It’s hard to tell without more references, but it looks as though the line drawn as Israel’s “Northern Maritime Border” does not go straight out from the coast at a 90 degree perpendicular to the coast — instead, the line shown here seems to go north…

A report by the German News Agency DPA published in Haaretz reports that “Lebanese Foreign Minister Adnan Mansor, in a letter sent Monday to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, rejected Israeli claims of the northern part of the waters between the two countries. ‘The Israeli claim infringes on Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic (sea) Zone’, a zone that gives a country the right to explore its maritime resources. ‘This is a clear violation of Lebanon’s rights… over an area of some 860 square kilometers, and puts international peace and security at risk’, it said”. This is published here.

As Haaretz reports, “Over the past two years, Israel has discovered two fields thought to contain about 24 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. The discoveries could be enough to make Israel energy self-sufficient for decades”, while “Norway-based Petroleum Geo-Services this year announced it had explored Lebanese waters which contained “valuable information” on potential offshore gas reserves”. Meanwhile, Lebanon and Israel have not ended the state of war that has existed since 1948, and do not speak directly to each other, or have diplomatic relations.

So, they have each asserted their claims in the media — and now at the UN [through the Secretary-General and his special representative...]

What I found interesting was the exchange about legality.

Hostage wrote on July 20, 2011 at 7:26 am:
…
The official commentary on Article 59 of the Geneva Conventions describes many of the customary prohibitions that Israel is deliberately violating regarding supplies of essential items and relief consignments to a civilian population. The convention provides that free passage of relief consignments is mandatory:
“The principle of free passage, as set forth in this clause, means that relief consignments for the population of an occupied territory must be allowed to pass through the blockade; they cannot under any circumstances be declared war contraband or be seized as such by those enforcing the blockade. The obligation to authorize the free passage of relief consignments is accompanied by the obligation to guarantee their protection. It will not be enough merely to lift the blockade and refrain from attacking or confiscating the goods. More than that will be required: all the States concerned must respect the consignments and protect them when they are exposed to danger through military operations“.

The official commentary also stipulates that the safeguards for verification and supervision,
“which were prescribed in the interests of the Powers granting free passage, must in no case be misused in order to make the rule [i.e. free passage] itself inoperative or unduly delay the forwarding of relief“.
…
France and Turkey were the parties to the landmark S.S. Lotus case in which the PCIJ ruled that “the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.” The US abstained from the vote on UN SC 1860. I doubt that Bibi is eager to take on a permanent member of the Security Council in an international court over the the legality of Israel’s blockade or which state owns Gaza’s territorial waters

Fredblogs wrote on July 21, 2011 at 4:31 pm:
… Just because it is legal to fight and capture an enemy soldier, does not mean you can prosecute him (unless he has committed war crimes). POWs aren’t prosecuted, they are locked up until traded back or until hostilities have ended.
In the case of blockades, you can only make them POWs if they have committed certain specified acts. For passengers, that is that they personally committed acts of hostility against the captor (San Remo 166a). That would be the passengers who actually fight. For crew it is that and also those who commit a list of other acts, including breaching a blockade (San Remo 166c) if they are “breaching a blockade, and after prior warning they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop, or intentionally and clearly resist visit, search or capture;” (San Remo 67a). I don’t know whether “breaching a blockade” includes heading toward the blockaded port, passing into the declared enforcement area of the blockade, or just entering the specific waters of the blockaded place…

Hostage wrote on July 21, 2011 at 8:09 pm:
It really isn’t the end of the matter since neither the U.N. HRC, nor the ICRC has the authority to “declare” a blockade illegal.
They most certainly do have the power. There are no international courts with compulsory jurisdiction, so states have always entrusted treaty bodies with the authority to make determinations and report violations of international law. In a number of cases the ICJ has advised that other UN organs can make legal determinations within their area of competence. The UN HRC has a mandate from the General Assembly “to address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations”. See General Assembly Resolution 60/251, 15 March 2006 entitled “Human Rights Council” and the “Report of the international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships carrying humanitarian assistance, A/HRC/15/21, 22 September 2010. UN HRC also operates human rights treaty bodies for the Contracting State Parties. Israel is bound by the terms of its acceptance of those agreements to act on the decisions of the treaty body panels of experts.
The ICRC has been formally entrusted with the role of guardian of international humanitarian law. It also published the official explanation of the San Remo Manual article 102 which explained that any blockade may become illegal and stipulated some of the possible conditions … Judge Schwebel noted that when the General Assembly adopted the consensus Definition of Aggression it was concluding more than fifty years of sporadic discussions among the members of the international community of states on that subject. The definition included military occupations and blockades as specific examples of constituent acts of the crime of aggression. Shortly after the attack on the first flotilla, the ICC review conference voted to incorporate that definition into the Rome Statute. So, the notion that there is an authoritative international convention that grants any state permission to unilaterally employ a blockade over the objections of the ICRC, UNHRC, UNRWA, & etc. is utter nonsense. Every time an Israeli official travels abroad, he or she is at risk of being arrested for crimes against humanity in connection with the blockade.

Fredblogs wrote on July 22, 2011 at 6:40 pm:
Which might actually matter, if Israel were a signatory to the 1st additional protocol. Which it isn’t. So it doesn’t matter.
Wait, even if Israel were a signatory, it’s not offers of “relief consignments” that would be the hostile act, it would be fighting the soldiers. Even in the section you cite goes against you: Parties (e.g., blockaders) “a) shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted;”
Which is lifted, almost word for word from San Remo paragraph 103(a):
“the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted; and”
Remember, if you are going to allow blockades at all (ever), which International law does, then you aren’t going to require that any blockader just take someone’s word that they aren’t smuggling weapons or other contraband. It would make the whole blockade pointless if anyone could just waltz across with a smile and a “I’m a humanitarian ship”.

Hostage wrote on July 22, 2011 at 10:05 pm:
Which might actually matter, if Israel were a signatory to the 1st additional protocol. Which it isn’t. So it doesn’t matter.
Even the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that the customary rules in Additional Protocol 1 are part of Israeli law. HCJ 769/02 (11 December 2005) The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, at ¶ 20 says:
In addition, the laws of armed conflict are entrenched in 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, hereinafter The First Protocol. Israel is not party to that protocol, and it was not enacted in domestic Israeli legislation. Of course, the customary provisions of The First Protocol are part of Israeli law.
So, once again:
*The San Remo Manual explanation; the GCIV Article 59 and 1st Add. Article 70 commentary on the rule of free passage stipulate that Israel’s right of supervision can not be used to make the rule of free passage through the blockade to the coast of the blockaded belligerent inoperative and that offers of relief can not be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts.
*ICRC Customary Rule 55. “Access for Humanitarian Relief to Civilians in Need” says:
The Fourth Geneva Convention requires States to “allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores” intended only for civilians and “the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases”.[1] Additional Protocol I broadens this obligation to cover “rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel”.[2] This broadening is generally accepted, including by States not, or not at the time, party to Additional Protocol I.[3]
.
Many military manuals contain the obligation to allow and facilitate access of humanitarian relief to civilians in need.[4] The obligation to allow and facilitate access of humanitarian relief to civilians in need is also supported by official statements and reported practice.[5] The United Nations, in particular, has on many occasions called for respect for the rule. The UN Security Council, for example, has called for unimpeded access for humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq and in all areas affected by the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[6]
.
It is also relevant that under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, extermination, defined as including “the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia, the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population”, constitutes a crime against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.[12] The legislation of numerous States provides for the crime of extermination.[13]
*Customary IHL Rule 103. Collective Punishments says
The prohibition of collective punishments is stated in the Hague Regulations and the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.[2] The prohibition is recognized in Additional Protocols I and II as a fundamental guarantee for all civilians and persons hors de combat.[3]
*The overwhelming majority of UN Security Council members say that Israel is in violation of resolution 1860 which called for unimpeded access for humanitarian aid. link to un.org
even if Israel were a signatory, it’s not offers of “relief consignments” that would be the hostile act, it would be fighting the soldiers.
You’ve never cited a permissive rule that allows the enforcement of a blockade outside the published coordinates. Israel acted prematurely and used excessive force when it attacked a neutral foreign-flagged aid ship in international waters. The passengers and crew had an individual right of self-defense against the illegal use of force by the IDF.
Even in the section you cite goes against you: Parties (e.g., blockaders) “a) shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted;”
Israel has refused to prescribe any arrangements whatsoever under which free or unimpeded passage of vessels to the coasts of Gaza is permitted. So, you are failing to even address the rule of free passage through the blockade: “the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted”

Hostage wrote on July 22, 2011 at 11:30 pm:
BTW, thanks for the link to the ICRC “official” explanation. Which is actually the Red Cross’s explanatory commentary, and doesn’t claim to be a legally binding “official” explanation.
The commentaries are published by the ICRC Legal Commission for the benefit of government officials and legal practitioners responsible for applying the conventions and protocols. Unlike the San Remo “explanation”, they are legal opinions, not merely discussions about legal principles. They’re based on the “travaux preparatoires” of the Convention which are preserved in the Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 & protocols et. seq. They’re are frequently cited in accordance with Article 38 of the ICJ Statute which provides that the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations are a subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.
It makes exactly the point I made in other posts. 102a isn’t violated and 102b is based on military necessity and amount of damage done to the civilians.
The ICRC doesn’t interpret Article 50(1) and 50(2) of the 1st Additional Protocol in that way at all. For example, you can’t starve 10% of the children of an occupied territory on the basis of “military necessity”. In fact, the ICJ advised that Article 51 of the UN Charter doesn’t apply to belligerent occupation regimes at all. It already ruled that Israel’s regime in the territories was violating the right of Palestinians to adequate supplies of food, water, and a decent standard of living.
There is a jus in bello right of visit, but there is no jus in bello right to blockade an occupied territory. There is no state practice to support the notion that the jus ad bellum right of self-defense permits preventive interdiction of arms flows on the high seas. See Craig M. Scott, Israel’s seizure of the Gaza?bound flotilla: applicable laws and legality, Peer Zumbansen, John W. Cioffi, Lisa Philipps, Nassim Nasser (eds), Osgoode Hall Law School, Research Paper No. 42/2010, Electronic copy available at: link to ssrn.com

James wrote on July 20, 2011 at 1:19 am:
“Israel has declared a blockade on Gaza and justified previous fatal attacks on neutral civilian vessels on the High Seas in terms of enforcing that embargo, under the legal cover given by the San Remo Manual of International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.”
“There are however fundamental flaws in this line of argument. It falls completely on one fact alone. San Remo only applies to blockade in times of armed conflict. Israel is not currently engaged in an armed conflict, and presumably does not wish to be. San Remo does not confer any right to impose a permanent blockade outwith times of armed conflict, and in fact specifically excludes as illegal a general blockade on an entire population.”
“It should not be denied that Israel suffers from sporadic terrorist attacks emanating from Gaza.
However this does not come close to reaching the bar of armed conflict that would trigger the right to impose a limited naval blockade in terms of San Remo. To make a comparison, in the 1970?s and 1980?s the United Kingdom suffered continued terrorist attack from the Irish Republican Army, with much more murderous impact causing many more deaths than anything Israel has suffered in recent years from Gaza. However nobody would seek to argue that the UK would have had the right to mount a general naval blockade of the Republic of Ireland in the 1970?s and 1980?s, even though the Republic was undoubtedly the base for much IRA supply and operations. Justifications of Israeli naval action against neutral civilian ships by San Remo is based on special pleading and an impossibly strained definition of the term “armed conflict”.
link to canpalnet-ottawa.org

Hostage wrote on July 21, 2011 at 3:39 am:
Which means that the laws governing such conflicts apply; and under these laws, sea blockades are allowed.
When jurists come together they also agree that fact-finding missions performed by officials “on mission” for the relevant treaty monitoring bodies have a legal mandate to report violations of international conventions within their areas of competence. If the ICRC and the UN HRC say that a particular blockade has become illegal, that’s really the end of the matter. As usual, the US and Israel have hand-picked an ad hoc inquiry commission to offer rebuttal and conceal that fact, while muddying the waters. There is nothing new about that.

Fredblogs wrote on July 21, 2011 at 4:40 pm:
It really isn’t the end of the matter since neither the U.N. HRC, nor the ICRC has the authority to “declare” a blockade illegal. If by “declare” you mean “issue a legally binding determination”. They have the authority to _say_ that they think it’s illegal, but so do you. Just like I have the authority to _say_ that I think it is legal, but not the authority to “declare” it legal.
Whether it is actually legal boils down to whether “the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade”. (San Remo 102b).
Israel thinks it isn’t, the Palestinians think it is, and there is no objective body to decide which is true.

This is an excerpt from the exchange of comments on a Mondoweiss post published here.

Netanyahu did specifically mention Egypt in the announcement on Friday, saying: “Most of our [natural gas] supply today is coming from Egypt”, Netanyahu said. But, he added immediately, “It’s important for us to develop additional resources”.

The exact situation on the ground, resulting from the Egyptian-Israeli natural gas deal, is rather unclear.

The announcement – as CNN’s Jerusalem correspondent Kevin Flowers pointed out in a Tweet on Friday afternoon – came on the eve of the first meeting of the Middle East Quartet principles of 2011 on Saturday (February 5) in Germany, on the margins of the Munich Security Conference.

The Quartet meeting will be chaired by Catherine Ashton, European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, and will be attended by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the Quartet Envoy Tony Blair.

In a statement released by the EU on Friday, Ashton said: “This meeting comes at a crucial time when we are witnessing significant events in the Middle East region. It is therefore extremely important that we stay the course in the Middle East Peace Process. We must remain focused on making progress on a negotiated peace agreement between Israel and Palestine — a key component in bringing about peace and stability in the wider region.”

In his announcement in Jerusalem on Friday, Netanyahu didn’t utter a word about Gaza (nor did he mention Hamas, who now control the Gaza Strip) – he mentioned only the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Netanyahu said: “It’s important for us to develop additional resources but it’s also important for the Palestinians. There’s a Palestinian Authority gas field adjacent to an Israeli gas field. We need to develop both simultaneously. This is something that the Palestinian Authority expressed interest in. I think we’re going to begin discussions and negotiations to facilitate both, where the revenues from the Palestinian field go to the Palestinian Authority and the revenues from the Israeli field go to the Israeli government and I think this is good for stability, good for prosperity and good for peace”.

Previous hard-nosed Israeli negotiations with BG (formerly British Gas – whose commercial interests in a long-pending Gaza gas deal were strongly backed by Tony Blair when he served as British Prime Minister) were stuck for some years on an Israeli insistence on negotiating a highly-concessional long-term and below-market price for the gas it would buy from the Palestinians – similar to the deal it had signed with Egypt.

These negotiations were conducted between BG and the Israeli Ministry of National Infrastructure (then headed by Benjamin “Fouad” Ben Eliezer, who is of Iraqi origin).

However, BG was consulting closely throughout the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah – and could not have concluded a deal without PA approval. The PA position was, and still remains, that it will not sell Palestinian natural gas for anything less than the going market rate (apparently, at any given time).

The broad outlines of the deal were that the gas would be piped, underwater, to an Israeli refinery near Israel’s southern port city of Ashkelon, which would process the gas and then re-ship a small quantity back to Gaza for the Palestinians’ own needs (at the time, it was assumed that the Palestinian usage would be small – but this might not be realistic any longer).

The gas could be used to fuel Gaza’s only power plant, and a possible water desalination plant, as well as other domestic needs. A pipeline to the West Bank was not apparently envisaged. The PA in Ramallah would receive about 25% of the profits, which was projected at the time to be about $1 billion dollars.

Somewhat surprisingly, these profits would not go to the PA governmental coffers directly, but would instead go to the extra-governmental Palestine Investment Fund (PIF), originally set up to receive many of the assets in the portfolio of the late Yasser Arafat, when donors demanded greater transparency in PA operations. The PIF itself, led by a group of prominent Palestinian businessmen, has itself adopted a policy that seems rather less than transparent.

Political and legal challenges to the highly-concessional Egyptian-Israeli gas deal were raised by the Egyptian opposition in the wake of the unprecedented Israeli military operation, Cast Lead, ostensibly against Hamas forces in Gaza from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009. These challenges were discussed, then dismissed, first in the Egyptian parliament then in the courts.

But, there appear to be significant technical problems that have not been overcome. It had been announced with much fanfare in May 2008 (after an earlier disappointment in March) that gas had started flowing from Egypt to Israel in an underwater pipeline. Since then, not much clear information has been given publicly.

There have been indications of problems with the pipeline itself, then with the particular mix or chemical composition of the Egyptian gas being fed through the undersea pipeline, which apparently was not suitable to the needs of the Israeli refinery (though this is something that is usually clarified at a very early stage in any negotiation).

Before these disappointments – but within weeks of the BG announcement that it was freezing negotiations with Israel – then-Minister Ben Eliezer told participants at the right-wing Jerusalem Conference in Jerusalem in January 2008 that even with the 15-year Egyptian gas deal in place, Israel needed to diversify its sources for security needs – because it lived in a “rough neighborhood” and had relational problems. Ben Eliezer specifically said at that time that Israel should ideally have at least five different sources of supply for natural gas.

Despite the BG statement that negotiations had been frozen, Ben Eliezer said Israel was still interested in concluding a deal with the Palestinians. But, it became clear that the real problem – as much for the PA in Ramallah as for anyone else – was Hamas. Israel had increased its price offer to about half of the going market rate – still not enough to satisfy Ramallah’s requirement – by the time of the Hamas rout of Fatah/Palestinian Preventive Security Services in mid-June 2007. When it became clear, about six months later, that the resulting split between the two parts of the occupied Palestinian territory was not about to change any time soon, BG “froze” its negotiations with Israel, and closed its office in Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv (though a small Ramallah office has been maintained).

The unstated reason was that nothing could be done as long as Hamas was in control in Gaza.

Hamas had said in late 2007 that it wanted to have a say in the negotiations, and suggested it would like to see a revision of terms already agreed.

Since then, everything went quiet.

Some thought that Israel would completely lose interest in pursuing any gas deal with the Palestinians following announcements, first in 2009, and then in 2010, of one large natural gas discovery, then a second, possibly huge, gas under the Mediterranean Sea off Haifa on Israel’s northern coast (more or less on the same latitude as the Israeli city of Hadera, a bit inland). If the promise lives up to expectations, and all arrangements put into place, these wells could come online in 2012 or 2014, respectively.

Netanyahu said, in the announcement with Blair on Friday, that “Israel has of course its own gas supplies down the line in the close of the decade, but we have interim gas needs”.

A day before (on Thursday 3 February), the largest-circulation Israeli newspaper, Yediot Ahronot, published an article discussing “the day on which Egypt will close the [natural gas] pipe.” The Yediot Ahronot article said, according to an English-language translation provided by the Israeli Government Press Office, that “It has become clear, in the wake of the recent events, that it is difficult to depend on others. Accordingly, what is necessary is to prohibit natural gas exports [from Israel, once these new finds become productive]…That would ensure the supply of gas to Israel for decades.”

But, Netanyahu’s remarks suggested a far more wide-reaching strategy.

The Israeli Prime Minister’s remarks on Friday, with Blair by his side, are yet another of several indications that some kind of multi-sided deal has already been sketched out, and agreed in private, with both Hamas and the PA on board.

The move also sends a signal (the significance of which is not yet totally clear) to Egypt.

This implies a deal on Palestinian reconciliation is in the works, which would be another a major shift in the regional equation – but it is one demanded by most Palestinians.

Egypt had been playing a role in inter-Palestinian reconciliation talks for the last couple of years, without results. These efforts may have been, in part, a stalling tactic.

It also signals that Israel is not quite as dependent on Egypt as some in Egypt may have thought.

For Israelis, it may remove anxieties about Israel’s dependency on Egypt.

For international actors, it suggests a way to defuse the ramifications, in Palestinian territory, of the potentially-destabilizing effects of major changes that are now expected in Egypt.

The discovery of these large – possibly huge – offshore deposits of natural gas in areas of the eastern Mediterranean that Israel in effect must share with neighboring countries, not all of them friends, has been expected to cause a positive change (a “mellowing”, one regional diplomat predicted) in Israel’s regional and international outlook.

Israel will have to clarify its Mediterranean maritime claims by reaching negotiated agreements with its neighbors. So far, Israel has only reached agreement with Cyprus (and this is still subject to parliamentary ratification, but no problem is envisaged).

With Lebanon, it is another story. Israel has asserted that it possesses rights that, in reality, must be negotiated. But, the two countries remain in a state of war, and Lebanon has said several times that it is prepared to defend its own economic interests in Mediterranean waters. Even more, Lebanon is not ready to negotiate with Israel (unless there are big regional changes – including Israel’s acceptance of the Arab Initiative offering recognition and full normalization of relations if Israeli withdraws from territory occupied in the June 1967 war.

This will also require Israeli ratification of the Law of the Sea treaty – a move that Israel had been considering anyway, apparently even before the discovery of the large new undersea gas deposits.

Netanyahu also said on Friday that “We’ve had a series of meetings and we’re concluding with the announcement of several steps that we take to, first of all to enhance stability. I think people understand that stability is important at all times, but it’s especially important now and the first set of steps that we’re taking are to continue the policy we’ve advanced to enable economic growth in the Palestinian areas. I think this has contributed to stability; it’s contributed to a better life for the Palestinians and I think it’s contributing to peace and security in the long term”. Netanyahu added that Israel was also going to take steps which he said were “intended to make Gaza independent of Israeli infrastructure by helping to develop their electricity plants; water, sewerage treatment. I think this is important. There are significant international projects that we want to advance. We talked about the ways to do it in specific concrete terms”.

Netanyahu added: “I don’t delude myself for a second that an economic peace is a substitute for political peace. We need both, and I hope that Abu Mazen [Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas] will heed my call and enter direct negotiations with us. And one of the things that I think people can appreciate today is the importance we attach to the security arrangements on the ground because as recent events have shown us, the peace agreement has to take into account not only the situation that is present today, but the situation that could unfold tomorrow. So I look forward to resuming these negotiations with the Palestinians”…

The Palestinians suspended direct negotiations with Israel in December 2008, a few days after the start of Operation Cast Lead. Under pressure from the Obama administration that took office in January 2009 (just hours after two unilateral cease-fires — one by Israel, one by Hamas — that ended the massive Israeli military operation) the Palestinians agreed in March 2010, then again in September, to engage in indirect talks, but only if Israel stopped its settlement building. There are no negotiations at the moment.

This article was first posted on Bikya Masr here.

UPDATE: Haaretz reported the following, in an article by Barak Ravid published here:
“The package of confidence-building measures that Israel will offer the Palestinian Authority is seen as a bid to moderate the Quartet statement at the end of its deliberations, which is expected to criticize Israel for its continued construction in West Bank settlements … In the end, Netanyahu’s offer did not include measure that would enable the PA to take over land required to build the new town Rawabi. Blair added, however, ’5000 Gaza-registered residents of the West Bank will be given West Bank identity cards’. Israel’s forum of seven senior ministers discussed the proposed gestures to the Palestinians last week. Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and minister Dan Meridor supported the gestures, while ministers Benny Begin, Moshe Ya’alon, Avigdor Lieberman and Eli Yishai objected. The gestures will also ease the blockade on Gaza, permitting more items for export and permitting a limited amount of construction materials. Blair also announced the agreement to establish ‘mobile desalination plants to meet Gaza’s needs for clean water and approval in principle for a larger permanent desalination plant’. Netanyahu agreed to the Palestinian Authority’s request to renew discussions on the development of an offshore natural gas field opposite Gaza’s shores, and agreed in principle for the gas to power the new power plant to be built in Gaza, which he also specifically approved. Netanyahu said that although Israel’s natural gas needs will be satisfied by its Leviathan and Tamar gas fields in ten years’ time, it needs other sources of natural gas in the interim, and it is currently dependent upon supply from Egypt. Netanyahu pointed out that the profits from the Palestinian gas field will go to the Palestinian Authority, and not to Hamas, who rules Gaza”…

The Israeli FM explained in an email to diplomats that “An Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ can be claimed for up to 200 nautical miles off the coast of the State”.

But, the eastern corner of the Mediterranean is a relatively crowded place.

Therefore, the Israeli FM explains, “Of course, if there is less than 400 nautical miles between opposite states, as is the case between Israel and Cyprus, international law calls upon such states to come to an agreement to divide their overlapping EEZs, which is exactly what Israel did with its agreement with Cyprus”.

The Israeli FM noted that “There are roughly 230 nautical miles between Israel + Cyprus”, and said that the “median line method” was used to divide overlap.

CORRECTION: That means that Israel and Cyprus each have, in the area where their claims intersect, 115 nautical miles of EEZ + 85 nautical miles for possible joint development. What it seems they have done, according to the announcements made, is to divide that 85-mile overlap in half…, giving each of them 136.25 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic Zone.  [It could be that more research is needed here...]

The Israeli FM did not once mention the Law of the Sea Treaty, or Convention, under which the concept of Exclusive Economic Zones was developed (through years of tough and intense multilateral diplomatic negotiations, mostly at the United Nations).

But, it did say that “Until now, Israel claimed natural resources in the Mediterranean pursuant to the principles of customary international law relating to the ‘continental shelf’ (the floor of the sea). Under such principles, the coastal state has an automatic right (even without any formal declaration) to all natural resources, including natural gas, that stem from its continental shelf”.

The advantage to what Israel has just agreed to do, the note explains, is that delimitating Israel’s EEZ “provides increased certainty + precision about the exact location of Israel’s maritime borders” for neighbors and investors.

“This explains why signing the EEZ agreement with Cyprus is so significant: it further secures Israel’s vital economic interests at sea”, it notes.

The Israeli FM note adds that Turkey is being kept “updated”.

Northern Cyprus is across from Lebanon, not Israel, so Israel has no EEZ overlap that would touch the northern part of the island of Cyprus.

As to Lebanese claims, the Israeli FM note says “Lebanon published such positions in a unilateral manner, in opposition to the principles of customary international maritime law, which call for countries to try to settle maritime border disputes in good faith and in a spirit of cooperation vis-à-vis neighboring states)”.

While a Cypriot diplomat said frankly that there was a lot of fighting during the negotiations with Israel, the Israeli FM note states only that “This agreement was signed after a long period of professional work and mutual consultations”.

The note added that “The delimitation of Israel’s maritime borders with Cyprus was done in a spirit of cooperation, in consultation with cartographic and legal experts on both sides, and in accordance with customary international maritime law and accepted cartographic practice. It should be stressed that Israel did not establish its borders on a unilateral basis. The borders set forth in the Israel-Cypriot agreement were mutually agreed upon by experts on both sides, using accepted legal and cartographic methodology … In the framework of the new EEZ agreement, Israel and Cyprus committed to work together to establish the proper modalities for dividing cross-border resources and to cooperate on the technical level in this area”.

Another part of the message was more specific: “In the framework of the agreement both sides committed to work together and find ways to develop and exploit any cross-boundary hydrocarbon reservoirs”.

The Israeli FM’s note explains: “an Exclusive Economic Zone (or EEZ) is an area in which the coastal country enjoys exclusive economic and research rights — but not sovereignty. The coastal State enjoys full sovereignty only in its territorial waters, which is an area of up to 12 nautical miles off the coast. Israel has had a 12 nautical mile territorial water area for years, as established under Israeli domestic law. With the exception of artificial installations built in the EEZ, over which a coastal state does enjoy full sovereignty, the coastal state does not exercise sovereignty in the EEZ”.

The Associated Press reported from the Cypriot capital Nicosia this evening that “Cyprus and Israel signed an accord Friday demarcating their maritime borders to facilitate a search for mineral deposits in the east Mediterranean where huge natural gas reserves have been discovered. Cyprus Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou and National Infrastructures Minister Uzi Landau signed the deal in the island’s capital. No statements were made after the signing”. This AP report is published on the Jerusalem Post website here.

This is an important and interesting development.

The main immediate interest is the formal division of the area where important deposits of natural gas have been discovered in the eastern Mediterranean, and where several countries can claim jurisdiction.

“We could live by ourselves, and we could bring in American, Russian, and other exploration companies to help us develop our own undersea gas. But, we wanted to make it the proper way, and to make everything clear”, said a Cypriot diplomat in the region.

However, it is also a very important regional and international development.

It is Israel’s first bilateral negotiated agreement concerning its maritime space, including an “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) a relatively recent concept that evolved out of long diplomatic negotiations on an major international treaty known as The Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Under the Law of the Sea Convention, every country has the right to claim a 200-mile EEZ.

In the Mediterranean Sea, however, and particularly at its curved eastern end, the claims of many of the coastal countries are overlapping.

In this case, countries have the option of negotiating an agreed demarcation to divide the waters they share.

Cyprus has been the pioneer in the eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus concluded the first agreement in the Eastern Mediterranean with Egypt in 2003. The two countries agreed, in negotiations, to divide the space between them equally. That means, at every point along the coastline, lines drawn at a 90 degree angle, and extended straight out to sea between Cyprus and Egypt, are divided exactly in half.

The same procedure was used in the agreement concluded today with Israel.

“We fought a lot, both sides fought a lot”, said a Cypriot diplomat in the region.

Today’s agreement with Cyprus on the demarcation of the EEZ — a concept elaborated only in the context of the Law of the Sea Convention — is a good indication that Israel will very likely soon ratify this international treaty.

Meanwhile, Cyprus has finished negotiations with Lebanon, but the Lebanese Parliament has not yet ratified the agreement.

Some of the undersea gas fields are believed to be in areas where Cypriot, Lebanese, and Israeli claims may overlap. But, because Lebanon will not deal with Israel until a larger regional peace is agreed, there have been no negotiations between them. Threats, however, have been made by various political leaders in Lebanon. And Israel simply asserts its own claims.

Cyprus has also finished negotiations with Syria — but the agreement is not yet ratified. The Cypriot diplomat in the region said Friday evening that “we think they are playing games, because they think this might be able to strike a better bargain if they can bring Turkey into the picture”.

Turkey does not recognize the government of the Republic of Cyprus in the south of the country, which is predominantly Greek community (including Greek refugees who fled or were expelled from their homes in the northern part of the island, which is now ruled separately by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey) — so negotiations on defining the maritime space between Turkey and Cyprus have not yet begun.

Cyprus has, however, concluded negotiations with its other northern neighbor, Greece. In this case, the agreement has not yet been ratified because of pending Greek elections.

“It wasn’t easy. None of the negotiations was easy to reach. The easiest was the first one, with Egypt”, said the Cypriot diplomat.

“We thought it was important to agree on the lines between all the countries and us”, the diplomat noted. “It’s normal that it’s better to know what each country’s limits are”.

Israel has not yet ratified the Law of the Sea, but it participated as an observer in the lengthy diplomatic negotiations, and it has reportedly been giving serious consideration to ratification in the past five or six years, as it sees that it might serve the country’s interests. (Israel has ratified one codicil, concerning fishing.)

Israel has previously granted, at the very outset of the Oslo Accords a decade and a half ago, a specific area off the coast of the Gaza Strip, going straight out from shore to a distance of 20 miles out in the Mediterranean Sea, which is a formally designated Palestinian maritime space for fishing and other economic activities. This, however, was not the result of a negotiation between two equal parties.

Israel has for decades imposed various restrictions, upon its decision alone, on Gaza’s maritime space. Palestinian fisherman cannot count now on being allowed to fish more than three miles off the Gaza shore. On the night of 3-4 January 2009, Israel declared a formal naval blockade of Gaza’s entire maritime space just as the IDF launched the ground phase of its three-week military attack on Gaza, Operation Cast Lead. Though the prevention of gun-running to Hamas forces in Gaza was the stated Israeli justification, Israel also wanted to tighten up the legal arguments it used to prevent the Free Gaza and other subsequent flotillas from making sea expeditions designed to “break the blockade” on the Gaza Strip where Hamas has been in control since mid-June 2007.

Israeli warships are reportedly tracking the Amalthea. The Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak earlier called this expedition “provocative”. Israeli military officials say that the cargo this ship is carrying is redundant, because these materials are now entering Gaza relatively freely via Israeli-controlled crossings. However, there are still logistical limitations.

Although Israeli officials continue to be suspicious about the ship — and there have been contradictory claims about the intended destination coming from various people involved with the Libyan aid group that hired the ship and from some of their supporters — they say that as things appear at the moment there does not appear to be any security threat involved. However, they say, they are watching, and will be taking no chances.

The Amalthea appears to have turned off its transponder in recent hours… Or, according to some reports, the ship’s communications are being jammed, and the ship is surrounded by 8 Israeli warships.

Interesting — on the Live Ships map at the Marine Traffic website here, there are now NO ships at all shown from the Suez canal up to Beirut — how is that possible?

UPDATE: At about 10:30 this morning Jerusalem time, SMS reports from Israeli sources indicate that the Amalthea has begun to move toward Egypt…

UPDATE TWO: By about noon in Jerusalem, the Amalthea was back on the Live Ships map, and moving in the direction of El-Arish. It is now 32 nautical miles away from the Egyptian port in the northern Sinai, not far from the Rafah crossing in and out of Gaza — about 4 hours away, at the ship’s present speed of 7.5 knots…

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] website has a post citing “A report published by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center [that] claims that the sole mission of the Libyan foundation responsible for sending out this ship to Gaza is to ‘break the siege’. According to the published findings, the Libyans intend to pressure Israel to agree to allow the entrance of goods into the Gaza Strip according to the ‘rules of the game’ determined by Hamas. In addition, the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center report shows that there are political considerations behind the Libya-sponsored flotilla, as Libya is interested in strengthening its position within the Arab League” … This MFA post is published here.

The Israeli MFA post also cites the U.S. State Department briefing in Washington on Tuesday 13 July [which can be consulted in full here] in which U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Philip J. Crowley tells journalists: “We are conscious of the fact that there is a Libyan aid ship en route to Gaza as we speak, and that we, along with our partners in the Quartet, urge all those wishing to deliver goods to do so through established channels so that their cargo can be inspected by the Government of Israel and transferred via land crossings into Gaza. We have urged the Libyan Government to avoid unnecessary confrontations. We call on all parties to act responsibly in meeting the needs of the people of Gaza.”

The Jerusalem Post’s Defense Correspondent Yaakov Katz reports today that Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon has claimed, in an interview on Israel Radio’s “This Morning” program, that “calls by the US and the European Union to the ship’s captain to accept Israel’s diversion requests legitimizes Israel’s policy”…

Reports indicated, Saturday evening, that the ship had just sailed.

The voyage for this ship from Greece to Gaza is estimated to take about 80 hours.

However, Israel’s YNet website has reported that “the Greek government said it had reached an agreement with the crew according to which the ship would not try to reach the Hamas-ruled territory”. The YNet story added that the Israeli Navy will track the vessel throughout its voyage, and that an IDF officer said Saturday night: “Any deviation from the original course, which will lead the ship to Gaza, will be blocked by the Navy … In case those on board fail to follow our instructions to stop and allow the Navy vessels to escort them, we will not hesitate to employ other methods to stop them.” This is reported here.

The ship was chartered to deliver some 2000 tons of food and medical aid on behalf of the Gadhafi International Charity and Development Association, headed by Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi’s son, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi.

Food and medicine are items which should not, at least theoretically, be on the Israeli lists of what it bans from entering Gaza. But there is a problem with some “dual-use” items which could, theoretically at least, also be used in making weapons.

Israel has just published a list based, it said, on a list agreed by some 40 nations, supplemented with extra items prohibited in specific Israeli “internal legislation” — including an unspecified number of military orders drawn up by the Israeli military’s Central Command.

According to the report in Haaretz, written by Barak Ravid, Israeli Foreign Ministry officials said the ship “would dock at Egyptian port el-Arish rather than the Gaza strip”. This is published here.

The Jerusalem Post is reporting that Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak “met Saturday with Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman and discussed the Libyan flotilla that was set to arrive in the Gaza Strip. The two discussed the possibilities of the aid ship being accepted at the Egyptian port of El Arish”. This is posted here.

These are strong and concerted steps by two men who were at each other’s throats a week ago over fallout from the fiasco of the Israeli naval assault on the Freedom Flotilla at sea on 31 May which left nine men dead on board a large Turkish-chartered passenger ship, the Mavi Marmara. [Lieberman accused Barak of leaking news of a meeting that Lieberman had not been informed about between the Turkish Foreign Minister and Israeli Minister Benyamin [Fouad] Ben Eliezar].

Alternatively, an Associated Press report on Israel’s YNet website indicates, somewhat surprisingly, that according to the Libyan charity’s “head volunteer”, Adburaufel Jaziri, the group is prepared to let Israel check the cargo: “Israel ‘can check our cargo and certificates, of course they are free to do this’,” Jaziri said. ‘If we cannot deliver the aid, we will let (Israel) deliver it … Our job is to help anyone who needs it. We don’t care if they are Catholics or Muslims or whatever. Now we are helping the people of Gaza who are suffering”.

YNet added that “The Israeli military would not comment on the Libyan ship. Israel’s policy has been to offer ships of this type the option of docking at an Israeli port, after which Israel will screen the goods aboard and transfer them into Gaza by land”. [According to this AP report, there will only be 27 people on board [15 volunteers, almost all Libyan, and a 12-member crew from several countries] not hundreds, or thousands…] This YNet report is published here.

This was something that neither the Free Gaza movement, nor the coalition of groups on board the Freedom Flotilla, were prepared to allow.

These reported remarks from the Libyan charity “head volunteer” are yet another indication that Israel’s Naval blockade of Gaza is quietly gaining international agreement.

There was no public challenge to Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip when it was first announced during the Gaza war.

Now, to cover all its bases, Israel has written letter to the highest UN official and its two most significant bodies in which it discusses, perhaps for the first time [I stand to be corrected, if wrong -- but I don't think I am], Israel’s formal declared naval blockade of the Gaza Strip.

Haaretz reported today that the Israeli ambassador to the UN, Gabriela Shalev, wrote a letter on Friday to UN Secretary General BAN KI-Moon, which she also copied to the current President of the UN Security Council [Ambassador Joy Ogwu of Nigeria, during the month of July] and to the President of the current [64th] UN General Assembly [who just happens to be Libya's former Foreign Minister, Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki] saying that “Israel calls upon the international community to exert its influence on the government of Libya to demonstrate responsibility and prevent the ship from departing to the Gaza Strip … Israel reserves the right under international law to prevent this ship from violating the existing naval blockade on the Gaza Strip”. In the letter, Shalev further urged the international community “to discourage their nationals from taking part in such action,” adding that Israel “expects the international community to ensure that this ship does not sail.” This report is published here.

However, Haaretz, which should know better, wrote — incorrectly — that “Israel imposed the blockade on Gaza in 2007 following a bloody Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip. Israel recently eased the terms of the land blockade on the territory, following a deadly raid of a Turkish aid ship, but the naval blockade has so far remained in place”. [This was published here].

This shows how the imprecise use of the term “blockade” has confused the situation.

Many have used the word to mean all of what was happening in Gaza, following an Israeli government decision in September 2007 [less than 3 months after the Hamas rout of Fatah/Palestinian Preventive Security Services in Gaza] to declare Gaza an “enemy entity” or “hostile territory”. The Israeli Ministry of Defense was charged with implementing this government decision, and decided to impose progressively-tightened sanctions at Israel’s land crossings into Gaza.

The Free Gaza movement began in August 2008 to sail ships to “break the siege” on Gaza.

The Israeli government response was divided and chaotic. To deter the Free Gaza expeditions, the Israeli Navy announced, in a Notice to Mariners in mid-2008, that it would stop and search any ships entering Gaza’s maritime space. But, the top “political echelon” in Israel [which includes the Defense Minister] decided to ignore the first couple of Free Gaza expeditions, so as not to give them any “propaganda victory”. The not-quite-identical “political echelon” that is in place now in Israel said, before the Freedom Flotilla set sail for Gaza at the end of May, again said that this expedition was a mere propaganda ploy — but they also made it clear in advance that they were planning to stop the Freedom Flotilla from sailing to Gaza by all available means, including military force.

Even after the start of the IDF’s unprecedented Operation Cast Lead [27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009], the Free Gaza movement launched a sea expedition from Cyprus to Gaza that was rammed at sea on 30 December by Israeli naval vessels, and had to limp into a Lebanese port for repairs.

On 3 January 2009, as the Israeli Army began its feared ground offensive into the Gaza Strip [with its 1.5 million souls, it is one of the most-densely populated parts of the planet], the Israeli government announced a formal naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, essentially covering Gaza’s maritime space as defined in a map, which we have published several times on this blog here, and which is attached to the Oslo Accords.

As if nothing had changed — perhaps because they saw no Israeli effort to publicize or explain its naval blockade — the Free Gaza movement launched a second expedition by sea, well into the course of Operation Cast Lead. Confronted by the Israeli Navy, this ship gave up and returned to Cyprus without damage, in order to “save lives”. A Free Gaza spokesperson told me at the time: “We had no choice”.

Four months or so later, in June 2009, the last Free Gaza expedition left Cyprus and sailed for Gaza. They were intercepted, boarded, and forced to Ashdod Port, where those aboard were detained for over a week before being deported from Israel.

A formal naval blockade is quite different than what was happening at Israel’s land crossings into the Gaza Strip. A naval blockade has a specific status in international law.

For decades, however, there has been a diversity of attitudes in Israeli political echelons towards international law — and many of those attitudes were simply dismissive.

This is perhaps one of the explanations for Israel’s failure — until the Freedom Flotilla appeared on the horizon — to publicize or explain its formal naval blockade.

Questions I sent to the IDF spokespersons’ “new media” department a week ago are also still unanswered…

It interesting to see that the Israeli Ambassador’s letter to the UN officials and bodies states, according to Haaretz, that because “Israel has taken upon itself the responsibility of ensuring the transfer of humanitarian aid into the Palestinian territory”, then “The declared intentions of this [Libyan] mission are even more questionable and provocative given the recent measures taken by Israel to ensure the increase of humanitarian aid flowing into the Gaza Strip”.

In a similar vein, YNet reported that Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Andy David said that “Humanitarian aid is allowed into Gaza through land crossings and the Israeli government had increased the flow of goods into the Palestinian territory last week … ‘All humanitarian aid goes in freely, therefore the Libyan intention is nothing more than a cheap provocation’, he said”.

Showing how on-message the Israeli government appears to be, YNet reported on Saturday night that “Defense Minister Ehud Barak called the Libyan aid vessel’s journey an ‘unnecessary provocation’, and suggested that the ship allow Navy vessels to escort it to Ashdod Port ‘or sail directly to El-Arish Port’.” This YNet story can be read in full here.

According to Avnery:
“[T]he commission has not been accorded any legal standing at all. Netanyahu just asked three nice people to find out if the government’s actions were consistent with international law, nothing more”.

UPDATE: The Israeli cabinet voted on Sunday that the commission, headed by former justice Jacob Tirkel, will be allowed to subpoena witnesses and receive sworn testimony, but Israeli soldiers will not be questioned as part of the inquiry. according to the Prime Minister’s office.

Avnery’s article continues: “All commentators agree that the commission was not set up to clarify the affair, but only to help President Barack Obama to obstruct the appointment of an international inquiry commission. All agreed that this is a ridiculous commission without teeth, that its composition is pathetic and the terms of reference marginal. It seems that Judge Turkel himself felt ashamed. After accepting the appointment on Netanyahu’s terms, this week he threatened to resign if his powers were not extended. Netanyahu gave in”.

“NETANYAHU’S DECISION to enlarge the powers of the commission, so that it will be able to summon witnesses, is far from what is needed. The commission will be unable to investigate how and by whom it was decided to impose the blockade on Gaza, how it was decided to attack the flotilla, how the operation was planned and how it was carried out”

“Now, it seems, it will be given the legal standing of a ‘Government Commission of Inquiry’, but definitely not of a ‘State Commission of Inquiry’.

“Turkel himself, a week before his appointment, had also called for the appointment of a State Commission of Inquiry”.

“[A] ‘State Commission of Inquiry’ would resemble a regular court … such a commission would have the power to summon witnesses, have them testify under oath (with the usual penalties for perjury), cross-examine them, subpoena documents, etc. Also, the commission would warn in advance any persons whose interests could be harmed by its findings and accord them the right to be represented by a lawyer” …

“Bulent Yildirim, President of IHH, said ‘If they harass the flotilla, what is left to separate the state of Israel from the pirates of Somalia?’ noting that the convoy will not even draw close by Israel’s territorial waters, in his response to the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s threats of attacking the ships, should they sail near the Gaza territory.

IHH administration said ‘We will not even pass close by the Israeli waters. If they attack us regardless, what is the difference between them and the pirates of Somalia?’, in their response to the threats by Israeli Foreign Ministry regarding the humanitarian aid ships to Palestine, saying ‘We will strike on the ships if they sail near Gaza’.

Bulent Yildirim, President of IHH (The Foundation For Human Rights And Freedoms And Humanitarian Relief) , said ‘Let them come and attack us, we have no preparation to strike back. Whether they fire down on us, bomb us with airplanes, we will not let them onto our ships. They can attack, yes, but they will not be let onboard. We are not carrying weapons to Palestine, we are carrying humanitarian aid only’.

Yildirim went on to say ‘As a requirement of international laws, 12 miles off the shores belong to the territorial waters of countries. It applies to Israel as well. Our flotilla will be sailing 80 miles off of Israeli coast. We will never enter Israeli waters. We will take a 90 degrees turn just before entering the Egyptian territorial waters. Therefore, Israel have no right to claim ‘They have entered our territorial waters.’ They have no authority there. If they decide to attack us regardless of this fact, then, there is no difference left between Israel and the pirates of Somalia’.”

This statement is posted here.

There is no mention whatsoever on the IHH website — or in any of the organization’s statements that I have been able to locate so far — of the formal declared Israeli Naval blockade [which was announced on 3 January 2009, as the Israeli Army lauched the ground phase of Operation Cast Lead], though this should have factored into the Freedom Flotilla’s strategic planning, and though in fairness and full disclosure all passengers who joined the trip should have been made aware of the implications.

It is, however, also true, as we have reported here many times, that Israel did not go out of its way to clarify its naval blockade of Gaza [until after the Israeli naval assault on the Freedom Flotilla that resulted in 9 deaths on board the Mavi Marmara, the largest passenger ship in the convoy].

Spokespersons for the IDF and for the Israeli Ministry of Defense did not answer my several inquiries about this formal naval blockade during the month of May — including my request for confirmation of whether the naval blockade was still in effect, or not…

I was only able to locate the formal publication of the declared Israeli naval blockade from a tip left by an informed but anonymous commentor on this blog. As we have reported earlier here, the required formal notice is published only on the website of the Israeli Ministry of Transport [which is, of course and obviously] controlled by Israel. It is dated 3 January 2009, but the posting date listed is 6 January 2009 [three days after it went into effect]. This formal notice was not cross-posted on the UK Hydrologic (UKHO) Office website — a standard reference — or for that matter anywhere else that I have been able to find.

This IHH statement, published on their website on 7 May, does note, however, that “Yavuz Dede, Vice President of the Foundation, noted that they sense a state of panic within Israel, [and] added ‘Despite the standard limit of 12 miles, they are now trying to impose their own limit of 40 miles. We are not combat-ships. We are not carrying weapons. We now have 8 ships. In coming days we will purchase another cargo ship. A donor who wished to remain anonymous has donated another ship. The flotilla will consist of 9 ships in total. We will be sailing off from near Cyprus in the end of May. We will be delivering 6,000 tons of cement, 2,000 tons of iron, medicines and medical equipment to Gaza no matter what’.”

This reference, to a “standard limit of 12 miles”, is only to Israel’s territorial claim of 12 miles off its own coast. This is published on the UKHO Office website — a standard reference. We have reported this earlier here.

We have also pointed out that the Israeli claim of a 12-mile territorial sea has been amended, according to the UKHO, by a footnote saying that this has been amended to “3 miles off the coast of Gaza” — an interesting and significant development, which has not yet been either refuted or explained.

[It does have one clear implication, however: that for the first time since its of trumpeted unilateral "disengagement" in 2005, Israel is now admitting that it is, indeed, occupying the Gaza Strip. However, this status would, however, undermine the legal argumentation of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the naval blockade is justified because there are "hostilities at sea". However, this striking wording may indicate that the Israeli MFA may well mean there are "hostilities at sea" not with Gaza, but perhaps with others ... and perhaps even including Iran].

The IHH official’s mention that “they [Israel] are now trying to impose their own limit of 40 miles” is unclear, though it was reported elsewhere at the end of May, just after the Freedom Flotilla was finally getting ready to sail to Gaza on 29 or 30 May.

It is not clear how far Israel is actually claiming, now, or on what basis — and indeed, no new Israeli claims are yet posted, either on the website of the Israeli Ministry of Transport, or on the website of the UKHO. I have seen undocumented mention, in the Israeli media, of new expanded Israeli claims of 60 miles, and even 80 miles.

The Mavi Marmara was intercepted by the Israeli Navy at sea at a point 73 miles straight off the coast of Netanya, according to a graphic in a new document posted today on Ali Abunimah’s website, here.

Israel could, but it has not yet, claimed 100 miles of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the Law of the Sea Convention, which Israel signed — as an observer, just like the P.L.O. — but which Israel has not yet ratified (though it was reportedly tempted to do so, and was reportedly considering, in recent years).

Gaza’s maritime space, however, is defined by the Oslo Accords, as a 20-mile zone for “fishing” and “economic activities”, and published in a map appended to the Oslo Accords in 1994 that was signed by the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat [with a hand-written notation that there is a separate letter on the matter, that nobody has yet produced] and the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The map is witnessed by the then-U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and the then-Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and also by an Egyptian official.

The Israeli naval blockade covers the area defined as Gaza’s maritime space.

It is entitled: “Crisis Furthers In the Mediterranean, Turkish Government Expected To Intervene”, and is posted here.

Here is the sub-title:
“Israeli assault boats are harassing the ships of the Freedom Flotilla, which are carrying humanitarian aid to Palestine. 6 ships are persistently followed by Israeli warships despite being in international waters”.

Here is the text:
“Helicopters and unmanned aircrafts are tracking the ships as well. Israeli officials are calling the Captain of Mavi Marmara and they are constantly harassing the ships. The Captain of Mavi Marmara refused to change the route of the ship. Meanwhile 578 passengers onboard Mavi Marmara have been given life jackets. Passengers were also provided with gas masks. The ships are on alert now. Israel can carry out a possible operation any minute now. They are expected to intercept the ships.

“The activists onboard are trying to make their voices heard through live broadcast. There are women, children and the elderly onboard. The ship is packed with civilians. An operation by the Israeli navy with gas canisters might lead to chaos onboard.

“As the crisis furthers in Mediterranean, Turkish government is expected to interfere. Flotilla organizers expect the Prime Minister of Turkey, Erdogan, to interfere into the situation and stop a possible military operation by Israel.

The text of this IHH communication continues:
“Diplomatic negotiations are thought to be run behind the curtains, as the harassment continues in the waters of Mediterranean. Unless the states come up with a solution to the crisis which has been talked about for many days now, Israel is set to carry out a military operation on the ships tonight towards the dawn. If Israel does not intercept, the ships are planned to arrive in Gaza tomorrow morning”.

This is posted here.