The SC meeting, and agreement on the resolution, is a very major diplomatic achievement for Obama.

The resolution says that the main aim is, eventually, “a world without nuclear weapons”, which would be a total reversal of the doctrine of Mutually-Assured Destruction that is believed to have kept the Cold War from developing into a hot war.

Resolution 1887 also “Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms”. Israel is one of the countries most affected by this clause — as are also India and Pakistan (and apparently also now North Korea). These are countries which were regarded as “threshhold” countries when the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was adopted in 1967, but which have since reportedly become nuclear weapons states (though Israel maintains its policy of “nuclear ambiguity”). The only states recognized as nuclear powers by the NPT are the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council — pure coincidence, if you believe some of these council members …

Most of these former-threshhold states are not likely to be happy at the prospect that they can only join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapons states.

In any case, it was a rare UN Security Council summit, with 14 of the 15 UN Security Council members represented by their Heads of State and/or Government — and only Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi was absent (though he addressed the UN General Assembly in New York earlier this week, and Libya is currently one of the non-permanent members of the UNSC).

Instead, this SC meeting was addressed by Libya’s UN ambassador, Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgam, who told the meeting that Israel’s nuclear sites should be subject to international oversight, or “Otherwise, all the states of the Middle East will say, `We have a right to develop nuclear weapons. Why Israel alone?’ “. Israel has not ratified the NPT, and thus cannot be accused of having violated its provisions. John Bolton, when he was in charge of disarmament matters for the American State Department, said when pressed by a journalist once in Geneva that the U.S. does believe Israel should join the NPT — but eventually, in the far distant future. Another American official later added that this would have to be as a “non-nuclear-weapon State”. This does not, apparently, mean that the former “threshhold” states would have to eliminate their arsenals, but rather that they would not be allowed to assume the title (or perquisites) of nuclear weapons powers.

As remote as they may seem, major documents such as this often become the basis and the justification for major future international policy moves.
The Associated Press counted, and reported that the resolution contains 2,300 words.

It is a document full of nuance.

It was promoted by the U.S., and adopted in a UNSC meeting chaired by the President of the U.S., which calls for all states to “sign and ratify” the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), “thereby bringing the treaty into force at an early date”. The CTBT was, in fact, promoted by the U.S., and which then-U.S. President Bill Clinton did sign in 1996 (after the text of the treaty was finally agreed in international negotiations in which the U.S. actively participate) did not even try to take to the U.S. Congress for approval in 1999, because Republican opposition to curbs they said would be imposed on U.S. sovereignty so clearly indicated that the move would have been defeated.

This resolution also calls for the negotiation of a treaty limiting the production of fissile material — this has been the chief U.S. goal in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament for years, but it has been held up because the U.S. has not agreed to deal with China’s main concern, which is the prevention of an arms-race in outer-space. The Conference on Disarmament works on consensus, and China’s position has been backed by Russia. Other countries have also objected to other aspects of this proposal, including the fact that the proposed new Fissile Ban treaty would only limit future production of the fissile material needed to make nuclear explosions — meaning that the big and powerful countries would be able to keep the large stockpiles they already have of fissile material, while all others would be left as “have-nots” (just as with nuclear weapons themselves, which is the basis of the objections to the NPT from some countries, including those former “threshhold” countries who have since become self-declared nuclear weapons states, as India did in 1998. This self-definition has now officially been shot down in this new UNSC resolution adopted today).

The UN press release providing coverage of the meeting stated that: “Unanimously adopting resolution 1887 (2009) in its first comprehensive action on nuclear issues since the mid-1990s, Council members emphasized that the body had a primary responsibility to address nuclear threats, and that all situations of non-compliance with nuclear treaties should be brought to its attention … The meeting began at 9:30 a.m. and ended at 11:30 a.m”. All of this, within two hours.

The UN press release also reported that “the Security Council had before it a concept paper conveyed in a letter dated 15 September 2009 (document S/2009/463) from the President of the Security Council [this month, it's the U.S] and addressed to the Secretary-General [which said that] the Security Council will focus broadly on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and not on any specific countries, with the goals of underscoring the global reach of proliferation threats; the broadly shared obligation to respond; the positive steps taken to reduce nuclear dangers; and the Council’s essential role in addressing growing and pressing nuclear threats … According to the paper, the summit is intended as an opportunity to build support for fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol; ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and strategic arms control, including new negotiations over the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START)”.

While the U.S. said that the focus would be broad rather than on any specific countries, the individual statements made by world leaders in the UN SC meeting Thursday did name names — especially Iran and North Korea …

A group of countries including Western Europeans and the U.S. are due to meet again on 1 October with an Iranian delegation in Geneva, Switzerland for “Geneva Talks Two”, a continuation of a day-long meeting held in Geneva in July 2008.

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The statements made by major world leaders are, at least in this summary form, rather obtuse and unrevealing, but the presence and participation of the speakers shows the importance of this meeting,and the significance of this resolution.

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“1. Emphasizes that a situation of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

“2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty,

“3. Notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

“4. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms;

“5. Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavour;

“6. Calls upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament;

“7. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force at an early date;

“8. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, welcomes the Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009, and requests all Member States to cooperate in guiding the Conference to an early commencement of substantive work;

“9. Recalls the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and affirms that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

“10. Expresses particular concern at the current major challenges to the non?proliferation regime that the Security Council has acted upon, demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, and reaffirms its call upon them to find an early negotiated solution to these issues;

“11. Encourages efforts to ensure development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries seeking to maintain or develop their capacities in this field in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

“12. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the inalienable right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II, and recalls in this context Article III of the NPT and Article II of the IAEA Statute;

“13. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

“14. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

“15. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

b. Calls upon all States to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

“16. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

“17. Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while noting ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirms that a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

“18. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, non-compliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

“19. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has signed and ratified an additional protocol based on the model additional protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

“20. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

“21. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;

“22. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

“23. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;

“24. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

“25. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

“26. Calls upon all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and calls upon those States in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

“27. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing and shipments, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

“28. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

29. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

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The UN press summary reported that “In his own opening remarks, President Obama said today’s resolution represented agreement on a broad framework of action to end the complex dangers posed by nuclear weapons in the post-cold-war world. To that end, he pledged that the United States would host a Summit in early 2010 and pursue deeper cuts in its nuclear arsenal, as well as agreements with the Russian Federation towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. He said the resolution also emphasized the Council’s authority to respond to violations of its resolutions, including those on Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea … BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States, recalled that the Council and the United Nations had been established at the dawn of the nuclear age, pointing out, however, that while a nuclear nightmare had been averted during the cold war, today the threat of proliferation was growing in scope and complexity. Just one explosion of a nuclear weapon could kill hundreds of thousands of people. He said the resolution just adopted had brought agreement on a broad framework for action, which acknowledged that all nations had a right to peaceful energy, and those with nuclear weapons had a responsibility to move towards nuclear disarmament. To that end, the United States would host a summit in April 2010. The resolution would strengthen institutions and initiatives aimed at battling trafficking in proliferation-sensitive materials. It also called for safeguards to prevent the conversion of peaceful nuclear energy programmes into weapons programmes. The Council had the authority to respond to violations of its resolutions, including on Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, he said, emphasizing: ‘The world must stand together and demonstrate that international law is not an empty promise’. The coming 12 months would be critical to implementation of today’s resolution. Meanwhile, the United States would pursue an agreement with the Russian Federation, as well as ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It would also make deeper cuts in its nuclear arsenal. ‘We harbour no illusions about the difficulty of bringing about a world without nuclear weapons’, he said … Quoting the words of President Ronald Reagan, he said a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. ‘We must never stop until we see the day that nuclear arms are banished from the face of the earth. That is our task’.”

The UN press summary also reported that “DMITRY A. MEDVEDEV, President of the Russian Federation, said it was obvious to everyone that issues of security were indivisible and global, and that only on the basis of the principles of equal security, mutual respect and compliance with the norms of international law could present-day threats be fought … He said his country and the United States had carried out unprecedented reductions of strategic nuclear arsenals within the framework of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START). The Russian Federation had tabled proposals during negotiations with the United States on a new treaty to replace START. ‘Our main shared goal is to untie the problem ‘knots’ in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament’. That could not be done overnight, as the level of distrust among nations remained too high. Because one of the most dangerous threats was that of nuclear components falling into the hands of terrorists, the existing “back-up system” needed to be modernized. Underscoring the importance of paying serious attention to peaceful nuclear energy, he said new nuclear power programmes were a key to resolving many of the problems afflicting developing countries and an incentive for the economic growth of entire regions. However, States that carried out such programmes must abide strictly by non-proliferation agreements. Priorities in that area of international cooperation included strengthening the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime, in particular the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The system of IAEA safeguards must be universalized, and there was also a need to stimulate the earliest ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the countries that would ensure its entry into force, he said. The non-proliferation measures of resolution 1540 (2004) must be used more actively. An effective solution to many of the aforementioned problems depended on an interested and constructive engagement by all parties. The strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the intensification of the nuclear disarmament process required, most of all, strategic stability and ensuring security for each and every State”.
…
“HU JINTAO, President of China, said the threat of nuclear war must be eliminated and, for that to happen, global balance and stability must be maintained. Proliferation should be stopped and the nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals should reduce those arsenals, after which the countries with smaller arsenals should also begin to reduce their stocks. In order to maintain the peace, there was a need to renounce the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the threat to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States. Work should then commence on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. He said the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be actively promoted, and IAEA strengthened with that purpose in mind. All countries should strictly observe international agreements on nuclear materials and work together to keep them out of the hands of terrorists. China had always supported the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It only held them for defence, having pledge no first use and no use against non-nuclear-weapon States. China would continue to play its role in upholding international non-proliferation and disarmament regimes”.
…
“GORDON BROWN, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, said that by adopting today’s resolution, nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States were making a commitment to ridding the world of the danger of nuclear weapons. The global bargain underlying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty –- based on the obligations of both categories – must be strengthened through a renewed commitment to ensuring compliance and seeking solutions to technical and policy problems.
The world could not stand by when Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea breached international agreements, he stressed. Far tougher sanctions must be considered, and the onus of proof must be on those who breached the relevant agreements. The United Kingdom welcomed efforts to prevent nuclear weapons and materials to fall into the hands of terrorists. It had already taken major steps towards nuclear disarmament, reducing its nuclear-strike capability by 75 per cent. Retaining only the absolute minimum needed for national security, Britain would also reduce its nuclear submarine fleet as a way to further disarmament goals“.

“NICOLAS SARKOZY, President of France, said that while ‘we are here to secure peace’ and say yes to reductions, two countries, ‘right in front of us’, were doing exactly the opposite. What Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were doing undermined the very rules upon which collective security was based. In violation of five Security Council resolutions, Iran had been pursuing nuclear proliferation activities since 2005, he said. It was amassing centrifuges and enriched uranium, while threatening to wipe a United Nations Member State off the map. ‘There comes a moment when stubborn facts will compel us to take a decision’, he said. ‘Let us not accept violations of international rules. We may all be threatened one day by a neighbour endowing itself with nuclear weapons’, he warned. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had acted in defiance of all Council decisions since 1993 and continued to test ballistic missiles. ‘Here again there will come a moment one has to agree and take sanctions’, he said, stressing that Council decisions must be followed by results. Access to nuclear energy for peaceful uses and the transfer of technology by developed countries would obviate the arguments of those who claimed that they needed nuclear energy but converted their nuclear programmes into weapons programmes. Given the courage to impose sanctions against those violating Council resolutions, efforts towards a world without nuclear weapons would gain credibility. Those who needed civil nuclear energy must be guaranteed sustainable access to technologies and fuel, and the entire international community must be assured that nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation would be respected”.

“YUKIO HATOYAMA, Prime Minister of Japan, said his country had a special moral responsibility as the only one ever to suffer atomic bombings. Describing a wrenching visit to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he encouraged all world leaders to experience on their own the cruelty of nuclear weapons by speaking to survivors. Having chosen not to possess nuclear weapons, Japan had signed onto the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to try to prevent the vicious cycle of a nuclear arms race. He renewed his country’s commitment to the three non-nuclear principles no matter what steps neighbouring countries took. Calling upon nuclear-weapons States to reduce their arsenals and foster a climate for disarmament by ensuring transparency, he urged the pursuit of nuclear-weapons-free zones, the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the immediate start of negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty. Japan would engage in active diplomacy to lead international efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The nuclear development programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in particular, posed a grave threat to the peace and security of Japan and the world as a whole, and must not be tolerated. There was also cause for concern about Iran in that regard and there was a need to strengthen the Council’s ability to meet those challenges”.
…
“MOHAMED ELBARADEI, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said the global nuclear non-proliferation regime was fragile and had many shortcomings. The Agency’s legal authority was severely limited in some countries because many States had not concluded the required agreements with it. Thus, in more than 90 States, it either had no verification authority at all, or its authority was inadequate and it could not verify whether a country was engaged in clandestine nuclear activities. Moreover, the verification mandate centred on nuclear material. If IAEA was expected to pursue possible weaponization activities, it must be given the corresponding legal authority, he emphasized. A growing number of States had mastered uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing and any one of them could develop nuclear weapons quickly if they decided to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, he warned. To address that, a shift was needed from national to multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle. He said he had proposed the establishment of a low enriched uranium bank that would ensure that States had a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for their reactors and did not need to process their own. Complementary proposals had subsequently been made, but the main goal should be the full multi-nationalization of the fuel cycle towards nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, efforts to secure vulnerable material must be intensified to prevent extremists from getting hold of nuclear and radioactive material. He went on to emphasize that the Agency itself must be strengthened. Given its dilapidated infrastructure and lack of state-of-the-art technology, which was key to modern-day verification, it would be unable to fulfil its mission at current funding levels. To provide the agency with the kind of supportive political process it needed, the Council needed to develop a comprehensive compliance mechanism to address consistently and systematically cases of non-compliance with or withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including giving the Agency additional authority to act in specific cases as needed. More emphasis should also be placed on addressing the insecurities behind many proliferation cases, including endemic conflicts, security imbalances and lack of trust, he said. By demonstrating their commitment to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States would give legitimacy to the non-proliferation regime and gain moral authority in their calls to curb the proliferation of those inhumane weapons”.

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This UN press release, with its summaries of public statements made, and the full text of the new UNSC Resolution 1887 (including all the preambular paragraphs), can be read in full here.

Apparently, there is only “little risk” to the international space station — not no risk, just a little one.

Remember the fuss about space debris when China deliberately shot down one of its “weather” satellites (apparently to try to focus attention on China’s belief that it is urgent to negotiate a new disarmament treaty? [See our earlier posts here, and here.]

AP reported that “Russian Mission Control chief Vladimir Solovyov said Tuesday’s smashup of a derelict Russian military satellite and a working U.S. Iridium commercial satellite occurred in the busiest part of near-Earth space — some 500 miles (800 kilometers) above Earth. ’800 kilometers is a very popular orbit which is used by Earth-tracking and communications satellites’, Solovyov told reporters Friday. ‘The clouds of debris pose a serious danger to them’. Solovyov said debris from the collision could stay in orbit for up to 10,000 years and even tiny fragments threaten spacecraft because both travel at such a high orbiting speed.
“James Oberg, a NASA veteran who is now space consultant, described the crash over northern Siberia as ‘catastrophic event’. NASA said it was the first-ever high-speed impact between two intact spacecraft — with the Iridium craft weighing 1,235 pounds (560 kilograms) and the Russian craft nearly a ton. At physical contact at orbital speeds, a hypersonic shock wave bursts outwards through the structures’, Oberg said in e-mailed comments. ‘It literally shreds the material into confetti and detonates any fuels’.
“Most fragments are concentrated near the collision course, but Maj.-Gen. Alexander Yakushin, chief of staff of the Russian military’s Space Forces, said some debris was thrown into other orbits, ranging from 300 to 800 miles (500-1,300 kilometers) above Earth.
“David Wright at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security said the collision had possibly generated tens of thousands of particles larger than 1 centimeter (half an inch), any of which could significantly damage or even destroy a satellite. Wright, in a posting on the group’s Web site, said the two large debris clouds from Tuesday’s crash will spread over time, forming a shell around Earth. He likened the debris to ‘a shotgun blast that threatens other satellites in the region’
…
“In January 2007, China destroyed one of its own defunct satellites with a ballistic missile at an altitude close to that of Tuesday’s collision, creating thousands of pieces of debris which threatened other spacecraft.
“Both NASA and Russia’s Roscosmos agencies said there was little risk to the international space station, which orbits 230 miles (370 kilometers) above Earth, far below the collision point”…

This report can be read in full here.

The vote in the 47-member Human Rights Council was 33 countries in favor, with one NO vote (Canada), and 13 abstentions (European countries, Japan, and South Korea).

Russia, China, Latin American and members of the Organization of Islamic Conference countries supported the resolution.

This Reuters report was published in Haaretz here .

Correspondent Gideon Levy wrote today in Haaretz that “When the cannons eventually fall silent, the time for questions and investigations will be upon us. The mushroom clouds of smoke and dust will dissipate in the pitch-black sky; the fervor, desensitization and en masse jump on the bandwagon will be forever forgotten and perhaps we will view a clear picture of Gaza in all its grimness. Then we will see the scope of the killing and destruction, the crammed cemeteries and overflowing hospitals, the thousands of wounded and physically disabled, the destroyed houses that remain after this war. The questions that will beg to be asked, as cautiously as possible, are who is guilty and who is responsible … The public, moral and judicial test will be applied to the three Israeli statesmen who sent the Israel Defense Forces to war against a helpless population, one that did not even have a place to take refuge, in maybe the only war in history against a strip of land enclosed by a fence. Ehud Olmert, Ehud Barak and Tzipi Livni will stand at the forefront of the guilty”. This article can be read in full here.

There are already IDF solidiers who have refused to enter the Gaza Strip to take part in Operation Cast Lead, in protest of the killing of Palestinian civilians, according to another report n Haaretz. “On Monday it emerged that [one] soldier has been jailed for 14 days in a military facility. He was the first soldier to be tried for refusing orders since the beginning of the operation. Attorney Michael Sfard, the legal adviser of Omets – a non profit organization for judicial and social justice – said that since the beginning of the Israeli offensive on December 27, eight reservists have sought his advice upon being drafted in the emergency reserves call-up…” This report can be read in Haaretz here.

And, in a letter published in The Sunday Times of London, a group of international law professors — including the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, Richard Falk, who was recently barred from entry into Israel and then deported from Ben Gurion airport — wrote that “ISRAEL has sought to justify its military attacks on Gaza by stating that it amounts to an act of ‘self-defence’ as recognised by Article 51, United Nations Charter. We categorically reject this contention. The rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as they are, do not, in terms of scale and effect amount to an armed attack entitling Israel to rely on self-defence. Under international law self-defence is an act of last resort and is subject to the customary rules of proportionality and necessity … For 18 months Israel had imposed an unlawful blockade on the coastal strip that brought Gazan society to the brink of collapse. In the three years after Israel’s redeployment from Gaza, 11 Israelis were killed by rocket fire … Throughout this time the Gaza Strip remained occupied territory under international law because Israel maintained effective control over it … As things stand, its invasion and bombardment of Gaza amounts to collective punishment of Gaza’s 1.5m inhabitants contrary to international humanitarian and human rights law. In addition, the blockade of humanitarian relief, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, and preventing access to basic necessities such as food and fuel, are prima facie war crimes … Israel has a right to take reasonable and proportionate means to protect its civilian population from such attacks. However, the manner and scale of its operations in Gaza amount to an act of aggression and is contrary to international law, notwithstanding the rocket attacks by Hamas”. This letter was published here .

The AP reported that “The Pentagon said Monday it has a ‘high degree of confidence’ that the missile fired at a dead U.S. spy satellite in space destroyed the satellite’s fuel tank as planned. In its most definitive statement yet on the outcome of last Wednesday’s shootdown over the Pacific, the Pentagon said that based on debris analysis it is clear that the Navy missile destroyed the fuel tank, ‘reducing, if not eliminating, the risk to people on Earth from the hazardous chemical’. The tank had 1,000 pounds of hydrazine, a toxic substance that U.S. government officials believed posed a potential health hazard to humans if the satellite had descended to Earth on its own. The presence of the hydrazine was cited by U.S. officials as the main reason to shoot down the satellite — described as the size of a school bus — which would otherwise have fallen out of orbit on its own in early March … ‘By all accounts this was a successful mission’, Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in the Pentagon statement Monday. ‘From the debris analysis, we have a high degree of confidence the satellite’s fuel tank was destroyed and the hydrazine has been dissipated’. The Pentagon statement said a space operations center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., is tracking fewer than 3,000 pieces of satellite debris, all smaller than a football”. This AP report is published here.

There has still been no reaction from Russia.

Did Taiwan receive one of the 192 letters that the Kosovar leadership sent out yesterday asking for recognition?

(And if not, why did Taiwan feel obliged to make this announcment?)

The AP said that “China’s Foreign Ministry criticized Taiwan for welcoming Kosovo’s independence, saying the island’s government did not meet the criteria for recognizing other countries. ‘It is known to all that Taiwan, as a part of China, has no right and qualification at all to make the so-called recognition’, Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said in a statement posted on the ministry’s Web site. China has good ties with Serbia and expressed ‘deep concern’ over Kosovo’s independence declaration. For Beijing, the announcement conjures up one of its greatest fears: that Taiwan could some day make a similar declaration, something China says it would meet with military force”…

This AP report is posted This here.

The U.S. has refused, so far.

Russia has continued supporting China, to the amazement of many diplomats (particularly European), and Russia and China are pursuing their efforts to open discussions on the situation in space.

The two countries apparently fear that the “Star Wars” idea first launched by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan is somehow still behind both the U.S. efforts to deploy an international “Missile Defense Shield”, and the American refusal to discuss this in a disarmament forum.

As condemnation of China’s actions last year coalesced around outrage at the creation of space debris and pollution, China confirmed to Geneva’s Conference on Disarmament that it had indeed conducted an anti-satellite test in outer space, and said that a ground-based medium-range missile was used to destroy an ageing Chinese weather satellite. At the time Germany’s Arms Control and Disarmament deputy commissioner Ambassador Rudiger Ludeking, speaking on behalf of the European Union, told the Conference on Disarmament that the EU “is very concerned about the recent test of an anti-satellite weapon. Such a test is inconsistent with international efforts to avert an arms race in outer space.”

One of the amazing things about last year’s Chinese “test” is that was the first time that a ground-based missile was successfully launched to destroy an orbiting satellite, as Asia Times reported at the time.

Now, in a scenario that could be as much a retort to the Chinese “test” last year as the basis for a thrilling disaster movie, U.S. President George W. Bush has apparently given the order to try to shoot down a faltering U.S. satellite that will fall to earth in the coming weeks. The intention, U.S. officials say, is to help avoid a serious accident. But, it also appears that the U.S. cannot resist the chance to try to meet — if not beat — what the Chinese accomplished by their “test” last year

CNN has just reported that “The U.S. military may try within days to shoot down a failed satellite using a missile launched from a Navy ship, officials announced Thursday. Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at the Pentagon that the window to accomplish the mission could begin in three to four days, and remain open for seven to eight. While much space trash and debris have safely crashed to Earth after burning up in the atmosphere on re-entry, authorities said what makes this 5,000-pound satellite different is the approximately 1,000 pounds of frozen toxic hydrazine propellant it carries. Without any intervention, officials believe the satellite would come down on its own in early March. If it came down in one piece, nearly half the spacecraft would survive re-entry and the hydrazine — heated to a gas — could spread a toxic cloud roughly the size of two football fields, Cartwright said. Hydrazine is similar to chlorine or ammonia in that it affects the lungs and breathing tissue, the general said. The option of striking the satellite with a missile launched from an Aegis cruiser was decided upon by President Bush after consultation with several government and military officials and aerospace experts, said Deputy National Security Adviser James Jeffrey. ‘After further review of this option and, in particular, consideration of the question of saving or reducing injury to human life, the president, on the recommendation of his national and homeland teams, directed the Department of Defense to carry out the intercept’, Jeffrey said. The goal is to hit the satellite just before it enters Earth’s atmosphere and blast it apart so that the hydrazine tank explodes. The smaller debris would be more likely to burn up in the atmosphere. NASA Administrator Michael Griffin said there’s nothing the military can do to make the outcome worse. ‘If we miss, nothing changes. If we shoot and barely touch it, the satellite is just barely in orbit’ and would still burn up somewhat in the atmosphere, Griffin said. ‘If we shoot and get a direct hit, that’s a clean kill and we’re in good shape’, he added. Experts said that with three-quarters of Earth covered in water, there’s a 25 percent chance the satellite’s remnants will hit land — and a 1 percent chance they will hit a populated area…” This CNN story is posted here.

Another really interesting part about all this is that CNN reported earlier that “A U.S. official confirmed that the spy satellite is designated by the military as US 193. It was launched in December 2006 but almost immediately lost power and cannot be controlled. It carried a sophisticated and secret imaging sensor but the satellite’s central computer failed shortly after launch. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because the information is classified as secret … The satellite includes some small engines that contain a toxic chemical called hydrazine — which is rocket fuel. But Renuart said they are not large booster engines with substantial amounts of fuel. Video images of the satellite captured by John Locker, a British amateur satellite watcher, show it to be about 13 feet to 16.5 feet across. He believes it weighs a maximum of 10,000 pounds. Locker calculated its size with data on its altitude and location provided by other amateur satellite watchers, using the International Space Station as a yardstick. Satellite watchers — a worldwide network of hobbyists who track satellites for fun — have been plotting the satellite’s degradation for a year. They estimate it is now at an altitude of about 173 miles, and Locker believes it is dropping about 1,640 feet a day. Where it lands will be difficult to predict until the satellite falls to about 59 miles above the Earth and enters the atmosphere. It will then begin to burn up, with flares visible from the ground, said Ted Molczan, a Canadian satellite tracker. From that point on, he said, it will take about 30 minutes to fall”. This CNN story is posted here.

So, this satellite — an advanced spy satellite with a “sophisticated and secret imaging sensor” — was launched just weeks before the Chinese “test”. Hmmm, could there have been any link between these events?

The U.S. is taking a risk — but greatly increasing the entertainment value — by announcing its plans in advance. What if the U.S. fails (where China succeeded)??? And, even if the U.S. does manage the “kill”, what about all the space debris for which China was so roundly berated?

AP is reporting that “The military will have to choose a time and a location that will avoid to the greatest degree any damage to other satellites in the sky. Also, there is the possibility that large pieces could remain, and either stay in orbit where they can collide with other satellites or possibly fall to Earth … [O]fficials familiar with the situation say about half of the 5,000-pound spacecraft is expected to survive its blazing descent through the atmosphere and will scatter debris — some of it potentially hazardous — over several hundred miles. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.” This headline AP story is posted here.

For comparison purposes, the earlier CNN report says that “In January 2007, China used a land-based missile to destroy a 2,200-pound satellite that was orbiting 528 miles above Earth. But the impact left more than 150,000 pieces of debris floating above Earth, NASA estimates. The space agency characterizes nearly 2,600 pieces as ‘large’, meaning greater than 4 inches across, which pose a potential threat to satellites and spacecraft. China is responsible for 42 percent of all satellite debris in orbit as of January 1, most of it from that Fengyun-C meteorological satellite. NASA has called it the worst satellite breakup in history”. This CNN story is posted here.

Reading this CD Report, however, one gets the distinct impression that what is being viewed as progress is a mobbing situation, where constant attempts are made to isolate and blame China for causing the difficulties in the CD.

China has insisted that it can only agree to start work on negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which the U.S. wants, if China’s top priority, which is the Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), is also given some attention.

China has been given critical support by Russia — though Western European diplomats have been watching with relish and malicious glee for any possible weakening in Russia’s position (though this has not happened so far).

ReachingCriticalWill’s Report says that “The annual CD report reflects the progress of the 2007 session towards consensus on a program of work by chronicling the development of the ‘Presidential Proposal’, beginning with the Presidential Draft Decision (L.1) put forth by Sweden in the first session, followed by the introduction of a clarifying Complementary Presidential Statement and the Draft Decision of the Conference in the second session, which linked the three documents in a concise package. The report does not go into detail about the substantive thematic informal discussions, but rather lists documents produced in relation to these discussions, including the Coordinator’s reports. In his statement, Ambassador Kahn of Pakistan raised the question of why a fissile materials treaty was dealt with under agenda item 2, prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, instead of agenda item 1, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The report answered this question (paragraph 41) by ‘recognizing that the issues of the prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices is pertinent to agenda item 1, this topic was discussed under agenda item 2, for practical reasons’ … In contrast, last year’s report included minimal description of the process of work on the agenda items. It listed a timetable for discussion of substantive issues, based on the P6 joint proposal, which experts from capitals participated in. In September 2006, when the CD was discussing the annual report, the Netherlands suggested the report be used as a vehicle to endorse the timetable for substantive discussions that could be built upon in 2007. However, the final report did not include any conclusions or recommendations, except to request that the incoming Presidents conduct consultations during the intersessional period and to make recommendations based on all relevant proposals, views, and discussions (paragraph 25). The 2007 annual report does note the situation that developed in the CD when certain Member States continued to block consensus on the Proposal while the majority of the Conference was ready to move forward … Looking ahead to continuing the progress made in the CD this year, many delegations took the floor to express their frustration and hopes for achieving a consensus on the L.1 package. It will remain a focal point of the work of the 2008 session. Other delegations highlighted the continuation of work on a Fissile Materials Treaty (FMT) and Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in next year’s session”.

Hill told journalists that “We are working very hard to get the teams identified. China, for example, just gave a name of a nuclear scientist who will be coming. We are putting together
our list of people. And so they will assemble in Pyongyang. The purpose is to do a survey of the
sites that need to be disabled pursuant to our agreement. And so they will visit Yongbyon in particular, because “as we already know, even without a declaration , we know that Yongbyon has three of the main sites. That is, the fuel fabrication facilitation, the 5-megawatt
reactor, and the reprocessing facility.  And so the idea is for these nuclear experts to look at these three facilities and “ working with the DPRK experts to figure out how they can be disabled and how to do that disablement before December 31st …

Hill continued: “We have a lot of work to do to get ready for Tuesday. People have to get their gear together. We believe the U.S. group — which will consist of a few experts from, for example, from the Department of Energy, but also the Department of State; I think we also have someone from the National Security Council staff — the plan is for our team to arrive in Pyongyang the night of the 11th and rendezvous with experts from Russia and China. Then, probably starting on the 12th, they will go and visit probably the Yongbyong facility — because everybody knows that’s what needs to be done.

…

QUESTION: Do you think those people will visit sites other than at Yongbyon?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I don’t know. I don’t want to get into the specific sites. But I know they will be visiting Yongbyon.

QUESTION: Are they going to actually enter the facilities?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again, they will have to work this out, because there will be a lot of DPRK, a lot of North Korean experts there as well. So we’ll have to work that out. This plan has not been choreographed every step of the way, so I am sure they will encounter issues there. But we’ll try to deal with them … We have to see what the results are of the visit. Our hope is that they can agree on some disabling measures that, first of all, meet the definition of disabling – which is to make it very difficult to bring a facility back on line. Right now, the facilities are shut down, but in theory one could bring them back up online. The idea of disabling is to make it difficult tobring things back online. So we hope that, within that definition of disabling, we can agree on some measures with the North Koreans that mean we will be able to meet our deadline of December 31st.

QUESTION: Is that more for the disablement, rather than declaration?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: This is more for the disablement. Now I don’t think this will be the last team either. But this is a start of the disablement process. And the reason I know they are going to Yongbyon is that the facilities in Yongbyon don’t need to await a declaration in order for technicians to begin looking at the technical task of how to disable them.

QUESTION: Are they not going to look for uranium facilities?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: This delegation is probably not going to be looking at uranium facilities at this time. But, as we have made very clear, when we get to a declaration — and we need a declaration that can be done in time to have all the nuclear facilities disabled by the 31st … I’ve talked in the past about how we’ve talked about documents and agreeing on pieces of paper. Now we have people actually getting on the ground and looking at real facilities and figuring out how things can be done in a real way. But, you know, this is a long process. We’re not at the end. We’re not even at the beginning of the end. So we’ve got a ways to go. And so I’m just going to keep my adrenaline in check for the time being.
…
QUESTION: Is this something that North Korean voluntarily came up with, or is it something that was a response to U.S. requests?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: … It was their suggestion, and it was an outgrowth of the denuclearization working group that took place in Shenyang — during which there was a discussion of how do you disable. And one of the questions is, how do you define disablement? And then how do you disable in a way that meets that definition, but also the time frame — because I think we’ve lost a lot of time in our process over the spring. And so we want disablement, the disablement phase, to be done by December 31st. So rather than talk about ideas on a piece of paper, the North Koreans suggested that some nuclear experts come and have a look and let’s figure out what we can get done according to our definition and get it done by December 31st.

QUESTION: Japan and Korea I think also have nuclear experts. What is the reason –

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, this has to do with nuclear weapons ultimately.  At the end of the day, we’re talking about facilities that have been used for military purposes.  And I think we have to realize that Yongbyon was a facility that was used to reprocess spent fuel into plutonium for military purposes, and for that reason we have the three nuclear weapons states. In the future, I don’t know what kind of experts would be involved. But, at this stage, having the three nuclear weapons states seemed appropriate. I want to stress that the results of this expert-level visit, the results will be forwarded, will be reported to the Six-Party meeting, which is under the chairmanship of the Chinese. So we will go from there.

…

QUESTION: Does this mean the North Koreans are ready to disable and declare all nuclear programs by the end of this year? Are they really going to do that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, they said they will.

QUESTION: By the end of this year?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes.

QUESTION: They said in public? In public, I don’t think they said –

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: They’e said they will.

QUESTION: And if they disable by the end of this year, are you ready to delist them from the state sponsors list?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, well, we have some very specific understandings about that, but I’m not ready to talk about that publicly.

See U.S. State Department site for full transcript.

And one thing that we agreed on is that the DPRK will provide a full declaration of all of their nuclear programs and will disable their nuclear programs by the end of this year, 2007.

I think this is very important. Of course, we will have to work out some of the details of this in the Six-Party process. As I’ve stressed many times, this is not a bilateral process at all. It’s a multilateral Six-Party process. But we had a very good understanding of this today and an understanding that we need pick up the pace and get through this phase in 2007.

Our hope, of course, in getting through this phase in 2007 is to get on to other events in 2008 such that we can finish this job in the calendar year 2008 and complete the implementation of the September ’05 statement. It’s, of course, going to require continued, a great deal of effort on everyone’s part. We’re especially appreciative to the Chinese, who continue to be in the chair and a key factor in the Six-Party process. Indeed, I look forward to briefing China and the other delegations on our talks today …

[W]hat we’re in this for is not just declarations or disabling of facilities. We’re in this for denuclearization.  We want to complete the task, to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula …

[W]hat we’re looking forward to as well as we get into calendar year ’08 – thanks to the expectation that we can complete this disabling in calendar year ’07 – is we can get on with beginning this Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism. The Russian Federation has done a lot of work on that as the Chairman of that particular working group …

QUESTION: Did North Korea admit that they have an HEU [highly enriched uranium] program?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We had, I think, a very good discussion about this issue, and we will continue to have good discussions such that I believe we can address this issue in connection with the declaration…”