UN-Truth

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eiland delivered his report on the Freedom Flotilla fiasco to the IDF Chief of Staff today, and said that “the issue should be viewed with perspective, being that the damage caused to Israel is not as severe as it seemed following the incident”.

According to Haaretz, Eiland told journalists after he delivered the report that “mistakes made at the relatively top levels that caused the results to be different from what was planned”. The Haaretz story is posted here.

The Eiland report was commissioned by the IDF – and it focused only on the military aspects of the operation.

The Jerusalem Post reported, however, that “Eiland slammed the Navy for not preparing a ‘Plan B’ for the operation and should have reconsidered rappelling commandos onto the Mavi Marmara’s upper deck after noticing from sea and air that there were several dozen activists on board prepared to violently resist”. According to the JPost, Eiland said that “the Navy did not have technology that would have enabled it to stop the ship ahead of the operation without putting soldiers on board its upper deck to take control of the bridge … During their work, members of Eiland’s panel met with a number of officials who offered ideas how to stop the ship without boarding it. According to the committee, it is possible to develop such a capability but it will take approximately two years. Since the flotilla, the Navy has met with a number of companies and is pursuing technology that could be used to stop a ship in the future”.

A Libyan-chartered, Moldovan-flagged cargo ship has just left Greece and is now near Crete, on its way towards Gaza now. However, officials from the Libyan aid group say they do not want to provoke Israel, and have variously said they are either prepared to go to El-Arish, or let Israel inspect the cargo, or whatever… Needless to say, this expedition is being tracked by the Israeli Navy and other services.

The JPost said that “Eiland’s probe also found that shots were initially fired at the boarding commandos from weapons that the passengers likely had prepared before hand. The slug that was dislodged from the knee of one of the soldiers was of a different caliber than that which is used by the Navy”.

The JPost reported that Eiland “detailed the events that led to the abduction of three commandos, who were thrown from the upper to the lower deck and were only recovered about 40 minutes later after they were spotted standing wounded on the ship’s bow and surrounded by a number of passengers. The Navy commandos opened fire from above, scared off the passengers enabling two of the wounded to jump into the water. The third, who was severely wounded, was then rescued by other commandos who jumped down to the bow from the upper deck”. This can be read in full here.

The YNet website said that according to the report “the IDF had begun preparing for the flotilla in February. In mid-May Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi sent a letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak requesting their cooperation in order to prevent a violent incident”. This is published here.

Nine people [8 Turkish men and an American-born high school student of Turkish origin] were killed on board the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish-chartered passenger ship carrying over 600 passengers and crew that was sailing towards Gaza when it was intercepted by the Israeli Navy in the pre-dawn hours of 31 May for attempting to breach the formal Israeli naval blockade of Gaza.

Only a limited edition of the full report was made public, apparently.

According to the IDF spokespersons site, the Eiland report made these observations:
“In terms of the intelligence effort, the team concluded that not all possible intelligence gathering methods were fully implemented and that the coordination between Navy Intelligence and the Israel Defense Intelligence was insufficient. At the same time, the team emphasized that it is not certain that an optimal intelligence effort would create a complete intelligence picture. The team also pointed out that the anticipated level of violence used against the forces was underestimated.

“In terms of situation assessments towards the flotilla, the team clarified that the operation relied excessively on a single course of action, albeit a probable one, while no alternative courses of action were prepared for the event of more dangerous scenarios.

“Regarding technological alternatives, the team determined that on the day of the incident, decision makers were not presented with alternative operational courses of action other than a full boarding of the flotilla. The team emphasized the fact that as far as is currently known, no country in the world holds the ability to stop a vessel at sea in a non hostile manner. Therefore statements made on this matter following the incident are unfounded and irresponsible. At the same time, the team determined that alternative courses of action could have existed had the process of preparation begun enough time in advance, and recommended to accelerate the process of examining alternative methods.
…
“In terms of operation command, the team determined that the location of the commanders during the incident and the presence of the Commander of the Israel Navy at sea during the operation [n.b. - right next to the Mavi Marmara], was proper and fit with the Chief of the General Staff’s view regarding the role of commanders at the front lines of IDF activity. His presence proved effective in terms of the decision making process, saving lives and more. The team praised the Israel Navy combat protocols, the preparations of the Naval Commando Unit, the Navy Command, the Electronic Warfare Formation and the medical evacuation.

“The team determined that the Navy Commando soldiers operated properly, with professionalism, bravery and resourcefulness and that the commanders exhibited correct decision making. The report further determines that the use of live fire was justified and that the entire operation is estimable” … This is posted here.

The Eiland report noted that “regarding media relations, the preparations made in advance were good. However, the release of press statements and visual materials was delayed due to the need to maintain reliability, the obligation to notify the families of the critically injured soldiers and the long authorization process at the levels above the IDF Spokesperson Unit. The team noted with favor the work of the IDF spokesperson following the incident and emphasized the need for better coordination between the IDF, the foreign ministry and other foreign affairs institutions”.

It said nothing about the confiscation — and use — by the IDF of equipment and produced materials belonging to journalists and their media organizations, which has not been returned.

UPDATE: The Turkish publication Today’s Zaman published a short piece with some Turkish reaction to the Eiland report. It said that “The Israeli military has failed to take responsibility for the deaths of nine activists including eight Turkish citizens, in its inquiry report on the deadly attack on the Mavi Marmara aid ship on May 31. ‘If the report really says that they did not have the adequate intelligence, obviously they are lying’, Sedat Laçiner, from the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK), told Today’s Zaman … He added that the Israeli army’s claim of inadequate intelligence is not persuasive at all. ‘Well, as someone who lives in Ankara, I was able to contact the Mavi Marmara and able to ask them how the situation was. They told me that there was a group of people on the ship, preparing sticks to use against Israeli soldiers if they tried to intercept them. If I knew that, sure Israel knew about it, too’, he said”. The same article also reported that “Nihat Ali Özcan of the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) said if the Israel is really claiming that it had inadequate intelligence, this means it does not know anything about the changing characteristics of conflicts and should urgently replace its analysts. ‘Recent developments in the world tell us that if you confront a group, you have to learn their conflict culture, not their physical capacity. The passengers of the ship were from a civil society organization, but not a Norwegian-style [one]‘.” This report is published here.

Filed under: Boundaries & Borders, Gaza, International Humanitarian Law, International Law, Israel, Palestine & Palestinians, Sanctions