UN-Truth

6 Responses to “If only this had been done in Srebrenica”

1. aletheia kallos, on March 18th, 2008 at 4:14 am Said:

   analysis from
   http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/serbia_struggle_mitrovica

   Serbia: The Struggle for Mitrovica
   March 17, 2008 | 2307 GMT

   Summary
   Trouble continued on Kosovo’s northern border with Serbia on March 17. Angry Serbs skirmished with a U.N. convoy transporting a handful of Serbian prisoners away from the offices of a U.N. tribunal they had invaded days before. In Serbia’s bid to break the Mitrovica district away from Kosovo, it is employing three tactics: civil disobedience, attacking civil institutions and disrupting the Kosovar-Serbian border. Belgrade will achieve the ethnic partitioning of Kosovo only if it can sustain these tactics.

   Analysis
   U.N. police raided the headquarters of the U.N. court in Mitrovica, Kosovo, on March 17, which Serbs had taken over March 14 by protests. The police drove out the Serbian occupiers with tear gas, but protests continued outside the building. Shortly thereafter, a separate group of Serbs ambushed a U.N. convoy carrying prisoners from the raid, freeing many of them.

   The violence highlights continued chaos in Serbia after Kosovo declared independence Feb. 17, as well as the Serb bid to detach the Mitrovica district from Kosovo.

   Mitrovica, the major city in the district of the same name in northern Kosovo, has become the focal point of the conflict because it is divided between ethnic Serbs and Albanians. The Serbian government has sworn never to recognize Kosovo’s independence and has moved to protect Kosovo’s 70,000 Serbian inhabitants; but Albanian Kosovars see the northern territory as their own. NATO — and soon EU peacekeepers — maintain security and provisional government in the area, much to the chagrin of Serbia and its allies. These include Russia, which sees the shift to EU peacekeepers as an attempt to bypass Moscow’s veto power at the United Nations.

   The Serbs want to wrest the Mitrovica district from Kosovo and bring it back into Serbia proper. This would create a new Serbian-Kosovar border along ethnic boundaries. Recovering Mitrovica would serve as a consolation prize for Belgrade after losing Kosovo. It would deliver an early blow to Kosovo’s pride over independence and demonstrate to the Kosovars that Serbia is still calling some of the shots. Losing Mitrovica also would harm Kosovo economically, since the region’s mines are the fledgling state’s only source of income other than foreign aid.

   To this end, the Serbs have employed three tactics, all leading to initial successes. The first is civil disobedience, a natural response to the recent events that have so angered many Serbs. The persistence of massive protests has further energized popular resistance and could lead to material changes in the Kosovo situation.

   The second tactic is attacking civil and judicial institutions that legitimize the current status, which is seen as favoring Kosovo. Burning the U.S. Embassy in Serbia was one example of this tactic, though not the most effective use of it. Targeting U.N. or EU institutions with direct jurisdiction over Mitrovica is much more likely to have the desired effect.

   The Serbs recognize the need to strike at the symbols of law and order in Kosovo, as revealed by the recent incidents at the U.N. court in Mitrovica. Serb demonstrators can claim to have won this battle, since peacekeepers were not able to detain many of them. The incident also gives insight into how future sabotages of the same kind could be carried out. The Serbs who orchestrated the takeover of the U.N. court had been employees and clerks in the court before the 1999 NATO war. While civil institutions are vulnerable to plots by those familiar with their inner workings, insiders are not necessary for Serbia to continue to succeed on this front.

   The third tactic for the Serbs to achieve the partition of Kosovo is to disrupt Mitrovica’s borders. Just after Kosovo declared independence, about 1,000 Serb Kosovars lashed out at two border crossings March 19. But the Kosovar Albanian police force was not strong enough to block the action. Border posts are sparse along Mitrovica’s borders, making it easier for Serbs to claim this area. Also, the natural border formed by the Iber River means Serbia’s control of the Mitrovica district seems inevitable. Closing off the major bridge across the river would alone accomplish a de facto partition.

   NATO and EU forces would have to institute draconian measures to preserve this territory for Kosovo and block Serb ambitions, something they are not willing to do. But to fully achieve the partitioning of Mitrovica from Kosovo, the Serbs will have to sustain these tactics. Otherwise their small and sporadic victories will easily be reversed over time, as Western influence strengthens the status quo and as Serb fury over Kosovar secession gradually ebbs. While partition seems like a natural outcome, the Serbs will have to work to make it happen.

   accompanying sketch map
   http://www.stratfor.com/mmf/111130

   also
   another comment from me posted yesterday under the ethiopia eritrea blog entry here below
   comparing the kosovo situation with the eritrea situation
   appears to have gone astray

2. aletheia kallos, on March 18th, 2008 at 6:12 am Said:

   from
   http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/kosovo_nato_troops_secure_northern_area
   Kosovo: NATO Troops Secure Northern Area
   March 18, 2008 | 1108 GMT
   NATO troops in armored personnel carriers secured a strip of northern Kosovo on March 18, a day after riots by Serbians in Mitrovica killed one U.N. police officer from Ukraine and forced U.N. personnel to withdraw from the city, Reuters reported. Bridges over the Ibar River that divides Mitrovica’s Serbian north from the Albanian south were closed.

3. Marian Houk, on March 18th, 2008 at 6:14 am Said:

   One UN police officer killed! This is the first report I’ve seen of this …

4. aletheia kallos, on March 18th, 2008 at 7:17 am Said:

   true
   but
   wow
   it looks like our de mistura mattress is indeed already out of the barn too

   & it turns out to be called a yakushik administrative restructuring
   http://www.ifimes.org/default.cfm?Jezik=En&Kat=09&ID=350

   & frankly i have only skimmed thru this paper lightly so far
   in my excitement
   concentrating on the bold faced items
   but it sure looks like he has thought of everything we have & more

   the full text is reproduced below just to keep it handy in case of need

   11.03.2008

   SEARCHING FOR CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF KOSOVO STATUS - THEORETICAL ASPECTS

   The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES), Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyzes events occurring in the Middle East and the Balkans. Dr. Valentin M. Yakushik, professor at the University of »Kiev-Mohyla Academy« and member of IFIMES, presents his view on the independence and recognition of Kosovo. Within a historical context, he points out a variety of solutions with certain similar inter-regional and inter-ethnic conflicts. His article, entitled »Searching for constructive and realistic solutions of Kosovo status (theoretical aspects) «, is here published in its entirety.

   Dr. Valentin M. Yakushik
   Professor at the University of »Kiev-Mohyla Academy«
   Member of the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)

   Confronting types of solutions in the restructuring of inter-regional and inter-ethnic relations
   In the context of the present analysis, “administrative restructuring” is regarded as the process leading to at least one of the following three results: (1) a change in the political and legal status of particular administrative entities within a state; (2) significant corrections of the boundaries between the existing administrative entities; (3) the creation of the new administrative (e.g. autonomous) entities, or the dissolution or loss of the old (traditional) ones.
   The present analysis is not just a purely theoretical exercise; rather, it is an attempt to present some typologies, which are relevant and important for identifying and listing the existing and possible confronting approaches (some of them being latent) to solving the acute inter-ethnic and inter-regional conflicts in the Western Balkans and, in particular, in Kosovo and Metohija (although not only there, but possibly also in Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia–Herzegovina). Keeping in mind mostly the process of further restructuring of the ex-Yugoslav historic and cultural space (and concentrating on the related topical issues), some relevant and useful experiences of other regions will be presented, and some conclusions can be drawn from other countries facing the problems of separatism and irredentism, or at least the extreme forms of decentralisation, bordering on fragmentation.
   Probably for the first time in history, in the contemporary world (in the 21st century), even the weakest and helpless states (which sometimes lack the vital capacity) are guaranteed their political independence (if they already possess it) and territorial integrity, and are legally and politically protected against separatism, irredentism and unwanted foreign occupation or attacks. To lose this lucky historical chance, it is necessary either to make extremely serious and, sometimes, even fatal mistakes in internal politics, or utterly misunderstand the essence and the degree or level of power relations in the contemporary world and confront oneself (in a very risky way) with the currently irresistible world’s core forces. Unlucky losers often fall into some kind of trap (either a natural historical trap, or the one prepared by skilful internal or external political and cultural opponents), thus victimising themselves.
   In the contemporary world, there is a natural process of attraction to the currently more successful geopolitical entities (the centres of world regionalisation), but also (to some extent) to the kin cultural regions. These realities had a visible effect on the process of breaking up of several multicultural entities which, at some point, failed to adjust to the contemporary realities (Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Serbia, etc.).

   Decisions relating to certain administrative restructuring in a country may result from:

   The act of the legitimate, or de facto administering, dominant outside authority (e.g. the patrician of British India, or Palestine under the British mandate; radical administrative changes in Bosnia–Herzegovina after the achievement of the Dayton Accords; contemporary Kosovo and Metohija);
   The chaos created by the break-up of a traditional power structure in the entire country, or in a certain one part of it (e.g. Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Somalia);
   Intervention by the neighbouring countries (e.g. Kashmir; Cyprus);
   The success of a separatist movement supported by the neighbouring nations (separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan; Nagorno-Karabakh; Abkhasia; South Osetia);
   The targeted action of the power which exercised its sovereignty over a particular administrative entity in the past, but was unable to continue to do that in full (e.g. the actions of France vis-à-vis Mayotte, or British actions vis-à-vis the Chagos Archipelago);
   Forceful reintegration (e.g. reintegration of the Serb Krajina into Croatia, unification of Yemen);
   Peaceful, negotiated separation (the dissolution of the USSR and independence of 15 ex-Soviet republics in 1991; independence of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993), or vice versa – negotiated reunification (e.g. German reunification; Gaugazia’s reintegration into Moldova; the return of Hong Kong and Macao to China); or
   A combination of several types of the above mentioned actions, etc.
   If we take the present situation in Kosovo and Metohija as an example, what kind of major political-administrative processes can be observed there – clear-cut, vivid, or latent? They are as follows:

   Forceful establishment of an international protectorate;
   Separatism, secessionism (as to the entire administrative entity);
   Irredentism (usually disclaimed and ignored, tacit, latent, and delayed as to its possible implementation);
   De facto partition of the entity into two different zones controlled (or, at least, populated) by each of the two ethnic communities (under supervision of the international forces);
   Gradual expansion of one zone due to ethnic cleansing (the expulsion of the original population), seizure of property etc.;
   Creation of enclaves (some of them being almost without the population, but preserving the highest historical and general symbolic value for one of the confronting communities).
   The most important and usually available approaches to a comprehensive solution to defining Kosovo’s future status are formulated on the basis of the following: (1) “the option of Kosovo Albanians who seek full independence”; (2) Serbia’s position, which persistently dismisses the possibility of independence and “has declared the formula “more than autonomy and less than independence”…”; and (3) the position of “many unofficial and opinion-making international resources” opting for Kosovo’s “conditional independence”. In fact, the third approach is a variation of the first one, which anticipates only somewhat delayed yet full implementation. Thus, the list of the presented approaches clearly introduces the choice between two possible types of status for Kosovo Serbs living in their historical territory.
   The first type of status – allows the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija to become an ethnic minority in an uncertain environment, under a constant threat from the notorious effects of “democratic tyranny” by the ethnic majority which is obviously lacking (in its own majority) the culture of pluralism and tolerance. All this, irrespective of the possible sincere (albeit rather unrealistic – due to the peculiarities of the given situation) wishes and hopes of some liberal-democratic elites aimed at creating a pluralistic multicultural democracy in the independent Kosovo. It also assumes that Serbian historical heritage in Kosovo and the remaining ethnic Serbs will be safe under the “security and protection” offered by the successors and co-religionaries of UCK radical forces.
   The second type of status – preserving the elements of the Serbian state’s sovereign control over the territory of Kosovo and Metohija (probably with a varying degree of intensity in different districts or zones), sharing this control with the international forces representing the institutions of the international protectorate authorities, as well as with local ethnic Albanian authorities.
   Both approaches seam to be quite dubious as to whether they will bring real peace and reconciliation. Even the deeply-rooted intrinsic hopes connected with the inclusion of that region in the European Union cannot “dissolve” the basic inherent conflict.
   There is certainly enough absorption capacity of the European Union so as to admit the small West Balkan national entities, and there is still a relatively high level of the EU commitment (made especially after the 1999 events and during the 1990s, in general). So, there is a chance for the effective application of a kind of the “Puerto-Rican model” of development in different small states in this region. But this does not exclude a strong element of naivety in the hopes that EU membership will “dissolve” the administrative and ethnic problems of the hatred-torn region (particularly in Kosovo, but not only in it). The situation being similar to that in Northern Ireland shows some specific, inherent logic, dissimilar to the logic of European integration.
   Are there any other proposed, viable approaches to solving the basic conflict in Kosovo and around it, which will be able to decrease tensions and give more promising prospects to all ethnic and religions communities involved? Certainly, there are. But before mentioning one of them, let us review the “internal” obstacles to taking the approaches that may bring a real compromise and limit the destructive aspirations to the establishment of some kind of new local hegemony.
   There are obviously at least three such major obstacles: (a) unrealistic Serbian nationalism rejecting “further loss of the national territory”, (b) arrogant Albanian nationalism demanding further national humiliation of Serbia and Serbs and (c) some vested geo-strategic interests profiting from the absence of peace and stability in the region.
   Irrespective of the provision of a comprehensive international support to Kosovo Albanians, Serbian (anti-separatist) position is quite strong due to the internationally acknowledged principle of state sovereignty. Theoretically, the available ways for legitimising the secession of Kosovo Albanians from Serbia are as follows:
   (a) To put the “devastated loser” “on the knees” (like Pakistan in 1973, when Bangladesh was created, or Ethiopia in 1991, when Eritrea became independent). But, this is obviously not the case now (in 2006) with Serbia. Although there is no way for Serbia to fight for the integrity of its territory “physically”, there are both a basic internal consensus and strong popular will in Serbia that one should not succumb to external pressures (the situation being somewhat similar to the dominant political spirit in Georgia and Azerbaijan vis-à-vis the breakaway separatist regions).
   (b) To “buy off” the population of the “loser” by some attractive and alleviating promises, which might somehow “sweeten the bitter pill” of national humiliation – like in Russia in 1991 – by promising it to become a “natural part of the civilized world”, to start real cooperation with the prosperous nations, and introduce and guarantee democracy and an effective market economy, as well as to point to the advantages of getting rid of the burden of subsidising the depressed and stagnating regions. For Serbia such alleviation can be linked to the promise of easier and speedy accession to the EU.
   (c) To bring in realism and limit the ambitions of each side in an inter-ethnic conflict (like in conflict-solving efforts taken by Israelis and Palestinians during the Oslo negotiations, or in the current process of negotiations on solving an ethnic conflict in Cyprus; or within the Dayton process in Bosnia–Herzegovina), and (inter alia) deciding on the appropriate “demarcation” of various zones of control, and creating a relatively effective “umbrella” coordinating structures for maintaining the relations between those zones.
   In legal terms, the strategic ability of Kosovo Albanians to influence the “final solution” (Kosovo’s future status) is rather limited. They are not even an “unrecognised state”, just an “international protectorate” with an uncertain status. And there is a legitimate right of the international community and the official sovereign authority (Serbia) to impose on them a general framework for a negotiated and agreed conflict-solving, including the re-definition of the present and future zones within Kosovo (including the status of each of them). By contrast, nobody has such a legitimate right to impose the final decision on Serbia.
   Those exerting pressure on Serbia can attain their goals only if the Serbian authorities agree to this pressure. And it is clear that the Serbian nation will hardly allow that. Meanwhile, the Kosovo Albanian nation has only a consultative word to say when the international community exerts pressure on the Kosovo self-government structures. In addition to Kosovo’s almost total dependence on the aid of the international community (both at present and in the future), the Kosovo Albanian political elite is so eager to upgrade the status of its institutions – all that means that the Albanian community in Kosovo will have to be quite flexible in accepting the final compromise.
   So, what is basically needed at the moment is to change Serbia’s official and general national position so as to become more realistic (based on the real strategic interests of the Serbian nation and the Southern Slavic people in general), and promote this new position in the international arena, showing Serbia’s readiness for a sound, comprehensive compromise with Kosovo Albanians (as Israelis have done vis-à-vis Palestinians at some point, and as Cypriot Greeks will do vis-à-vis the unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus).
   As for the envisaged formal and de facto ties between the two clearly defined (ethnic communities’) zones in the future, there are several types of possible solutions:
   (a) With the prospects for mutual (albeit predominantly detached and separate) coexistence within a federal or confederal arrangement under one national (state) “umbrella” (like currently in Bosnia–Herzegovina, and probably, in the nearest future, in the reunited Cyprus);
   (b) With an active involvement of the neighbouring kin countries (like the current situation in Northern Ireland after the recent comprehensive peace arrangements in which the Republic of Ireland is strongly involved; in the case of Kosovo, it might assume the involvement of Serbia and Albania);
   (c) With the prospects for maintaining a number of joint infrastructure facilities, but existing as two separate entities (like Israeli–Palestinian coexistence in the future, as is predominantly viewed in Israel today);
   (d) Splitting the territory (along the ethnic lines) between the countries representing the kin nations (in the case of Kosovo, it may be based on Serbia’s proposal to Albania; and if Albania rejects it, it may be enacted by the decision of the Serbian sovereign authority as a step-by-step programme anticipating the further negotiations between Serbia and the international protectorate authorities.
   There are the following major aspects (components) of this issue in its specific territorial, practical communicational and legal (normative) dimensions to be clearly defined (on an unbiased, fair, historically, culturally and demographically proven basis):

   The borders between the two zones (between the two ethnic communities), and the safe protection of these borders;
   The legal administrative status of each zone, and the type of relations to be maintained between these two zones and with the neighbouring kin countries;
   Compensation for the expropriated property, or the property taken in some other unfair and/or illegal way;
   Freedom and safety of communications between, and access to and from, the created and recognised enclaves or exclaves;
   Special security arrangements (including the limits on the allowed and deployed military forces and armaments, international security forces or military observers, etc.).
   What basically matters now (in 2006 and in the future) for Serbia and Serbs, who do not wish to become the citizens of Albanian-dominated Kosovo (whatever status Kosovo acquires), is not whether Serbia can again exercise sovereign control over the whole of Kosovo and Metohija. This is already impossible. What really matters is the guarantees for the national and human rights of Kosovo Serbs and the preservation of Serbian (and Christian Orthodox, in general) historical heritage in that territory and “physically” located there. All the rest can be regarded as the remnants of the old “imperial” past, most of which are already just a part of history, have already gone and continue their existence only in the imagination of unrealistic nationalists.
   The promising, safe and prosperous future (for all parties involved) cannot be connected with pressing into an unwanted (by both sides), forced “cohabitation” of the already separated national entities (the ethnic communities in Kosovo), which are not strategically oriented towards a common future but, rather, towards separation and the distinctly separate paths of development. Why not let the historical “divorce” happen in the most painless, smooth and institutional way?
   In fact, in the current circumstances, it does not matter at all for the local Serbs and the neighbouring Serbia if there will be (at some point in the future) the “reunification” of Kosovo with Albania (like in 1941 under Italian occupation), or if there will be two Albanian states (Albania proper and Kosovo), like some cultural and political forces interpret the existence of Romania and Moldova as being “two Romanian states” with the widespread current practice of granting Romanian citizenship to the citizens of Moldova if they, or their ancestors, were born or lived in the territories administered by Romania from 1918 to 1940.
   When making their mind and bringing the final decision on the future of Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia and Serbs, in general, have an important international mission. There are obviously at stake not only strategic national interests of various states (both those being relatively small and those being very big and very influential, including the superpowers) and not only the future of ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians, but the important patterns of problem-solving. In fact, the key archetypes are at stake. And dealing with them requires a wise, well thought-out and balanced approach, clear strategic humanistic vision and even audacity.
   Like Ukraine which, in the 1990s, brought a courageous historical decision (although viewed by some nationalistic politicians as controversial) and got rid of all nuclear weapons on its territory and any attempt to become a member of the “nuclear military club”, Serbia and Serbs (with the intellectual and administrative elites having the great potential), with an outstanding international experience and the worldwide strategic vision, can be expected to show that strategic vision vis-à-vis the current Kosovo crisis.
   Serbia is capable of working out and proposing a valid compromise, as well as of firmly defending the basic values of its strategic vision, thus guaranteeing a fair, unbiased, systemic and comprehensive implementation of a real compromise decision vis-à-vis all parties involved. This is the only way in which it will be possible to guarantee a stable and long-lasting peace and sustainable development in the Western Balkans. A well thought-out and planned comprehensive final solution for Kosovo can (and probably has to) anticipate some interim, transitional stages, but a “suspended solution” (when the communities and political structures basically remain in a kind of limbo, with many hidden “time-bombs” of various types) cannot be regarded as being fair and strategically effective.

   The faits accomplis policy, or the rejection of double standards?

   There are some important symbolic features that strike one’s eye when directly observing today’s “almost peaceful” life in Kosovo. In particular the following facts may easily be noticed as a kind of a symbolic background:

   (1) Now usually the region is officially called (by the UN, EU, NATO etc.) just Kosovo. Sometimes even a dual possible spelling (Kosovo / Kosova) is mentioned by some Western and international organisations – certainly with the respect to a multicultural (predominantly bicultural) nature of this land; whereas Albanian nationalists use the spelling: Kosova. Meanwhile, all that in fact openly ignores the region’s constitutional name (Kosovo and Metohija) within the legal framework of the still de-jure sovereign power – Serbia.

   (2) Albanian red-and-black national flags are hoisted on the most of official buildings (with the exception of the predominantly Serbs-populated areas), even though this banner is not in any way officially recognised by any supreme legitimate authority in this region. And certainly there are no Serbian flags (those of the still de-jure sovereign power) in those parts of the region that are populated by the Albanian majority.

   (3) No organisers and executors of massive atrocities against local Serbs (plunder and destruction of their property and in fact brutal ethnic cleansing) on the 17th of March, 2004 have been found. And seemingly nobody among the international and local authorities is interested in bringing to justice the active protagonists of these events of prime importance. Silencing this and similar chapters of Kosovo criminal and political history is probably viewed as the best tool for appeasement.

   (4) Serbian language is no more studied at schools in the most of Kosovo (i.e. with the exception of Serbs-populated areas).

   (5) Faits accomplis (accomplished facts) policy is expected by the majority of local people to be implemented, and this approach is tacitly promoted by official representatives (in the region) of the international community.

   What is (and should be) the legal (and moral) starting point for the final solution?

   The faits accomplis policy, or alternatively – a kind of policy of rectification and moral commitment to the natural justice both have a number of important major dimensions:

   (1) Specifying the type of a desired general status of the region, and of its two major ethno-territorial components:
   (a) either a nominal (formal) independence; or some kind of a wide autonomy; or partition and possible absorption (by a kin neighbouring nation);
   (b) the type of cultural and political regime in the region: pluralistic multiculturalism, formal multiculturalism with an imposed particular cultural hegemony, uniculturalism with some elements of local cultural autonomy (in particular districts);
   (c) internal borderlines between the main communities, and the status of zones allocated to these communities.

   (2) Making absolutely clear the “official” interpretation of the recent history (in particular, from 1999), including unequivocally defining those who are the responsible (guilty) and those who are the victims – the relevant strata and particular groups of individuals.

   (3) Defining what particular inter-communal de-facto situation (general co-relation of forces – and especially as to the territory and property control, and the number of each ethnic community’s legitimate present and potential residents) should be the basis (the legal starting point) for finding a fair solution in relation to communities’ and each individual person’s issues:
   (a) either the pre-1999 situation (taking into account all those who lived in Kosovo and Metohija by 1999, and disregarding the present quite numerous new settlers),
   (b) or there should be some other date (and the de-facto situation) taken as a starting point, e.g. 1991, or 2004 (on the eve of mass campaign of intimidation, setting fire, plundering and expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo), or 2007, e.g. the date of unilateral proclamation of independence of Kosovo by radical Albanian nationalists that is expected for November – December 2007.

   (4) Defining those (individuals and legal entities) who are entitled to the relevant property in the region, and those who have illegally seized other persons’ and legal entities’ property and thus have to return that ownership to the legitimate owners or somehow reach fair (and mutually acceptable) arrangements with them.

   (5) Reliable and safe security arrangements:
   (a) on the level of the region – Kosovo and Metohija (taking into account its impact on Europe and the neighbouring regions in general);
   (b) on the level of each community zone;
   (c) on the grass-root (local and micro-) level, including particular sites of special historic and spiritual importance).

   (6) Specifying and accepting the forced, in fact mandatory concessions vis-à-vis vested geo-strategic interests – conditions sine qua non – such as e.g. US (and possibly other NATO nations) military bases and other components of the system of “limited sovereignty” and “supervised independence”, either of Kosovo itself or (theoretically) of Serbia (in the utterly improbable case of preserving the whole of Kosovo and Metohija as its autonomous region).

   The major question is if there should rather be one Kosovo or two Kosovos, i.e. should there be a common future or a separate (dissimilar) future for the ethno-territorial communities (zones)?

   If case of one Kosovo, there are several possible concepts and the relevant possible functional models:

   (a) A de-facto Albanian state “granting” certain cultural rights to ethnic minorities, and in particular to Serbs concentrated in some districts in which international forces would guarantee security and (relative) peace.

   (b) An Albanian-dominated state with several quasi-autonomous districts with predominantly Serbian population and with an international control over the sacred places of Serbs and Christian Orthodox in general.

   (c) A cantonal state of a Bosnia–Herzegovina type.

   (d) A cantonal and micro-cantonal state of a probably still unknown type. Under such arrangements a very painful initial basic delimitation (splitting) on a micro-level is undertaken: creating initial (tentative) micro-enclaves and exclaves (irrespective of their space and location – even comprising only a monastery/church, or a farm, or even one house etc.) on the basis of inter-community lines on the historic date chosen as a starting point for all calculations and delimitation. And afterwards such new state-building process moves to a stage of possible exchanges of the enclaves or buying them off (on the basis of mutual consent), and other forms of “payments” from one to another community “record-book” and forming the final “balance-sheet” that would define the boundaries of community zones, their major assets and budgets (including the sources for the re-payment of losses during the previous years and for the former, present or forthcoming vivid injustices and/or discomfort.

   In case of two Kosovos, there seam to be the following two major concepts of nation-building:

   (a) Delimitation of the boundaries between an independent Albanian Kosovo and the northern (Serbs populated) area which will independently decide on its future (including the option of joining Serbia per se), and deciding upon the status of Serbian, Christian Orthodox sacred places – enclaves of an exceptional spiritual and/or historic value (e.g. recognising them as Serbian territory with the provision of security by the international police or military forces).

   (b) Creation of Albanian and Serbian cantons and micro-cantons, each one of those entitled to choose their future status (either joining the relevant new state, or the neighbouring kin country).

   In any case, it’s quite difficult to avoid an extensive relocation of representatives of the major ethnic groups (including the return of refugees) to the allocated ethnic communities zones. (There is a “rich”, extensive experience of such policies during and after the Second Wold War, and after a number of other wars and ethnic conflicts.)

   Can principles of fairness, stability and sustainability, relative comfort be applied to all parties involved?

   Currently we are observing attempts to implement a principle of punishing not only the tyrants and the regime, but the people who suffered under them, and who were induced into a historic trap (or may be even seduced) by those tyrants and the regime.

   It is a well-known political principle widely implemented throughout the 20th century – leading to a forceful relocation of people, ethnic cleansing, change of traditional (historic) borderlines etc. For some historic reason Serbs became those who have written the relevant final chapter in that particular story of the 20th century and brought this story with them into the 21st century.

   And it becomes quite obvious why indeed now, in the beginning of the 21st century, especially the Japanese and also recently the German diplomacy give some signs of perceiving the dangers of perpetuating such practices – of victimising and stigmatising particular ethnic groups representing the majority of the looser nation (looser at some particular moment, within a specific “chapter” of history, and most probably not forever, as Japanese, Germans and Italians have clearly proved).

   The policy of implementation in Kosovo of principles of fairness, stability and sustainability, and guaranteeing relative comfort to all parties involved into the current crisis (including the institutionalised geo-strategic interests and projects) would provide for setting of an important pattern. It will definitely have a positive effect on final settling of Georgia / Abkhazia / South Osetia, Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova / Pridnestrovie (Transnistria) ethno-territorial conflicts. Comprehensive solutions would have to be based on adjusting the existing administrative and de-facto borders and the appreciation of the will of the people of the presently unrecognised, though de-facto independent, separatist states. And it would definitely provide for the real détente in the relations between a number of nations, and for strengthening of peace and stability in the environment of greater justice in the entire world.

   In fact, the Balkans and some other war- and hatred-torn regions are facing the strategic choice between:

   (a) perpetuating the predominance of vested geo-strategic interests (quite often rather concerned with their own expansion then with the regional stability and sustainability) combined with the stubborn reluctance of unrealistic nationalists to take into account the basic values and interest of “the other side”; and

   (b) innovative approaches leading to a comprehensive compromise that definitely excludes the use of double standards, rejects a priori appointing of the “guilty” nations and those, in contrast, – “unlawfully suffering” ones.

   The future definitely belongs to constructive and realistic strategic approaches, and even in the short- and middle-term perspective balanced politics still have some chance to prevail in the Balkans and in a number of other areas of current destructive and latent inter-regional and inter-ethnic conflicts and tensions.

   Ljubljana, 11 March, 2008

   Milo P. The Conclusion of Kosovo Status – Contribution for Peace and Stability in the Western Balkans. In: National and Inter-Ethnic Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Western Balkans. Proceedings of the ECPD International Symposium. Belgrade, October 28-29, 2005. / Editors: Takehiro Togo and Negoslav P. Ostojic. – Belgrade: European Center for Peace and Development of the University for Peace established by the United Nations, 2006. – P. 42.

   Manley M. Jamaica. Struggle in the Periphery. – London: Third World Media Ltd., Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative Society Ltd., 1982. – P. 28-38, 42, 50, 92, 149, 186.

   Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity / Edited by Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich. – Lanham; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. – P. 24-25, 71, 77-78.

5. aletheia kallos, on March 24th, 2008 at 10:01 am Said:

   & there are other eruptions of common sense such as this one found at
   http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2008/03/24/a-united-cyprus-first-fruit-of-kosovas-independence/

   The perfect is the enemy of the good

   A united Cyprus: First fruit of Kosova’s independence ?

   We were warned that recognising Kosova’s independence would open a Pandora’s box, triggering global chaos by encouraging innumerable other secessionist territories across the world to declare their own independence in the hope of recognition. The threatened consequence was always something of a non-sequitur, since the secessionist territories most frequently cited - Northern Cyprus, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria - had all already seceded from the countries to which they formally belong. How could recognition of Kosova’s independence spark the secession of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), when the TRNC had already declared independence from Cyprus back in 1983, twenty-five years before Kosova was recognised ? It’s a riddle to which President Vladimir Putin of Eurasia no doubt has the answer, one that he may reveal to us in the course of his current propaganda war against Oceania. Putin is himself fond of the supposed Kosova - TRNC parallel. It is therefore particularly poignant that the recognition of Kosova’s independence appears to be having the exact opposite result to the one that he and other prophets of doom predicted. Namely, on Friday, the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat and Cyprus’s newly elected president Dimitris Christofias met and agreed to restart negotiations on reunifying the country.

   There is reason to believe that this positive development is not unrelated to the independence of Kosova, as Professor Mehmet Ozcan of the International Strategic Research Organisation has persuasively suggested. Under Christofias’s hardline nationalist predecessor Tassos Papadopoulos, it was the Greek Cypriots, not the Turkish Cypriots, who were most to blame for obstructing Cypriot unity. In a referendum in 2004, the UN’s Annan Plan for Cyprus’s reunification was overwhelmingly approved by the Turkish Cypriot electorate but, on Papadopoulos’s urging, overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriot electorate. Papadopoulos believed that, with Cyprus entering the EU and able to veto Turkey’s entry, he would eventually be able to extract more favourable terms from the Turks than those represented by the Annan Plan. It is also entirely possible that he actually preferred a permanently divided Cyprus to one reunited on the basis of an Annan-style compromise; at the very least, he was prepared to postpone reunification for the forseeable future. From the perspective of most Greek Cypriots who would like in principle to see their country reunited, this strategy only made sense if it was indeed going to lead to unity on favourable terms in the long run. But the upcoming recognition of Kosova’s independence showed them that the international community could not be relied upon to uphold the principle of the inviolability of state borders indefinitely, particularly when it was a question of a country, such as Serbia or Cyprus, whose leaders were behaving consistently unreasonably. Hence the surprise electoral victory of the moderate Christofias last month. Symbolically, the first round of Cyprus’s presidential election, in which Papadopoulos came third and was therefore knocked out, took place on 17 February - Kosova’s independence day.

   As leader of the Communist AKEL party, Christofias represented the non-nationalist option. AKEL has long upheld a cross-national ideology of brotherhood and unity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and has a history of persecution at the hands of both Greek and Turkish extremists. When, prior to his meeting with Talat, Christofias was asked by a reporter whether they would be drinking Greek or Turkish coffee (they are the same drink), Christofias replied ‘Cypriot coffee, we will both be having Cypriot coffee’. Christofias and AKEL should not be viewed through rose-tinted spectacles; they opportunistically collaborated with Papadopoulos, helping to bring him to power and defeat the Annan Plan. Christofias continues to follow the Greek-nationalist line of insisting that Macedonia change its name. Nevertheless, under his leadership, Cyprus’s prospects for reunification seem incomparably better than they did barely more than a month ago.

   The other element of the equation is that Talat did not respond to Kosova’s recognition by launching a new separatist drive, as the anti-Kosovar prophets of doom had predicted. Indeed, he explicitly rejected a parallel between Kosova and the TRNC: ‘We do not see a direct link between the situation in Kosovo and the Cyprus Problem. These problems have come up through different conditions.’ And he is right. Although it was the Greek side that was primarily responsible for provoking the crisis that culminated in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and although Turkey arguably had a legal basis for its invasion, nevertheless the form that this invasion took, involving as it did the dismemberment of the country and the ethnic-cleansing of the Greek population of the north, constituted an act of aggression and conquest. The Turkish Cypriot entity that became the TRNC in 1983 was therefore an artificial product of foreign invasion and ethnic cleansing - in contrast to Kosova, which was established as an autonomous region under the legitimate Yugoslav authorities, and whose Albanian demographic majority predated its conquest by Serbia in 1912.

   Talat may or may not recognise this distinction between Kosova and the TRNC. But he is undoubtedly aware of something of which the prophets of doom are not, but which is blindingly obvious: the fact that Kosova is being recognised internationally does not mean that other secessionist territories will be recognised internationally. The ’Pandora’s box’ model would only hold true if a secessionist territory, encouraged by Kosova’s recognition, could translate this sense of encouragement into international recognition. As there is no way for a secessionist territory to do this, the model does not hold. The prospects of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria for recognition by Russia may have improved, but this would be because of a conscious policy decision on Moscow’s part, not because the territories in question felt ‘inspired’ by Kosova’s recognition. Talat is no knee-jerk separatist but a rational, moderate politician who supported the Annan Plan; he has no reason to jeopardise the Turkish Cypriot community’s chance to enter the EU because of Kosova.

   There is a final lesson to be learned from this. Although Cyprus has much more justice on its side vis-a-vis the TRNC than Serbia has vis-a-vis Kosova, yet it is Christofias who speaks the language of reconciliation and ‘Cypriot coffee’. Serbia’s leaders have never been able to speak in this way to the Kosova Albanians; they did not speak of Kosova and Serbia as lands that belonged alike to Serbs and Albanians, or speak of the fraternity of the two peoples. Christofias may understand something that Serbia’s Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and President Boris Tadic clearly do not: that if you want to keep your country united and prevent one of its peoples from seceding, you need to treat the latter as your fellow countrymen and women, not as the enemy.

   This is a lesson that should be learned by all regimes around the world whose oppression drives subject peoples to secede: if you want to avoid losing part of your territory, it pays to be reasonable. Meanwhile, the leaders of the Western alliance may congratulate themselves on having, with their decision to recognise Kosova, helped to promote stability and reconciliation in South East Europe and the resolution of an old conflict in their ranks.

   This article was published today on the website of the Henry Jackson Society.

   & of course
   voluntarily blended societies are the grooviest
   as any american canuck ozzie european etc will attest

   but in the meantime & anytime
   let birds of a feather flock together
   & relay that cosmic egg

6. aletheia kallos, on March 24th, 2008 at 2:49 pm Said:

   Serbia, Kosovo: Serbia Proposes Ethnic Enclaves For Serbs In Kosovo
   March 24, 2008 | 1728 GMT
   Serbia has presented the United Nations with a proposal to segregate Kosovo into Serbian and Albanian sections, RIA Novosti reported March 24. The proposal suggests that a Serbian force under the supervision of the U.N. mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) take over the police, customs and judiciary in Serbian-majority regions of Kosovo. Serbia also is proposing a ban on trade barriers between Kosovo and Serbia. Serbian Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic delivered the proposal to UNMIK on March 16.

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