The full televised version of the interview of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas by Israeli Channel Two TV was ten minutes long, and was aired on November 2.
It can be viewed on Youtube here, or — with all the ads — on Israel Channel Two’s website here.
But, it was 2-minute preview aired the night before that got the most play, at least here in the region.
DID ABBAS RENOUNCE THE RIGHT OF RETURN?
In that 2-minute preview, Abbas responded to the mention that he was born in Safed [in the 193os, under the British Mandate], by stating that he personally has no intention to live there any more [unsaid: under Israeli rule], but that he would like to visit there — which is his “right”, he stressed, and which he said he has already done at least once [together, he indicated, with someone else sitting in the room at the time the interview took place].
It was the remark that he “had no right” to live in Safed [because it is in Israel, and he lives in Ramallah, in Palestine] which drew the most negative reaction — many Palestinians and their supporters vilified Abbas for supposedly giving up the Right of Return. Abbas’ team put out subsequent messages saying this was not true — but these messages were neither convincing nor persuasive. But there was not a lot of back-and-forth on this [or any other matter] …
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Abir Kopty observed on Twitter just after the full interview aired: “@AbirKopty – The interview was very short, they took from #Abbas what they wanted to hear and said bye bye!“
Abbas was speaking from a position that is based on the Camp David talks in late July 2000 [between Israel’s then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the late Yasser Arafat]. In these talks, which led to no conclusion, as well as in subsequent talks in Taba in January 2001, which also led nowhere as Barak lost reelection, the Israeli team stressed what is a majority position in Israel: there can be no “Right of Return”, and any “return” will be minimal and miniscule. A formulation to make this somewhat more palatable to Palestinians was mentioned in these talks, and was in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2000 by Israel’s Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, who said that Palestinian refugees can only “return” to a future Palestinian state [as it later emerged, and this can happen only with Israeli control and approval].
This was also the formula adopted by the Geneva Initiative between Israeli + Palestinian “civil society” — and was one of the main reasons that many Palestinians scorned, and denounced it. But some others, who were involved with the Geneva Initiative [including Abbas, though invisibly] believe that it was the only way to move things forward.
What Abbas was saying in the interview conformed to that negotiating position.
This whole matter is rarely ever discussed fully + clearly among Palestinians, in part because feelings are so strong and positions are so…determined.
The interview was conducted by Israeli Channel Two TV’s Udi Segal, who shot rapid-fire questions in English. Abbas began to answer in Arabic, but after about four minutes he switched into English.
WHY DID ABBAS SWITCH FROM ARABIC TO ENGLISH?
Could it have been because of the word [land] “SWAPS”?
It is, apparently, quite difficult to say “swaps” in Arabic.
Abbas switched into English at the moment that the subject of previous negotiations was introduced — about four minutes into the ten-minute interview. Negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians are almost always conducted in English. The original language for all the agreed documents was in English. It was easier for Abbas to speak about the negotiations in English than in Arabic.
SWAPS
The concept of land swaps — and on a 1:1 basis [same size, same quality of land] — is one of the distinctive innovations of the Geneva Initiative which was supposedly agreed between members of Israeli and Palestinian “civil society” [though the participants in this effort were derided as “has-been” and “wanna be” politicians.
Abbas’ name was not attached publicly to the Geneva Initiative, which is supposed to have been shaped by Israeli politician Yossi Beilin and Palestinian politician Yasser Abed Rabbo.
[One of the big questions at the time was whether Arafat backed it or not. Arafat was coy, but he gave clear logistical support to the Palestinian team, showing that it had his favor.
The document that formed the basis of the Geneva Initiative itself was drafted by Daniel Levy on behalf of Yossi Beilin, and Ghaith al-Omary on behalf of…. well, not Abed Rabbo, because al-Omary worked directly with Mahmoud Abbas, out of what eventually became the PLO Negotiations Support.
But, Abbas’ backing for the Geneva Initiative, invisible though it was, at the same time was nothing new or recent. A PLO backgrounder describing the Palestinian delegation to September 2010 direct talks in Washington said: “In 1974, he [Abbas] was responsible for opening channels of communications with Israeli peace groups groups + was the primary force behind the PNC’s [Palestine National Council’s] decision to work with these groups” [Israeli peace groups].
UPDATE: the Fateh International Relations Committee in Ramallah put out a statement of damage control, saying: “As a deep believer in peaceful coexistence with the Israelis President Abbas never stops inviting Israeli leaders and journalists to the Moqataa compound in Ramallah to relay the message of peace to his Israeli interlocutors… By insisting on his declared policy of non-violence President Abbas didn’t drop the option of non-violent resistance against a vicious Israeli military occupation, yet declined the use of violence or the eruption of a third violent Intifada… He vowed to carry on his UN efforts asking for non-member state status at the UN General Assembly. In a moment of waning two-state solution and in a world order based on double standards and the absence of Super powers fairness, President Abbas will respect the results of U.S. elections and advance Palestinian UN bid in November”. This was posted here.
THE GENEVA INITIATIVE, AGAIN
A few weeks ago, a group of influential or formerly influential Israeli ex-officials and military men, mostly linked somehow to the Israeli team of the Geneva “civil society” Initiative [2003] to advance stalled negotiations between the two leaderships, visited Abbas in the Ramallah Muqata’a, and urged Abbas to address the Israeli people directly. One suggestion was that that Abbas should address the Knesset [the precedent was Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem — which would have been rather unpalatable for the Palestinian leadership at this point]. Another suggestion was that Abbas should come and speak at the annual commemoration of the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
So, the idea was to pursue the TV interview.
Abbas was woefully-unprepared, and he is insulated and over-protected in any case. He travels around Ramallah in a 15-vehicle convoy with the Presidential Guard deployed all along his route to stop traffic, to general annoyance. He simply dismisses anyone who says something he does not like. His handlers will not tell him how much he’s isolated, or how badly he fumbled + misspoke. [Criticism will be blamed on a plot, on ill-will, on attempts to thwart Abbas’ policies]. Abbas will not be told point-blank that he failed to appeal to target audience and further alienated his own people.
The result was…this interview, and its aftermath
Back to the Abbas interview — once speaking in English, he apparently felt he had to continue in English — and it became clear to those of us who haven’t heard Mahmoud Abbas speak at any great length in English that he was not on the most solid ground.
IT WAS NOT SO MUCH WHAT ABBAS SAID — WHICH WAS NOT NEW — BUT RATHER HOW HE SPOKE
It seems clear, after several viewings, that Abbas had been briefed by Israeli Channel Two TV about what the questions would be, in advance, but stumbled when trying to answer.
Of course Abbas was rehearsed, by his team of advisers. It was clear during the interview that he had a list of points that he wanted to make. When Segal said “preconditions”, Abbas launched on an answer about “settlements”.
But, he rushed into making his points.
He thought that it did not matter — he thought that it was his intention that counted, and his intention was to calm and reassure the Israeli people.
But, he left many of his own people sinking into even greater anger and despair.
In Ramallah, many people have not seen full 10-min. Abbas interview aired by Israeli TV Ch 2 — only what Al-Jazeera’s showed [just the 2-min preview clip]. All who I spoke to in Ramallah said they knew what Abbas said was not new [for him], but they did not like the way he said it, or how he spoke. They said it was not the way a President should speak.
For people who discussed this with me in Ramallah, seeing Abbas’ interview clip was like re-living the Palestine Papers revelations [in a five-part series broadcast on Al-Jazeera in January 2011].
The reaction was slow, but strong.
UPDATE: The New York Times reported that Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, head of PASSIA [the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs], commented about the Abbas remarksL “He has been doing many mistakes, and this is one of them — his vocabulary was totally wrong…He underestimated the reaction; he underestimated the anger and the frustration in the society; he underestimated his constituency. It’s very clear that he’s not the hero, he’s not the liberator, he’s not the leader”. This is reported here.