the Palestinian Authority to re-launch permanent status negotiations as soon as possible. We also encourage domestic investigations of credible allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”

In the briefing, there were these revealing exchanges with journalists:
QUESTION: On the Goldstone referral, how much pressure did the U.S. put on the Palestinians to defer this? And what do you hope to get from the deferral? Are you looking for Israel maybe to put a select number of people on trial? And it’s going to be six – a six-month delay. You expect – you really expect Hamas to do anything on their side in that six months?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: Well, I’d say we appreciate the seriousness with which the parties addressed this issue, and the way they addressed it, really, during the session of the Human Rights Council. We’ve always said that the issue should be discussed in a constructive and non-divisive manner, and we’re grateful that that’s the approach that was taken by the parties to the report at this point. And the parties will now continue to look at it and prepare for the next session in March.
…
QUESTION: Quickly I got one more on Goldstone. This has just occurred to me. And that is, it’s my understanding that the United States had actually prepared an alternate draft for the Palestinians if they would withdraw their original resolution. Is that correct? Did – if it is correct, did the Israelis tell you that that also would not be acceptable to them?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER: We were prepared to, in case – first, in case the resolution – the Palestinian resolution came to the floor. We also did talk closely both to the Palestinians and to the Israelis about our main concerns of the report, what we would think a positive resolution – what it might look like. But clearly, it was the Palestinian resolution that was actually brought to the floor, so that’s what actually moved ahead”.

Amr was shot in the summer of 2004 by unknown gunmen while standing on the balcony of his home in Ramallah, after remarks he made in a television interview in which he criticized then-leader Yasser Arafat. As a result, his leg had to be amputated during his emergency hospitalization in Jordan, and he subsequently was treated in Germany as well.

Amr, a former journalist, was a member of Fatah’s outgoing Revolutionary Council who ran for election to the Central Committee but lost.

So far, Amr has not given any explanation for his resignations from all his current posts.

He announced his reported resignation from Cairo, according to a report by Bathlehem-based Ma’an News Agency published here, and said he was returning to Ramallah, and would make his formal farwell from the Egyptian capital later.

Mohammad Dahlan, the former head of Fatah/Palestinian Preventive Security Forces in Gaza, who was successful in his campaign to win a seat on the Fatah Central Committee, has reportedly been in Cairo in recent days.

The Fatah General Conference endorsed a proposal by Palestinian President and Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas that all candidates who win elections to seats in either the Central Committee or the Revolutionary Council would have to resign from all other jobs. But the only resignation that has been announced so far is that of Tawfik Tirawi, now elected to the Central Committee, who reportedly resigned as an adviser to Abbas. It is not clear if Tirawi also resigned as head of the Palestinian training academy for security forces in Jericho.

Abbas — who is now head of the overarching Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the elected President of the Palestinian Authority as well as the newly-appointed leader of Fatah [by acclamation, in front of the television cameras suddenly called into the otherwise closed conference proceedings] now holds a concentration of political power similar to that held previously by the late Yasser Arafat.

He has just decided to call a meeting of the PLO’s 600+member Palestine National Council, or Parliament, just over a week from now. On the agenda, apparently, is a proposal to add six new members to the PLO’s Executive Committee, boosting the number of seats from 12 to 18 — one way to compensate some of those who lost in the Fatah elections.

And, Abbas still hasn’t played his other cards remaining after the elections at the Fatah 6th Conference — he can still name three members to the Central Committee, and a dozen or two members to the Revolutionary Council, subject to the approval of the Central Committee and the accord of the Revolutionary Council.

Meanwhile, Israeli retired Brigadier-General Shlomo Brom, a senior research fellow and head of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian relations at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, has just published what he entitled a “preliminary” analysis of the 6th Fatah Conference.  In his article, Brom wrote that “The very fact of the recent event is a victory for Fatah’s current leader, Mahmoud Abbas, who succeeded in holding the convention after many postponements and in the face of severe intra-organizational opposition, especially on the part of the old guard worried about losing positions of influence …Initial analyses indicate that the election results will strengthen the standings of Mahmoud Abbas as well as Muhammad Dahlan – despite the accusations about his role in the Gaza Strip’s fall into Hamas hands. The election results were hotly contested, and a recount was necessary.  . The absence of women among the voters and the lack of appropriate representation for the Gaza Strip were challenged, but Abbas promised to address these protests through his prerogative to appoint four additional members to the Central Committee … [Abbas' achievements over the last year] have been translated only partially into increased political support for Abbas and Fatah, because the political process was not successful and because Abbas was accused by his political rivals, at home and from without, of being a lackey for Israel and the United States and having abandoned Palestinian national objectives. At the same time, Hamas was said to continue to pursue Palestinian national goals, while proudly defying Israel and the United States. This state of affairs was reflected in a discussion during the convention on the resistance (muqawama), which naturally enough received extensive coverage in Israel. Fatah’s fundamental principles required renewal because they were written before the negotiations process that began in 1991. The convention repeated Mahmoud Abbas’ policy principles from recent years, centering on a commitment to the political path and the peace process alongside declarations that the Palestinians have the right to choose resistance in all its forms should the political process fail. However, even in this respect, Abbas expressed his preference for popular resistance of the kind involving demonstrations against the separation fence. Similarly, the convention stressed the traditional positions with regard to the agreement with Israel, i.e., a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital, and a solution to the refugee problem on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 194. The convention also emphasized its opposition to an interim solution of a Palestinian state with temporary borders.  In Palestinian eyes, there is no contradiction between these positions and the progress that has been made in negotiations over the years … At the same time, many in Israel saw these positions as representing a hard line and unwillingness to show the flexibility necessary for an agreement”.

Thanks to a link on the Angry Arab blogspot, I found an earlier analysis published by Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations in Beirut on the very eve of the Fatah 6th General Conference.  The analysis,written by Toufic Haddad, included his translation of “a large excerpt from an article published in the Pan-Arab daily, Al Sharq al Awsat, which comes out of London, written by Bilal al Hassan … brother of Hani al Hassan [n.b. -- and also of the late Khaled al-Hassan], a former close political adviser to Yasser Arafat, and a ranking member of Fateh. Bilal has been around long enough to understand the dynamics of Fateh, and he also has the contacts to be able to write with credibility on what is going on in the movement, as it prepares for its moment of truth with itself. His conclusions are not very optimistic I’m afraid. It seems that many of the ploys and power games used by Fateh throughout the years to manipulate and control other factions within the Palestinian national movement, have now been turned inward against Fateh, thereby setting the stage for the movements final demise. Here are excerpts from “The Moment for the Curtain to Fall on the Unity of Fateh Has Arrived” Bilal Al Hasan, Al Sharq al Awsat July 19, 2009 (Unofficial translation by Toufic Haddad):
“Observers of Fateh, and those familiar with its atmosphere, currents and issues, expect that nothing from here on in is going to be smooth or simple. Developments will also not be solely determined on the basis of ideas or logic. That is, the Fateh wing enthroned in Ramallah, owns the money through which it guarantees the salaries of tens – actually, hundreds – of members on its payrolls. It also owns the money that guarantees the paychecks of those heading into retirement, once they turn 60, or after 45 if they [the leadership] so desire. The paying of these salaries takes place by way of the budget of the Ministry of Finance in the Palestinian Authority, or from the budget of the Palestinian National Trust, which for years has had the political task of exiling the generation of resistance from Fateh and the like, into the world of retirement [a reference to a PLO practice of marginalizing former guerillas and nationalist figures (many from the early days of the Palestinian revolution) by forcibly retiring them and giving them a salary.]  It is then, a war of money, a war of hunger, which we might be witnessing in the coming months, which could result in the hunger of some who in turn seek an outlet for themselves. Or, it will result in the silencing of some, who refrain from declaring their opinion so as to secure their daily bread for their families. This is a pitiful state, in which the path of fighters, strugglers, cadre and their qualifications – those who worked for many years to create what is termed the history of ‘the Palestinian Revolution’ will end. Rather than giving them praise and thanks [for their sacrifices], they face the terror of silence, the terror of hunger, or the tragedy of life on the margins. But if Fateh splits, it won’t just split in two. There could be successive splits – one splitting off independently in an Arab country, another in Europe [etc.] so that we find ourselves before a series of Fateh splinters. Moreover these splits will not result in anything inevitable [such as the reform of the movement], but could bring about the gradual diminishing of the movements membership [overall], such that its [Fateh's] body, presence and influence atrophy day after day, until one day the only part of Fateh within them is a piece of its history.  These splits point to the end and failure of the Palestinian national project that was led by Fateh, by way of the PLO, and its declared political program. They also point to the end of the revolution and the failure of the revolution. The question here is what comes after the end of a revolution and its failure?“  This analysis, including the translation of Bilal al-Hassan’s article, can be read in full here

A Cypriot diplomat in the region said that “They signed and they said they were going to Port Said. With that destination, they were covered by international law all the way”.

Of course, the Free Gaza activists always said publicly that their destination was Gaza, and they were determined to go to Gaza.

This diplomat had earlier indicated, as we reportedhere, that “we cannot stop them, if they tell us they’re going to Crete, or someplace else, then change once they’re at sea and head toward Gaza”. But, he added, if they do so, they will lose their base of support in Cyprus.

This diplomat said, at the time, that there was no physical way the Cypriot authorities wouldl try to stop this Free Gaza expedition from leaving port, if they intend to do so. But it would be a violation of Cypriot law or regulations, he indicated, because there is no “port” at the Free Gaza expedition’s destination in Gaza.

(n.b. There is a little fishing port in Gaza City, but not a real seaport. The Agreement on Movement and Access [to Gaza] that former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had to become involved with negotiating — staying up all night on her birthday, 15 November 2005 — stated that “Construction of a seaport can commence. The GoI [Government of Israel] will undertake to assure donors that it will not interfere with operation of the port”. But, so far, espcially because of the sanctions imposed on Gaza, and now of course with the formal naval blockade, there has been no movement at all on the construction of a seaport in Gaza.)

Today, the Cypriot diplomat explained that “We told them they cannot use Cyprus as a base to establish a formal line to Gaza[to transport humanitarian goods to Gaza, and also not incidentally to move Gazans in and out] because there is no legal port there, no insurance will cover them, there is no law there, and they would in effect be operating as a sort of piracy, entering a pronounced military zone declared by somebody else”

The Cypriot diplomat said that Cyprus is not angry with the Free Gaza activists: “No, we are not angry. Why should we be? We can understand the humanitarian side of what they are trying to do. It is completely understood. On the other hand, you cannot play with the lives of people. You cannot let them go, knowing their lives are in danger. Officially, how could we let them go to Gaza?”

The Free Gaza activists that were towed in the Spirit of Humanity to Ashdod Port yesterday and taken into Israeli immigration custody have apparently still not been released.

Ynet reported yesterday that “Israel is planning to deport within the next few days the 21 peace activists who arrived on a boat from Cyprus with the intention of entering the Gaza Strip. An Israeli Navy unit boarded their boat and escorted it to Ashdod port. Immigration police will transport the detained activists to Ben Gurion Airport, and from there they will be deported out of the country … Eight immigration police arrived at Ashdod police and performed a search of the activists’ belongings. The detainees will then be transferred to the Immigration Administration in Holon. The police will take their fingerprints, and then send them to Ben Gurion Airport, where each one will face a hearing before the Interior Ministry before being deported”

YNet added that “Among the peace activists are two Israeli-American citizens, and 19 others, including five from Ireland, three from Britain, five from Bahrain, three Americans, and Danish, Jordan, and Yemenite citizens.”

Are the Israeli authorities going to deport the Israeli-Americans?

YNet added that Gerta Berlin, founder of Movement for the Freedom of Gaza, who was contacted in Larnaca, Cyprus, said that “The Israeli government does not understand that time is on our side. In the meantime, the administration is losing public support. It would be much smarter on their part if they would simply turn the other cheek and let us
through. The detainment of the boat only works in our favor in the long run”.

The Free Gaza movement’s latest Tweet says: “No word where passengers are. Only a few text messages”.

The Egyptian blogger, Zenobia, is one of those following this case on her site — covering the Egyptian angle in particular. One of her recent posts is here. Zenobia writes that Egyptian officials, at least, suspect that Warren was trying to recruit his victims as agents.

Zenobia has a particularly interesting post, here.

In this post, she embds a Youtube video (also viewable here of an ABC television news report on this case:

An affadavit sworn by a U.S. Department of State diplomatic security officer to obtain a court order for a search warrant, described the extraordinary and sensational charges — that while on duty in Algiers, Warren offered and prepared in his home alcholic drinks to two women of Algerian origin, and he then raped them. This affadavit is posted online here.

In this affadavit, which was posted on the ABC news website, Victim One (Vi) said that she was invited to a party by U.S. Embassay employees at Warren’s home. She stated that Warren mixed for her, out of her sight, several drinks of cola and whisky. Toward the end of the evening, after the last drink that Warren prepared, “she suddenly felt nauseated and felt an immediate need to vomit. and violent onset of nausea as nothing like the physiological effects of alcohol that she had experienced while consuming alcohol on previous occasions. V1 physically held her hand over her mouth in order to avoid vomiting on the floor of the residence. V1 ran to a bathroom where she vomited into a toilet. While V1 was vomiting, Witness #1 (“W1”), a female, was trying to assist V1 in the bathroom. V1 remembered Warren standing in the bathroom doorway while she was sick, saying that V1 should stay the night at his house. After this memory, V1 could not remember anything that happened the rest of the evening. W1 stated that all of the other individuals at the party left the house around this time, and that only V1, W1 and Warren stayed the night in the residence” … and so on.

Victim Two (V2) had known Warren in Egypt, then visited him in Algiers in February 2008 after he was transferred there. She testified that Warren invited him to his new home (which, according to the affadavit, is “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”), and prepared apple martinis for both of them, then a second drink for her, and that “While drinking the second apple martini, V2 suddenly felt faint and felt the immediate needed to vomit. V2 described the sudden and violent onset of the illness as nothing like the physiological effects of alcohol related sickness that she had experienced when she consumed alcohol on previous occasions. V2 stated she immediately began to pass in and out of consciousness. V2’s recollections of the ensuing events are characterized as passing in and out of consciousness, due to the debilitating effects of the illness. After nearly fainting and experiencing the immediate need to vomit, V2’s next recollection was being located in Warren’s upstairs bathroom, on the floor. V2 could see and hear, but she could not move” … and so on,

The affadavit adds that “V2 told her husband and her psychologist about the
incident on February 17, 2008, but did not inform anyone at the United States Embassy
until she next returned to Algeria in September 2008. On October 9, 2008, Warren flew from Algeria to the United States, for a meeting scheduled on October 10, 2008. On October 9, 2008, Warren checked into Hilton Washington Hotel, Room 7212, located at 1919 Connecticut Ave., NW, Washington, DC. This hotel is located in the District of Columbia. On October 10, 2008, I met with Warren at his place of employment in Northern Virginia to inform him of the allegations leveled against him by V1 and V2. During this meeting, Warren agreed to cooperate with the investigation. Warren admitted during this meeting that he had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with V1 and V2 at his residence in Algiers, Algeria. Warren informed me that his personal lap top computer was in his hotel room located at the Washington Hilton Hotel and that photographs of V1 and V2 were probably on his personal lap top computer. Following this meeting, Warren voluntarily surrendered his cell phone and digital camera, which were located in his rental car, to me for forensic analysis. That analysis uncovered multiple photographs of V1 and V2, along with various other women. He declined consent to the seizure or search of his personal computer”.

The diplomatic security agent added, in the report, that “Through the toxicology expert, I learned that drugs which are commonly used to facilitate sexual assault are prescribed sleeping medications, muscle relaxants, anxiety pills, Xanax, and Valium, which are then converted from pill form to powdered form … These drugs are rapidly absorbed and metabolized by the body. Detectable levels remain in the urine for 8 to 12 hours and in the blood for 4 to 8 hours. Symptoms of these drugs appear within 15 to 30 minutes of ingestion, and the effects persist for 3 to 6 hours … [and that] information on how to obtain and use the above-described substances to facilitate sexual assaults can be found on the Internet”.

The diplomatic security agent then adds, in his affadavit in support of a search warrent, that “Searching computer systems requires the use of precise, scientific procedures
which are designed to maintain the integrity of the evidence and to recover
‘hidden’, erased, compressed, encrypted or password-protected data. Computer
hardware and storage devices may contain ‘booby traps’ that destroy or alter data
if certain procedures are not scrupulously followed. Since computer data is
particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction, a
controlled environment, such as a law enforcement laboratory, is essential to
conducting a complete and accurate analysis of the equipment and storage devices
from which the data will be extracted … Computer users can attempt to conceal data within computer equipment and storage devices through a number of methods, including the use of innocuous or misleading filenames and extensions. For example, files with the extension ‘.jpg’ often are image files; however, a user can easily change the extension to ‘.txt’ to conceal the image and make it appear that the file contains text. Computer userscan also attempt to conceal data by using encryption, which means that a password or device, such as a ‘dongle’ or ‘keycard’, is necessary to decrypt the data into readable form. In addition, computer users can conceal data within
another seemingly unrelated and innocuous file in a process called ’steganography’. For example, by using steganography a computer user can conceal text in an image file which cannot be viewed when the image file is opened. Therefore, a substantial amount of time is necessary to extract and sort through data that is concealed or encrypted to determine whether it is evidence,contraband or instrumentalities of a crime”.

Newsweek, the Los Angeles Times, and the International Herald Tribune are among the media which have covered these accusations.

Newsweek reported at the end of January that “Andrew Warren is a 6-foot-4 African-American schooled in the martial arts. Steeped in Middle Eastern history, he is a convert to Islam who speaks six Arabic dialects … Though the CIA won’t confirm it, numerous U.S. government officials acknowledged to NEWSWEEK the revelation, first reported by ABC News correspondent Brian Ross, that Warren was serving in Algiers as CIA station chief … Speaking anonymously in order to be candid, one of Warren’s former instructors at the ‘Farm’, where spies are trained, told NEWSWEEK that Warren was ‘a loose cannon’ whose confidence ‘bordered on narcissism’.” This article can be read in full here.

Six months after the charges were formulated (and many months after the alleged events). this 41-year-old ex-CIA agent was indicted just hours ago on 30 June in Washington DC for sexual assault, as reported by the Washington Post, here

After the indictment, the Washington Post adds, Warren “was released on personal recognizance after a brief appearance yesterday in the District’s federal court. The sexual-abuse charge carries a maximum sentence of life in prison”.

On top of all the unanswered questions in this case, there are these: Is it normal to indict someone six months after the accusations are formalized? Is it normal to release someone “on personal recognizance” who is facing life in prison?