A Guest Post from Aletheia Kallos/MD:
from
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/geopolitical_diary_syria_and_israel_hint_peace_talks
Geopolitical Diary: Syria and Israel Hint at Peace Talks
April 24, 2008 | 0154 GMT
The morning of April 21, we woke up to a report in the Syrian media saying that Israel had agreed to hand the Golan Heights back to Syria in exchange for a peace agreement. The Syrian story was reported in the Israeli media, with no comment from the Olmert government, although several Israeli politicians vigorously condemned the idea. Since Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was reported to be on vacation, we figured there was a time delay and settled back waiting for the Israeli government to deny the Syrian report.
That’s when it became interesting. Rather than denying the report, Olmert’s spokesman Mark Regev said, “I have nothing to add beyond what the prime minister said on Friday in his interviews with the Israeli press about his desire for peace with Syria.” Olmert had said, “Very clearly we want peace with the Syrians and are taking all manner of action to this end. President Bashar al-Assad knows precisely what our expectations are and we know his. I won’t say more.”
On Wednesday, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem held a press conference in Tehran, of all places, along with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. Al-Moallem said there that “if Israel is serious and wants peace, nothing will stop the renewal of peace talks”. Another Syrian minister, speaking on al Jazeera at about the same time, said that “Olmert is ready for peace with Syria on the grounds of international conditions; on the grounds of the return
of the Golan Heights in full to Syria.”
So now we have the Syrian foreign minister offering peace talks with the Israelis while standing next to the Iranian foreign minister, who apparently did not go into cardiac arrest; another Syrian minister confirming this and implying that the quid pro quo for peace is the Golan Heights; and the Israeli prime minister’s office refusing to deny these reports while referring back to a statement made by the prime minister in which he said that Israel wants peace with
the Syrians and both sides know what the terms are.
This is not quite the same thing as saying that a deal has been made. What it is saying is that the terms of such a deal are clearly understood by both sides and that neither side is walking away from the table, which means that the terms are at least in the ball park — so much so from the Syrian side that it was worth going to Tehran to talk about it with the Iranians, and apparently the Iranians did not back away from Syria. That means that the Syrians not only
have their ally on board, but are signaling the Israelis that the ally — Iran — can live with the terms, which of course opens other vistas.
The talk today has focused on the Golan Heights, at least as far as the Syrians are concerned. From the Israeli point of view, the Heights are not nearly as militarily critical as they once might have appeared. While holding the Heights — which, unlike Gaza, are fairly lightly populated — the Syrians fired artillery at Israeli settlements. That was a problem, but not a strategic threat. Holding the Golan Heights did pose a challenge to the Israelis. In the 1973 War, the Israelis had to fight with their backs to the Golan escarpment in order to block the Syrians. Had the Syrians held the Heights, and the Israelis were in the hills on the other side of the Jordan River, the strategic situation would have been different. The Syrians could not have taken the Israelis by surprise, and the armor descending the Heights would have been in the killing ground for Israeli armor, artillery and missiles as they descended. Moreover, in today’s
military environment, conventional artillery is vulnerable to everything from cruise missiles to helicopters firing Hellfire missiles and to computerized counter-battery fire. Whatever the argument was for taking the Heights in 1967, the military situation has evolved since then.
It is therefore not inconceivable that Olmert would trade the Golan Heights for a peace treaty. But the real issue between Israel and Syria isn’t the Golan Heights. The issue is Lebanon.
Syria’s fundamental interest is to the west, where it has strategic and economic interests. It wants to be the dominant power in Lebanon. Israel also has deep interests in Lebanon, which are primarily defensive. It does not want Lebanon used — primarily by Hezbollah At this point — as a base from which to attack Israel. Israel and Syria had an informal understanding after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon that Syria would have a free hand there and would be expected to control Hezbollah. There is a basis for understanding here as well — one which would leave many Lebanese in a difficult position, but might satisfy Israeli and Syrian interests.
But before that comes the domestic battle in Israel. There are powerful forces that would argue, one, the Golan is much more significant militarily than we have portrayed it here; two, allowing Syria to dominate Lebanon gives Damascus another axis from which to attack Israel later; and three, Israel would find a Syrian-Iranian force to its north over the next generation. These are not trivial arguments and can be reinforced by the Tehran press conference, which signaled that the Syrians are not acting independently of the Iranians.
At the same time, Olmert will argue that peace is worth the risk and point to Egypt as an example. The argument will go on, but now at least we are seeing where the various odd events of the past few weeks were leading — and it is not clear that it cannot end in war. If this falls apart, as it well might, the situation could rapidly spiral out of control as both countries start to maneuver in Lebanon.
All of this is fascinating, but what stands out is the fact that the Iranians have signaled that they can live with a deal with Israel. In the long run, the implications of that are the most interesting”.
stratfor followed up on this analysis with a raft of great questions
from
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/intelligence_guidance_week_april_27_2008
Intelligence Guidance: Week of April 27, 2008
April 25, 2008 | 1946 GMT
> Israel-Syria: Comments by the Syrians on an Israeli offer to exchange the Golan Heights for a peace agreement and the Israeli government’s failure to deny these comments indicate that relations between these two countries have reached a critical point. Since this is the Middle East, all of this could evaporate into nothing or explode into conflict. But if we couple this with Israel’s nonparticipation in the Bush administration’s briefings on the Israeli airstrike against an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor — and by the fact that Israel, by all accounts, asked the United States not to go public with the reasons for the strike — then we have to conclude that something is going on between Israel and Syria. Obviously, the discussions are secret, but now that the issue has broken into the open we need to look for some indicators of progress. One indicator will be opposition Likud party leader Benyamin Netanyahu, who probably will not like the deal. If the deal is locking in, he will have to go public at some point, or some of his colleagues in Likud will. Even if he thinks that the deal has to be made someday, he still will want to make political capital in the meantime. We need to watch the domestic Israeli political scene for indicators on whether these discussions are getting anywhere. So long as the political scene is not in an uproar, everything is either tentative or evaporated.
>Syria-Iran: Along with this, note the Syrians made their announcement in Tehran with Iranian officials present. It is a huge shift for the Iranians even to be present during a discussion of a peace agreement between a Muslim country and Israel. Nevertheless, there they stood. This must be explained. And bear in mind that all this has significance for Iraq as well. If Iran can countenance a Syrian-Israeli deal, all things are possible. We need to watch for Iranian statements on Israel. Any shift in nuance can be significant. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is going to India and will face media scrutiny. This will be an opportunity to gauge his views. Also watch the Iranian media for comments on Israel for any shift. If there is one, it will be subtle.
& all that on the heels of the following perplexities
from
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/geopolitical_diary_bush_administration_briefing_leaves_more_questions_answers
Geopolitical Diary: The Syrian Nuclear Mystery Evolves
April 25, 2008 | 0223 GMT
The Bush administration briefed the U.S. Congress on Thursday about the reasons behind the Sept. 6, 2007, Israeli raid on Syria. According to the secret briefing — the content of which, of course, not only was leaked immediately (as was intended) but was essentially confirmed by a White House spokeswoman — the target was a nuclear reactor, able to produce plutonium, that had been built with the assistance of North Korea. The administration showed a videotape, apparently produced by Israeli intelligence, showing faces that were said to be in the facility and to be clearly Korean.
What is important to note is this information is not new. It is a confirmation of the story leaked by the administration shortly after the attack and also leaked by the Israelis a bit later. The explanation for the attack was that it was designed to take out a reactor in Syria that had been built with North Korean help. There are therefore three questions. First, why did the United States go to such lengths to reveal what it has been saying privately for months? Second, why did the administration do it now? Third, why is the United States explaining an Israeli raid using, at least in part, material provided by Israel? Why isn’t Israel making the revelation?
It has never been clear to us why the Israelis and Americans didn’t immediately announce that the Syrians were building a nuclear reactor. Given American hostility toward Syria over support for jihadists in Iraq, we would have thought that they would have announced it instantly. The explanation we thought most plausible at the time was that the intelligence came from the North Koreans in the course of discussions of their nuclear technology, and since the North Koreans were cooperating, the United States didn’t want to publicly embarrass them. It was the best we could come up with.
The announcement on Thursday seems to debunk that theory, at least to the extent that the primary material displayed was U.S. satellite information and the Israeli video, which was said to have been used to convince the United States of the existence of the reactor and of North Korean involvement. So why didn’t the administration condemn Syria and North Korea on Sept. 7? It still seems to us that part of the explanation is in the state of talks with North Korea over its own program. The North Koreans had said that they would provide technical information on their program — which they haven’t done. Either the United States lost its motivation to protect North Korean feelings because of this or the Bush administration felt that Thursday’s briefings would somehow bring pressure to bear on North Korea. Unless the United States is planning to use these revelations as justification for attacks on the North Koreans, we find it difficult to see how this increases pressure on them.
More interesting is the question of why the United States — and not Israel — is briefing on an Israeli raid. Israeli media reported April 23 that the Israelis had asked the Americans not to brief Congress. The reason given was that the Israelis did not want the United States to embarrass Syria at this point. As we noted on April 23, there appeared to have been some interesting diplomatic moves between Syria and Israel, and it made sense that revealing this information now might increase friction.
If this read is true, then it would appear that the United States briefed deliberately against Israeli wishes. Certainly, the Israelis didn’t participate in the process. One answer could be that the United States is unhappy about Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s moves on Syria and wants to derail them. The United States wanted Syria out of Lebanon. The Israelis have a more complex view of their presence. In some ways, they see the Syrians as a stabilizing force. And they certainly aren’t eager to see Bashar al Assad’s government fall, since whatever might replace the al Assad government would probably be worse from the Israeli point of view. That would mean that the Israelis would want to take out the reactor, but not necessarily rub the Syrians’ nose in it.
So there are two plausible answers to Thursday’s show. One is to increase pressure on North Korea. The second is to derail any Israeli-Syrian peace process. The problem is that it’s hard to see why North Korea is going to be moved by the official declaration of what Washington has been saying from the beginning. The second would assume that U.S.-Israeli relations had deteriorated to the point that the United States had to use this as a lever. That’s tough to believe.
The senior Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, Peter Hoekstra, said after the briefing, “This administration has no credibility on North Korea. A lot of us are beginning to become concerned that the administration is moving away from getting a solid policy solution to ‘let’s make a deal.’”
So that seems to undermine the prep for strike theory. That leaves tension between the United States and Israel as the last standing theory. Not a good theory, but the last standing one.
&
i see a fresh trace of the diplomatic leading edge this hour
from
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/syria_turkish_prime_minister_visits_mediation_effort
Syria: Turkish Prime Minister Visits In Mediation Effort
April 26, 2008 | 2317 GMT
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Damascus April 26 to mediate talks between Syria and Israel, Xinhua reported. Before ending his one-day trip to the Syrian capital, Erdogan told reporters that Syria and Israel had asked Turkey to mediate. He said such efforts would start at a low level but that Turkey will make whatever efforts it can, including sending an envoy to Israel. Earlier in the day, Erdogan met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and talked about the Middle East peace process and bilateral ties, Syria’s official SANA news agency reported.
intriguing times
israel syria peace talks appear to advance again today in ankara
per
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/israel_ambassador_turkey_considers_talks_syria
Israel: Ambassador To Turkey Considers Talks With Syria
April 27, 2008 | 1523 GMT
Israeli Ambassador to Turkey Gaby Levy on April 27 raised the possibility of renewing long-stalled peace talks with Syria, with Turkey as a mediator, Agence France-Presse reported. Speaking from Ankara, Levy told public radio that low-level officials could handle the first step and, if there are results, the talks could continue at “a much higher level.” Levy said he could not reveal any details of the process.
peace may indeed be happening
by fits & starts
per
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/turkey_more_work_do_israel_syria_talks
Turkey: More Work To Do On Israel-Syria Talks
April 28, 2008 | 1256 GMT
Much work needs to be done before Israel and Syria can reach a peace agreement, Haaretz reported April 28, citing Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan. Turkey is trying to restart low-level talks between the two nations, but Babacan said they are only at the beginning of the process. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will send an emissary to brief Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Erdogan’s talks with Syrian President Bashar al Assad. The emissary reportedly will be Erdogan’s foreign policy adviser, who oversees talks with Syria and has previously met with Olmert’s adviser Yoram Turbowicz in Turkey.
update with additional background
per
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/geopolitical_diary_israel_syria_and_turkish_mediator
Geopolitical Diary: Israel, Syria and the Turkish Mediator
April 29, 2008 | 0200 GMT
Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said that while much remains to be achieved before any peace agreement between Israel and Syria, Ankara would continue to act as a go-between to encourage the two sides to restart direct negotiations, Haaretz reported Monday. The Israeli daily quoted Babacan as saying, “when the issue is a little more mature, then I hope that the sides will meet each other. It is a very promising development,” and that “There has been diplomatic traffic for the past year, which has intensified in the past few months.” The paper added that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan probably will be sending his foreign policy adviser, Ahmet Davutoglu, to Israel to brief Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on recent talks between Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Erdogan in Damascus, Syria.
At a time when it is difficult to determine the status of the Israeli-Syrian back-channel communications, information coming from the Turks is perhaps the best gauge on progress (or the lack thereof) in these talks. Meanwhile, the two principal actors — Israel and Syria — will continue to send out confusing signals. But the bottom line is that the public rhetoric matters very little, if at all; what does matter is that a negotiating process of sorts has taken off.
This is not to say that process will lead to an Israeli-Syrian agreement, however. Many bilateral and multilateral issues could complicate the talks, and possibly even derail the process. At this stage, it is very difficult to say with any degree of certainty what will happen, hence the need to watch the process play out.
That said, the Turkish role as the mediator between the Israelis and the Syrians is quite interesting to say the least. The key question is why are the Turks so keen on seeing a peace agreement between the two sides? How does such an agreement or working toward such an agreement serve Ankara’s geopolitical interests?
We have discussed Turkey’s bid to assert itself on the global stage by inserting itself into the various regions that it straddles, namely, Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. Faced with resistance in its efforts to gain an anchor in Central Asia and Europe, Ankara under the Erdogan government has sought to assert itself in the Middle East, where there are no barriers to entry — and more important, ample opportunities for Turkey to advance its international status.
Mediating between Israel and Syria allows Turkey to insert itself between various players, including the United States, Israel, certain Arab countries and Iran. Turkey is unique in that it has significant influence with all sides. This allows it to deal with both sides in the various conflicts brewing in the region, namely, in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
And this role comes at virtually no cost to Turkey. Ankara has nothing to lose should the talks lead nowhere. If the negotiations succeed, however, a peace agreement between Israel and Syria possibly could create the conditions for a Turkish role in the Palestinian and wider Arab-Israeli dynamics. More important, it could lead to a more comprehensive arrangement between the United States and Iran.
From the Turkish point of view, the U.S. move to effect regime change in Iraq in 2003 created chaos in Turkey’s backyard. Not only did it greatly enhance the Kurdish separatist threat to Turkish interests, U.S.-Iranian dealings on Iraq empowered Iran. Tehran thus emerged as a potential competitor to Ankara for top spot in the region, upsetting the latter’s regional calculus. Turkey thus needs to find a way to ensure that it has the upper hand in the region — and mediating a peace deal between Israel and Syria could go a long way in this regard.
more particulars on the diplomacy here
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1208870516196&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Turks try to find middle ground for Syria, Israel talks
By HERB KEINON
One of the issues Turkey is trying to work out between Israel and Syria as a prelude to direct negotiations is whether a Syrian announcement of ending support for terrorism needs to precede an Israeli guarantee that it will withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace, Western diplomats said Monday.
According to the officials, one question being discussed in exchanges Turkey has carried between Jerusalem and Damascus over the last few months is what comes first, an Israeli announcement – in some yet to be determined from – regarding withdrawal from the Golan, or a Syrian announcement of ending support for Hamas and Hizbullah.
Israel is also keen on a Syrian commitment to distance itself from Iran as part of any future peace agreement.
Both sides were willing to hold discussions, the official said, but there was no agreement yet on the modalities.
Turkish diplomatic officials meanwhile said no date had yet been set for a visit here by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign policy adviser Ahmet Davutoglu to discuss the Syrian track.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s office, meanwhile, denied reports Monday that a decision had been made that Olmert’s chief of staff Yoram Turbowicz would head discussions with the Syrians until a meeting was arranged between Olmert and Syrian President Bashar Assad.
Nevertheless, Turbowicz – who does most of the heavy diplomatic lifting in the prime minister’s name – is the natural candidate to engage the Syrians because he is among Olmert’s most trusted advisers, and because he has been in contact with the Turks on a number of issues in the past.
The Turkish press reported in March about efforts at the time to arrange a meeting between Turbowicz and a Syrian official in Turkey – a meeting that in the end never transpired.
Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, meanwhile, said Monday that a great deal remained to be achieved before any peace agreement between Israel and Syria, but that his country would continue to act as a go-between to encourage them to restart direct negotiations.
Ali Babacan said an agreement would require “strong political determination” from both sides.
“We are still at the very beginning of the process,” Babacan told reporters during a news conference with New Zealand’s foreign minister in Ankara. His comments were in response to a question on Turkey’s mediation efforts. Babacan said Turkey would pass messages between the sides until they were ready to meet.
“Talks will continue to take place through Turkey for a while,” the foreign minister said. “When the issue is a little more mature, then I hope that the sides will meet each other.”
“It is a very promising development,” Babacan said of Turkey’s mediation efforts. “There has been diplomatic traffic for the past year, which has intensified in the past few months.”
Babacan said the government would not discuss details of the mediation.
a fresh try to fully comprehend the complexity
& frankly the improbability of this peace deal in the making
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/shift_toward_israeli_syrian_agreement
The Shift Toward an Israeli-Syrian Agreement
April 29, 2008 | 2055 GMT
By George Friedman
The Middle East, already monstrously complex, grew more complex last week. First, there were strong indications that both Israel and Syria were prepared to engage in discussions on peace. That alone is startling enough. But with the indicators arising in the same week that the United States decided to reveal that the purpose behind Israel’s raid on Syria in September 2007 was to destroy a North Korean-supplied nuclear reactor, the situation becomes even more baffling.
But before we dive into the what-will-be, let us first explain how truly bizarre things have gotten. On April 8 we wrote about how a number of seemingly unconnected events were piecing themselves into a pattern that might indicate an imminent war, a sequel to the summer 2006 Lebanon conflict. This mystery in the Middle East has since matured greatly, but in an unexpected direction. Israeli-Syrian peace talks — serious Israeli-Syrian peace talks — are occurring.
First, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told the Israeli media that Israel had been talking to the Syrians, and then that “Very clearly we want peace with the Syrians and are taking all manners of action to this end. They know what we want from them, and I know full well what they want from us.” Then Syrian President Bashar al Assad publicly acknowledged that negotiations with Syria were taking place. Later, a Syrian minister appeared on Al Jazeera and said that, “Olmert is ready for peace with Syria on the grounds of international conditions, on the grounds of the return of the Golan Heights to Syria.” At almost exactly the same moment, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem said that, “If Israel is serious and wants peace, nothing will stop the renewal of peace talks. What made this statement really interesting was that it was made in Tehran, standing next to Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, an ally of Syria whose government rejects the very concept of peace with Israel.
We would have expected the Syrians to choose another venue to make this statement, and we would have expected the Iranians to object. It didn’t happen. We waited for a blistering denial from Israel. Nothing came; all that happened was that Israeli spokesmen referred journalists to Olmert’s previous statement. Clearly something was on the table. The Turks had been pressing the Israelis to negotiate with the Syrians, and the Israelis might have been making a gesture to placate them, but the public exchanges clearly went beyond that point. This process could well fail, but it gave every appearance of being serious.
According to the existing understanding of the region’s geopolitical structure, an Israeli-Syrian peace deal is impossible.
The United States and Iran are locked into talks over the future of Iraq, and both regularly use their respective allies in Israel and Syria to shape those negotiations. An Israeli-Syrian peace would at the very least inconvenience American and Iranian plans.
Any peace deal would require defanging Hezbollah. But Hezbollah is not simply a Syrian proxy with an independent streak, it is also an Iranian proxy. So long as Iran is Syria’s only real ally in the Muslim world, such a step seems inimical to Syrian interests.
Hezbollah is also deeply entwined into the economic life of Lebanon — and in Lebanon’s drug production and distribution network — and threatening the relationship with Hezbollah would massively impact Damascus’ bottom line.
From the other side, Syria cannot accept a peace that does not restore its control over the Golan Heights, captured during the 1967 war. Since this patch of ground overlooks some of Israel’s most densely populated regions, it seems unnatural that Israel ever would even consider such a trade.
Forget issues of Zionism or jihadism, or even simple bad blood; the reality is that any deal between Israel and Syria clashes with the strategic interests of both sides, making peace is impossible. Or is it? Talks are happening nonetheless, meaning one of two things is true: Either Olmert and Assad have lost it, or this view of reality is wrong.
Let’s reground this discussion away from what everyone — ourselves included — thinks they know and go back to the basics, namely, the geopolitical realities in which Israel and Syria exist.
Israel
Peace with Egypt and Jordan means Israel is secure on its eastern and southern frontiers. Its fundamental problem is counterinsurgency in Gaza and at times in the West Bank. Its ability to impose a military solution to this problem is limited, so it has settled for separating itself from the Palestinians and on efforts to break up the Palestinian movement into different factions. The split in the Palestinian community between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza helped this strategy immensely, dividing the Palestinians geographically, ideologically, economically and politically. The deeper the intra-Palestinian conflict is, the less of a strategic threat to Israel the Palestinians can be. It is hardly a beautiful solution — and dividing the Palestinians does not reduce the security burden on Israel — but it is manageable.
Israel does not perceive Syria as a serious threat. Not only is the Syrian military a pale shadow of Israeli capability, Israel does not even consider sacrificing the Golan Heights to weakening the Israeli military meaningfully. The territory has become the pivot of public discussions, but losing it hasn’t been a real problem for Israel since the 1970s. In today’s battlefield environment, artillery on the heights would rapidly be destroyed by counter-battery fire, helicopter gunships or aircraft. Indeed, the main threat to Israel from Syria is missiles. Damascus now has one of the largest Scud missile and surface-to-surface missile arsenals in the region — and those can reach Israel from far beyond the Golan Heights regardless of where the Israeli-Syrian political border is located. Technological advances — even those from just the last decade — have minimized the need for a physical presence on that territory that was essential militarily decades ago.
The remaining threat to Israel is posed by Lebanon, where Hezbollah has a sufficient military capability to pose a limited threat to northern Israel, as was seen in the summer of 2006. Israel can engage and destroy a force in Lebanon, but the 1982-2002 Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon vividly demonstrated that the cost-benefit ratio to justify an ongoing presence simply does not make sense.
At the current time, Israel’s strategic interests are twofold. First, maintain and encourage the incipient civil war between Hamas and Fatah. The key to this is to leverage tensions between neighboring Arab states and the Palestinians. And this is easy. The Hashemite government of Jordan detests the West Bank Palestinians because more than three-quarters of the population of Jordan is Palestinian, but the Hashemite king rather likes being king. Egypt equally hates the Gaza Palestinians as Hamas’ ideological roots lie in the Muslim Brotherhood — a group whose ideology not only contributed to al Qaeda’s formation, but also that of groups who have exhibited a nasty habit of assassinating Egyptian presidents.
The second Israeli strategic interest is finding a means of neutralizing any threat from Lebanon without Israel being forced into war — or worse yet, into an occupation of Lebanon. The key to this strategy lies with the other player in this game.
Syria
Ultimately Syria only has its western border to worry about. To the east is the vast desert border with Iraq, an excellent barrier to attack for both nations. To the north are the Turks who, if they chose, could swallow Syria in a hard day’s work and be home in time for coffee. Managing that border is a political matter, not a military one.
That leaves the west. Syria does not worry too much about an Israeli invasion. It is not that Damascus thinks that Israel is incapable of such an operation — Israel would face only a slightly more complicated task of eliminating Syria than Turkey would — but that the al Assads know full well that Israel is happy with them in power. The al Assads and their fellow elites hail from the Alawite sect of Islam, an offshoot of Shiite Islam that the Sunnis consider apostate. Alawite rule in Syria essentially is secular, and the government has a historic fear of an uprising by the majority Sunnis.
The Israelis know that any overthrow of the al Assads would probably land Israel with a radical Sunni government on its northeastern frontier. From Israel’s point of view, it is far better to deal with a terrified and insecure Syrian government more concerned with maintaining internal control than a confident and popular Syrian government with the freedom to look outward.
Just as Syria’s defensive issues vis-à-vis Israel are not what they seem, neither are Syrian tools for dealing with Israel in an offensive manner as robust as most think.
Syria is not particularly comfortable with the entities that pose the largest security threats to Israel, namely, the main Palestinian factions. Damascus has never been friendly to the secular Fatah movement, with which it fought many battles in Lebanon; nor is it comfortable with the more fundamentalist Sunni Hamas. (Syria massacred its own fundamentalists during the 1980s.) So while the Syrians have dabbled in Palestinian politics, they have never favored a Palestinian state. In fact, it should be recalled that when Syria first invaded Lebanon in 1975, it was against the Palestinians and in support of Lebanese Christians.
That invasion — as well as most Syrian operations in Lebanon — was not about security, but about money. Lebanon, the descendent of Phoenicia, has always been a vibrant economic region (save when there is war). It is the terminus of trade routes from the east and south and the door to the Mediterranean basin. It is a trading and banking hub, with Beirut in particular as the economic engine of the region. Without Beirut and Lebanon, Syria is an isolated backwater. With it, Damascus is a major player.
As such, Syria’s closest ties among Israel’s foes are not with the two major indigenous Palestinian factions, but with the Shiite group Hezbollah. The Syrians have a somewhat tighter religious affinity with Hezbollah, as well as a generation of complex business dealings with the group’s leaders. But its support for Hezbollah is multifaceted, and anti-Israeli tendencies are only one aspect of the relationship. And Hezbollah is much more important to Syria as a tool for managing Damascus’ affairs in Lebanon.
The Basis of a Deal
Israel and Syria’s geopolitical interests diverge less than it might appear. By itself, Syria poses no conventional threat to Israel. Syria is dangerous only in the context of a coalition with Egypt. In 1973, fighting on two fronts, the Syrians were a threat. With Egypt neutralized now and behind the buffer in the Sinai, Syria poses no threat. As for unconventional weapons, the Israelis indicated with their bombing of the Syrian research facility in September 2007 that they know full well how — and are perfectly willing unilaterally — to take that option off Damascus’ table.
Since neither side wants a war with the other — Israel does not want to replace the Alawites, and the Alawites are not enamored of being replaced — the issue boils down to whether Israel and Syria can coordinate their interests in Lebanon. Israel has no real economic interests in Lebanon. Its primary interest is security — to make certain that forces hostile to Israel cannot use Lebanon as a base for launching attacks. Syria has no real security interests so long its economic primacy is guaranteed. And neither country wants to see an independent Palestinian state.
The issue boils down to Lebanon. In a sense, the Israelis had an accommodation with Syria over Lebanon when Israel withdrew. It ceded economic pre-eminence in Lebanon to the Syrians. In return, the Syrians controlled Hezbollah and in effect took responsibility for Israeli security in return for economic power. It was only after Syria withdrew from Lebanon under U.S. pressure that Hezbollah evolved into a threat to Israel, precipitating the 2006 conflict.
This was a point on which Israel and the United States didn’t agree. The United States, fighting in Iraq, wanted an additional lever with which to try to control Syrian support for militants fighting in Iraq. They saw Lebanon as a way to punish Syria for actions in Iraq. But the Israelis saw themselves as having to live with the consequences of that withdrawal. Israel understood that Syria’s withdrawal shifted the burden of controlling Hezbollah to Israel — something that could not be achieved without an occupation.
What appears to be under consideration between the supposed archrivals, therefore, is the restoration of the 2005 status quo in Lebanon. The Syrians would reclaim their position in Lebanon, unopposed by Israel. In return, the Syrians would control Hezbollah. For the Syrians, this has the added benefit that by controlling Hezbollah and restraining it in the south, Syria would have both additional strength on the ground in Lebanon, as well as closer economic collaboration — on more favorable terms — with Hezbollah. For Syria, Hezbollah is worth more as a puppet than as a heroic anti-Israeli force.
This is something Israel understands. In the last fight between Israel and Syria in Lebanon, there were different local allies: Israel had the South Lebanese Army. The Syrians were allied with the Christian Franjieh clan. In the end, both countries dumped their allies. Syria and Israel have permanent interests in Lebanon. They do not have permanent allies.
The Other Players
The big loser in this game, of course, would be the Lebanese. But that is more complicated than it appears. Many of the Lebanese factions — including most of the Christian clans — have close relations with the Syrians. Moreover, the period of informal Syrian occupation was a prosperous time. Lebanon is a country of businessmen and militia, sometimes the same. The stability the Syrians imposed was good for business.
The one faction that would clearly oppose this would be Hezbollah. It would be squeezed on all sides. Ideologically speaking, constrained from confronting Israel, its place in the Islamic sun would be undermined. Economically speaking, Hezbollah would be forced into less favorable economic relations with the Syrians than it enjoyed on its own. And politically speaking, Hezbollah would have the choice of fighting the Syrians (not an attractive option) or of becoming a Syrian tool. Either way, Hezbollah would have to do something in response to any rumors floating about of a Syrian deal with the Israelis. And given the quality of Syrian intelligence in these matters, key Hezbollah operatives opposed to such a deal might find themselves blown up. Perhaps they already have.
Iran will not be happy about all this. Tehran has invested a fair amount of resources in bulking up Hezbollah, and will not be pleased to see the militia shift from Syrian management to Syrian control. But in the end, what can Iran do? It cannot support Hezbollah directly, and even if it were to attempt to undermine Damascus, those Syrians most susceptible to Tehran’s Shiite-flavored entreaties are the Alawites themselves.
The other player that at the very least would be uneasy about all of this is the United States. The American view of Syria remains extremely negative, still driven by the sense that the Syrians continue to empower militants in Iraq. Certainly that aid — and that negative U.S. feeling — is not as intense as it was two years ago, but the Americans might not feel that this is the right time for such a deal. Thus, the release of the information on the Syrian reactor might well have been an attempt to throw a spoke in the wheel of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations.
That might not be necessary. Nothing disappears faster than Syrian-Israeli negotiations. In this case, however, both countries have fundamental geopolitical interests at stake. Israel wants to secure its northern frontier without committing its troops into Lebanon. The Syrians want to guarantee their access to the economic possibilities in Lebanon. Neither care about the Golan Heights. The Israelis don’t care what happens in Lebanon so long as it doesn’t explode in Israel. The Syrians don’t care what happens to the Palestinians so long as it doesn’t spread onto their turf.
Deals have been made on less. Israel and Syria are moving toward a deal that would leave a lot of players in the region — including Iran — quite unhappy. Given this deal has lots of uneasy observers, including Iran, the United States, Hezbollah, the Palestinians and others, it could blow apart with the best will in the world. And given that this is Syria and Israel, the best will isn’t exactly in abundant supply.
a few more developments
per
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/iran_does_not_object_syrian_israeli_talks_golan_heights
Iran: Does Not Object To Syrian-Israeli Talks On Golan Heights
April 29, 2008 | 1919 GMT
Iran has announced that it does not object to Syria holding talks with Israel as long as the goal of the talks is to “liberate” the Golan Heights, Saudi-owned newspaper Asharq al-Awsat reported April 29. Tehran added that it is opposed to any prior conditions on the talks or on the turnover of the Golan Heights to Damascus. Citing an Iranian source, Asharq al-Awsat said the Syrians have said repeatedly that they will use negotiations to get Israel to hand over the Golan Heights to Syria. The source added that ties between Tehran and Damascus is “close and stable,” and that previous talks between the Syrians and Israelis have not harmed Damascus’ relationship with Tehran. Washington has not commented on the issue, saying the Syrian-Israeli talks are complex and the United States must study the different aspects of the situation before commenting on it.
per
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/israel_press_syria_hamas_hezbollah_issues
Israel: To Press Syria On Hamas, Hezbollah Issues
April 29, 2008 | 1922 GMT
Israel will ask Syria for guarantees that it will no longer host officials from Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Saudi-owned newspaper Asharq al-Awsat reported April 29, citing Israeli sources. Israeli will also ask Syria to no longer allow its territory to be used for transporting weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
per
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/pna_hamas_expresses_opinion_syrian_israeli_talks
PNA: Hamas Expresses Opinion On Syrian-Israeli Talks
April 29, 2008 | 1926 GMT
The Palestinian Hamas movement considers talks between Syria and Israel an internal Syrian affair, and believes the talks will lead nowhere, Saudi-owned newspaper Asharq al-Awsat reported April 29. The group announced that while it does not interfere in Arab affairs, it opposes normalization with Israel. Hamas added that “liberating” the Golan Heights is Syria’s right and duty, but the group doubts Israel’s intentions in the talks.
updated intel & analysis per
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/geopolitical_diary_1
Geopolitical Diary: Syrian-Israeli Peace Deal In Perspective
April 30, 2008 | 0149 GMT
Stratfor has received an unconfirmed report that the U.S. administration is currently reviewing a peace agreement drafted by Syria and Israel. Some of the terms of the alleged deal involve Syria regaining its military, political and economic influence in Lebanon in exchange for suppressing its militant proxies — Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Syria and Israel also reportedly came up with a system to create a demilitarized zone along the Israeli-Syrian border in which Syria would pull back four miles for every one mile that Israel pulls back its forces. The Golan Heights would be returned to Syria, though Israel would likely retain full rights to the key water source in the territory.
If this information is true, it would indicate the ongoing peace negotiations between Israel have reached a critical phase. Our first clue that these were not simply talks for the sake of talks came when the negotiations broke into the public sphere a little more than a week ago. The lack of denials followed by a public acknowledgment by both the Israeli and Syrian leaderships demonstrated that something serious was going on. The deal could evaporate given the complexities surrounding the issue, but if the two sides have actually crafted a peace agreement that is now being debated among U.S. officials in Washington, then the political map of the Middle East could undergo some major changes in the near future.
Over the years, Syria has carved out a place for itself as the regional pariah. It is a minority Alawite regime in a majority Sunni country. It openly harbors Palestinian militant leaders. It supports Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is the only Arab state allied with Iran. And it has directly supported the jihadist insurgency in Iraq since the 2003 U.S. invasion. Taken together, these charges make behavior modification in Syria sound nearly impossible.
But it must be remembered that Syria’s core geopolitical interest is in Lebanon — its primary gateway to the Mediterranean basin. Without Lebanon, Syria is politically, economically and militarily hamstrung. For Syria to regain its regional footing, it must finagle its way into a peace agreement in which the Arab world and the West will recognize a Syrian hegemonic role in its western neighbor. The opportunity has come through Israel, and it makes sense for the Syrians to pursue it.
Tactically speaking, however, this will be a messy peace agreement to implement. Perhaps the messiest part of it all is that Syria will have to demonstrate that it will incur the risk and trouble of containing Hezbollah. A few Hezbollah heads would need to roll for Syria to pull this off, and the process may have even already started. The February assassination of Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyah on Syrian soil, though still extremely murky, came at a critical point in these negotiations. We also cannot help but notice Syria’s unusual silence on its investigation of the assassination. If Syria were not engaged in serious peace talks with Israel, it would waste no time in playing the blame game to clear suspicion of its own involvement in the hit.
Meanwhile, a rumor is circulating that Syria has instructed its Shiite ally Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese House of Parliament and leader of the Amal Movement, to set a new date — May 13 — to elect a new president for Lebanon. If Syria has indeed gotten the guarantees it wants on Lebanon, it would make sense to see some moves in the coming weeks that would pull Lebanon out of political stagnation with the election of a Syria-friendly president in Beirut.
These signs of progress are all hinting that a peace deal may indeed be just around the corner, but there are enough spoilers on the table that this peace bubble could burst. It is questionable whether the current Israeli government has the political muscle to override domestic dissent in seeing through a peace treaty with Syria. Though it appears Saudi Arabia and France are backing the deal, it is far less assured that the United States is on the same page as Israel in pursuing peace with Syria. The Iranians, already pursuing complex negotiations with the United States over Iraq, are certainly not going to be happy if their Shiite extension in the Levant is hived off. And the groups with the most to worry about — Hezbollah, Hamas and PIJ — are highly unlikely to take their death sentence lying down.
In other words, though we are seeing some movement, we’ll need to see more before we believe that a solid deal can be cut.
what the neighbors are thinking
per
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/egypt_jordan_fears_israeli_syrian_d_tente
Egypt, Jordan: Fears of an Israeli-Syrian Détente
April 30, 2008 | 1922 GMT
Summary
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made an unannounced trip to Jordan on April 30, where he met with Jordanian King Abdullah II. Olmert paid his visit to inform the Hashemite monarch of Israel’s plans regarding Israeli peace talks with Syria and the future of the West Bank, both are key issues for Amman. Like Jordan, Egypt also is concerned about the consequences of a possible Syrian emergence on the regional scene as a result of its peace dealings with the Jewish state, but neither can do much to upset the process.
Analysis
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert held talks April 30 with Jordanian King Abdullah II in Amman, Jordan. Olmert’s bureau issued a statement that the two leaders discussed ways to move the Israeli-Palestinian peace process forward, but a spokesman for the Israeli prime minister declined to elaborate on the nature of the trip, the second by Olmert to the Hashemite kingdom in three months.
Olmert’s trip probably was designed to inform King Abdullah of recent movement on Israeli-Syrian relations as well as the push toward a settlement on security in the West Bank as Israel proceeds in its negotiations with Fatah. Both issues are of concern to the Jordanians, who view both as potential threats to the Hashemite monarchy. Thus, the Olmert visit aimed to address the concerns of Jordan, which depends on Israel for its national security given that Israeli control of the Palestinians prevents them from overwhelming Jordan, where a little more than three-fourths of the population is Palestinian.
On a broader scale, the Israeli-Syrian dealings are also of concern to Egypt, which plays a key role in Israeli-Palestinian affairs. The possibility that Syria not only could regain its control over the Levant but emerge as a major player in the wider Arab world threatens the monopoly enjoyed by Egypt and Jordan, the two Arab states to benefit from normalized relations with the Jewish state. Geography also has forced both Cairo and Jordan to be connected to the Palestinian issue, with Egypt bordering the Gaza Strip and Jordan bordering the West Bank.
Cairo and Amman also fear a normalization of Israeli-Syrian ties could give Damascus a seat at the table where Palestinian issues are discussed since Syria harbors Palestinian rejectionist groups. Both the Egyptians and Jordanians also fear the prospects of a change in the nature of their responsibilities toward Palestinians, which they would like to keep to a minimum as Israel pushes forward with its plans to disengage from the Palestinian territories. Both Israel and Jordan do not want Jordan to have any real security responsibilities in the West Bank.
In many ways, Israel has guaranteed Jordanian national security via its long, secret relationship one that dates back before their 1994 peace treaty to the early years of the modern Jewish state. Thus, Olmert likely assured King Abdullah that business as usual with regards to Amman’s role in the West Bank largely will proceed, and that an Israeli-Syrian relationship will not threaten Jordan.
In contrast, Egypt has far more options than Jordan. As Hamas’ link to the world via the Egyptian-Gazan border and the role it plays as mediator between Hamas and Fatah, the Egyptians potentially could use these groups to offset the Israeli-Syrian process. But there are limits to this because Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other secular left-leaning Palestinian rejectionist groups are closer to Syria than they will ever be to Egypt. And though the Syrian relationship with these groups will change in the event of a peace deal with Israel, that does not mean the Palestinians will align more closely with Egypt. These radical Palestinian groups also are nervous about Israeli-Syrian dealings, and are unsure of their own fates.
A potential peace deal with Israel opens the gate for Syria to re-emerge as a major player in the region. Stratfor sources have said the Egyptians — who were far happier having Syria be regionally isolated — oppose an Israeli-Syrian peace deal, but lack levers to contain Syria’s potential rise. Given the numerous variables that will remain in play until the Israeli-Syrian process plays out, Egypt and Jordan will remain on edge — especially since they lack the ability to do much about the possibility of an emergent Syria.