UN-Truth

Haaretz is reporting today that the Israeli Foreign Ministry (Tzipi Livni is FM) is disputing claims made by the office of the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to justify Israel’s final offensive in its 2006 war against Lebanon, in response to Hizballah’s kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and killing others. In that final offensive, 33 Israeli soldiers were killed, Haaretz says.

A very large number of Israeli cluster bombs were also used in that final offensive, and the bomblets are still causing Lebanese victims.

These revelations are coming in advance of the publication of the Winograd Commission report, due on 30 January, which is expected to make Olmert’s position very difficult. It is also expected to put Defense Minister Ehud Barak in a difficult position — he was not involved in the decision-.making during the war, but he has made ferocious criticisms of the government decisions, and has threatened to resign if Olmert does not. But, that will make the Israeli government coalition no longer tenable. Meanwhile, Tzipi Livni earlier called on Olmert to resign, just after then end of the war — but he did not, and she stayed on anyway, evoking a number of criticisms.

Meanwhile, Haaretz’s arguments focus on the negotiations for the now-sacrosanct UNSC resolution 1701, against which the Israeli military decisions are now being compared. The Haaretz argument is a little hard to follow (at least in English), but here it is:

“According to documents and testimony received by Haaretz, the final version of the resolution, before the offensive, was not ‘unacceptable for Israel’, as Olmert and Peretz claimed, and the differences from the version of the resolution that was passed were slight. Moreover, the ground offensive began while the final version had been finalized, and had no impact on its content. The different drafts of the resolution is one of the main questions the Winograd Committee report due on January 30 is expected to address. The IDF began its final ground offensive after a green light from Olmert, during the night of August 11, 2006. The forces were ordered to proceed and take up positions along the Litani River in anticipation of a cease-fire that was due to go into effect 60 hours later. In practice, the forces failed in their mission and their progress was stopped, by orders of the political leadership, even before a cease-fire began. On Thursday, August 10, at 4 P.M., deliberations in the Prime Minister’s Bureau began with the U.S. envoy, David Welch, and the legal adviser at the State Department, Jonathan Schwartz. At the end of the meeting, three hours later, a draft of 1701 that was acceptable both to the U.S. and Israel was reached. The Foreign Ministry’s document evaluating the various drafts of the resolution dubbed this version the ‘Welch Draft’. It was clear that changes might take place when the Americans negotiated the draft at the United Nations with the French, who represented the position of the Lebanese government. A new draft was received by Israel’s ambassador to the UN, Danny Gillerman, following talks between the U.S. and French ambassadors to the international body. This draft served as the main reason for the final ground offensive. Israel applied intense diplomatic pressure on the U.S. and France for changes to this draft, which were included. The final version was sent to Jerusalem on Friday, August 11, a little after 8 P.M. At that time the IDF had only begun flying forces deep into southern Lebanon, which was the first part of the ground offensive. On Saturday, August 12, at 2:52 A.M., Resolution 1701 was passed at the Security Council. This was the version that Israel received seven hours earlier. Sources close to the prime minister said on Saturday there were a number of reasons the final ground offensive went ahead. But it mainly stemmed from the feeling that there might be a last-minute softening in the American position, accepting the French/Lebanese demands, the sources said. Meawnhile, one of the four individuals advising Olmert on August 11, 2006 – the day he decided to initiate the major ground offensive toward the end of the Second Lebanon War – says he advised against the operation and suggested a series of feints instead. Major General (res.) Amiram Levine, told Haaretz on Saturday that he suggested the prime minister make do with creating the impression among Hezbollah and the international community that the Israel Defense Forces were about to advance in Lebanon”. [But this advice was ignored...] This article was published in Haaretz here.

A summary of the Hebrew-language version of the Haaretz article, offered by the Israeli Government Press Office, gives this timetable explanation of their report:

10 August – PM’s people discussed Security Council draft agreement with US administration emissaries.

11 August, 04:00 – Israel receives draft defined as “bad for Israel.”

15:00 – Rice tells Livni: two of four problematic clauses have been changed for your benefit.

16:50 – Olmert: “Start operation.”

Contacts on changing draft continue.

20:00 – Israel receives final version.

First forces land in Lebanon one hour later.

Filed under: Israel, Lebanon, UN Security Council