Hossein Mousavian, a former lead Iranian nuclear negotiator has relocated to America, taking up residence at Princeton University, the Wall Street Journal reported today.
Actually, he’s apparently been at Princeton for ten months already.
Mousavian was been Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami [who preceeded the present President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad], then later then deputy head of the Strategic Research Center of Iran’s Expediency Council.
The WSJ wrote that “In September, Mr. Mousavian, 53 years old, arrived at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs as a visiting scholar, where he has been writing on Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy and U.S.-Iranian relations. Neither Princeton nor the Obama administration would comment on the Iranian diplomat’s stay in the U.S., but American and European diplomats engaged in nuclear diplomacy with Iran say they are closely scrutinizing Mr. Mousavian’s work for insights into Tehran’s decision making”.
In the photo below, which was probably taken in 2003, Mousavian (on right side of photo) is seen talking to another Iranian diplomat Amir Zamaniniya (on left).
Mousavian, a former Ambassador of Iran to Germany, and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was instrumental in what was — for those Iranian officials involved — a risky agreement to freeze Iran’s nuclear program in 2003 to allow for negotiations with European states, observed by the U.S. But it did not result in any diplomatic movement. There were American elections first. Then, in 2005, there were Iranian elections, and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad won — radically changing the Iranian political landscape.
The WSJ article continues: “Mr. Mousavian said in his first interview since arriving at Princeton that he wasn’t in the U.S. to rally support for Tehran’s political opposition, known as the Green Movement. He said he is focused on his academic work and recovering from an illness contracted during his imprisonment and subsequent legal battles. He said he intends to return to Tehran at some point. ‘I don’t need asylum from any country, and I would never apply for it’, he said” …
The WSJ article continued: “In addition to Mr. Mousavian, a slew of other senior Iranian bureaucrats, diplomats and opposition figures have either been sidelined or fled to the West since opposition protesters challenged Mr. Ahmadinejad’s re-election a year ago, resulting in a broad government crackdown. Javad Zarif, a pro-engagement former ambassador to the UN, is under virtual house arrest in Tehran, said Western officials. [n.b. – this may have been in effect well before the Green Movement protests] Top aides to Iran’s two leading opposition figures, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, have also been forced to set up political bases overseas … Individuals who have met Mr. Mousavian said he is deeply concerned by the developments inside Iran following last year’s presidential election, which many Iranians claimed was rigged to insure Mr. Ahmadinejad’s re-election, a charge Tehran denies.”
Here, again, the WSJ may be linking two different phenomena — Mr. Mousavian may, for example, be more immediately concerned about developments related to the country’s nuclear program and its implication for policy than with the democracy movement.
As far back as December 2007, one of Iran’s former President, Khatami, did lump Mousavian, Zarif, and Sirous Nasseri together with protesting students — actually, Khatami defended all of them, as we reported earlier here. However, the students were not necessarily working together with the former Iranian diplomats.
As the WSJ story reported: “Mr. Mousavian continues to press for the U.S. to engage Tehran in a bid to reduce regional tensions, according to writings viewed by The Wall Street Journal [papers that have been distributed inside Princeton] … He argues that any Iranian government, even one headed by opposition political leaders, would remain committed to developing the infrastructure to produce nuclear fuel. But he says improved trust between Washington and Tehran could still allow for necessary safeguards to be put in place to guard against Iran building atomic weapons … He also says the U.S. should develop with Tehran a broad security plan for the Persian Gulf that could prove crucial to securing the free flow of energy in and out of the strategic waterway … “Thirty years of hostilities between Tehran and Washington has only served to diminish the security in the region”, [he wrote]. Mr. Mousavian, in spite of his close ties to Mr. Rafsanjani, played down the prospects for any quick leadership change in Tehran and said a move toward democracy could only be stimulated from inside … “Iran is not in a pre-revolutionary state”, Mr. Mousavian writes”. This is posted here.
Iran’s President Ahmadinejad went after Mousavian with particular zeal, interfering to deepen his legal problems [opposing his release on bail in May 2007, and later saying he believed Mousavian was a “spy”, despite the acquittal in court on most charges, as we reported here.
Mousavian was arrested in May 2007, released a couple of weeks later on bail, then rearrested and put on trial in November 2007, when he was acquitted on the most serious charges of “spying” and “holding confidential documents”, but was apparently found guilty of “engaging in propaganda against the state”. On 9 April 2008, Iran’s National Nuclear Day, Mousavian was reportedly received a two-year suspended sentence — and a five-year ban on being named to foreign policy or diplomatic positions, on the grounds that he had harmed national security.
Among our other earlier posts following Mr. Mousavian’s ordeal are:
here.
Ahmadeinejad threatens to reveal Mousavian’s conversations with “foreigners”
Posted on November 29th, 2007 – here.
Mousavian aquitted of spying – but found guilty of working against system
Posted on November 27th, 2007 – here.
Mousavian rearrested
Posted on November 16th, 2007 – here.
Good news — Mousavian free on bail ($225,000)
Posted on May 9th, 2007 here.
Mousavian remains in Evin Prison, under interrogation for “spying”
Posted on May 6th, 2007 – here.
Hossein Mousavian reported under arrest in Iran
Posted on May 2nd, 2007 here.
Iran’s Dilemma
Posted on March 25th, 2007 – here.
UN Security Council unanimously votes to tighten sanctions against Iran — even before 3pm in NY
Posted on March 24th, 2007 – here.
In the photo below, Mousavian is second from left, participating in an panel discussion on 21 March 2007 at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GSCP):
In his public statement at that meeting in Geneva, Dr. Mousavian said that “Iran’s nuclear issue is unduly blown out of proportion and falsely presented as a proliferation challenge. The United States has tried hard to portray Iran’s case as an international security crisis, and because of the power it wields at the international level, Chapter VII label, that is: threat to international peace and security, was placed on Iran’s case in the Security Council”. Instead, he said, “Iran’s nuclear issue is one that needs to be resolved through persuasion, cooperation and engagement”.
He said in the GCSP discussion that “When and if [the P] 5+1 gain Iran’ confidence, and negotiation would proceed in a mutually agreed direction, Iran should technically be able to demonstrate that it is under no time pressure to begin its commercial-scale enrichment for fabrication of nuclear fuel”.
European negotiators call the P5 [the five Permanent members of the UN Security Council ]+1 [Germany] the 3+3 [meaning 3 Europeans — Britain, France, and Germany, and 3 others — the. U.S., Russia, and China].
In a later interview, Mousavian explained that “This, for example can be an idea: If the negotiation can start with good faith in recognizing Iranian rights, and assuring Iran, then Iran can also show the signal of tolerance for time in order to reach commercial production, because Iran has enough time, and we can discuss with the partners, 5+1, to reach industrial scale in a phased approach”.
At the time, we wrote on this blog that “In March 2005, Iran apparently suggested to European negotiators that it might be willing to limit its number of cascaded centrifuges to 3000. But, in Geneva … Dr. Mousavian signalled that Iran intended to go ahead to reach industrial-scale production of (lightly) enriched uranium used to operate civilian nuclear power plants. One problem is that once mastered, the same process could simply be extended to produce the highly-enriched uranium used in the production of nuclear weapons, which is apparently the cause of much international concern. Asked about the doubts many have concerning the possibility of a future weapons program, Mousavian replied that ‘Iranians are only concerned about their rights, discrimination against Iran, and attempts to deprive Iran from their legitimate right. This is the basis for Iranian behavior’. Iran’s right, as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to the full nuclear fuel cycle must be recognized, Dr. Mousavian said. It should not be a question of who takes the first step, he added. ‘Iran should take one step, 5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) at the same time simultaneously should take one step: 5+1 should recognize the right of Iran for fuel cycle in the framework of NPT, the exercise of the right with no discrimination, compared to any other NPT member — this is the step from 5+1. And Iranian side I believe should be cooperative with the IAEA, for transparency, for confidence-building measures, in the framework of international rules and regulations — (but) not beyond. Therefore the two parties should take two steps simultaneously and together”. So far, he acknowledged, this proposal is not yet on the table”.
We also noted that “During the meeting at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, Dr. Mousavian got an earful of reproaches about Iran’s position, along with some suggestions intended to be helpful. The world’s problem with Iran’s nuclear program, said Dr. Patricia Lewis of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), addressing Dr. Mousavian in the discussion, “could be likened to a wife discovering that her husband had been less than honest with her about his time and activities, and that he has perhaps indeed been out with a number of different women. ‘It could all be perfectly innocent’ Dr. Lewis said, ‘But, believe me, Ambassador, it would take more than chocolates and flowers to make up to a wife who is feeling that way’. Dr. Lewis said that Iran’s case highlighted some of the most difficult issues that must now be dealt with under the NPT: ‘the issue of intent, and the issue of peaceful purposes, and how do we ascertain purpose, and intent, in the international system’, she said. ‘This has really been the crux of the matter vis-a-vis Iran. It was indeed the crux of the matter vis-a-vis Iraq. And, indeed, because of the lack of faith in the intent and purposes that were discovered as a result of what happened in ’91 — the discovery of a very near-nuclear-weapons fulfillment in that time — that led us up to war in 2003. And, make no mistake, we’re not at that stage now, perhaps, but we’re certainly at a very dangerous stage in this negotiation, and this discussion’, Dr. Lewis told the audience [in Geneva in March 2007]. Dr. Lewis said that ‘There is no smoking gun. There is no absolute evidence that Iran is on a path to have nuclear weapons. The problem with this is that Iran is now in a trust deficit’.
Dr. Mousavian replied, at that time [March 2007] in Geneva, that Iran had only signed [but not ratified] an Additional Protocol, allowing more and more intrusive NPT inspections, in December 2003 — and was therefore not obliged to report these activities prior to that date.