Mahmoud Abbas responds to strong criticism of his remarks by publishing a statement of apology

There was an uproar of criticism of Mahmoud Abbas’ opening speech to the Palestine National Council’s 23rd Session on 30 April, when he veered into an unscripted “history lesson”, some of it incomprehensible, about, among other things, the pressures on Jews in Europe that, he said, were designed to encourage their immigration to Palestine, where “Hitler wanted to have a supportive population”.

Abbas’ remarks were also criticized as “anti-Semitic”.

The New York Times Editorial Board  wrote on May 2 that: “Feeding reprehensible anti-Semitic myths and conspiracy theories in a speech on Monday, the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas, shed all credibility as a trustworthy partner if the Palestinians and Israelis ever again have the nerve to try negotiations”.

Speaking to the Palestinian legislative body, Mr. Abbas, 82, said the mass murder of European Jews in the Holocaust was the result of the victims’ financial activities, not their religious identity and anti-Semitism.  “So the Jewish question that was widespread throughout Europe was not against their religion, but against their social function, which relates to usury (unscrupulous money lending) and banking and such,” he said, according to the BBC…

(Abbas) was valued by the West as Mr. Arafat’s successor, and for years he has deployed Palestinian forces to help Israelis maintain security in the West Bank.  But pressures, some of his own making and many others caused by Israel, which has ultimate control over the West Bank, are building. Mr. Abbas, who oversees a governing system plagued by corruption and dysfunction, has lost support among the Palestinian people.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/02/opinion/abbas-palestine-israel.html

After the close of the PNC Session, Abbas issued a statement of apology published by the Palestinian news agency WAFA:

President Mahmoud Abbas stated on Friday that “if people were offended by my statement in front of the PNC, especially people of the Jewish faith, I apologize to them. I would like to assure everyone that it was not my intention to do so, and to reiterate my full respect for the Jewish faith, as well as other monotheistic faiths.”

He continued, “I would also like to reiterate our long held condemnation of the Holocaust, as the most heinous crime in history, and express our sympathy with its victims.”

“Likewise, we condemn anti-Semitism in all its forms, and confirm our commitment to the two-state solution, and to live side by side in peace and security.”

(http://english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=5eEbb9a97537550946a5eEbb9 ).

Abbas been talking like this at Palestinian meetings for years, and nobody (except Israelis) paid very much attention until Donald Trump, more openly aligned with Israel than any other President, took office in January 2017.

In this PNC Session, Abbas again used the same curse that got him into trouble after the PLO Central Council meeting in January, again saying “yikhrab beitak” — but this time not to Trump, but to the US Congress for passing a resolution calling the PLO a “terrorist organization”.

“Abbas is not going to change”, Amira Hass wrote in Haaretz.  He “does not listen to criticism and does not consult others – or, he chooses advisers who will not tell him anything he does not want to hear. He also chooses to be updated only on what suits him”.  https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-despite-scent-of-anti-semitism-abbas-still-supports-two-states-1.6050209

Mahmoud Abbas was stunned and enraged by Trump’s Jerusalem Declarations on 6 December 2017

Mahmoud Abbas was stunned and enraged when U.S. President Donald Trump decided to recognize Jerusalem (no coordinates specified) as Israel’s capital last December.

It’s a “reality on the ground”, Trump said – no mention of conquest, annexation, a continuing military occupation, and abandoned negotiations.

Trump also declared, in the same December 6th  speech he delivered, in front of VP Pence and multiple decorated Christmas trees, that he’d move the US Embassy to Jerusalem – in direct contravention of the UN Security Council’s resolution 478 (August 1980).

A consequential part of Trump’s decision is the opening of an interim US Embassy, in the Arnona area of south Jerusalem on May 14, timed to coincide with Israel’s 70th Independence Day anniversary by the Common Era calendar. That’s also the day before Palestinians mark the Nakba, or catastrophe, of their dispossession in 1947-1949, when some 75% of all Palestinians were forced out of their homes, lands, and villages; most have been barred from returning.

The immediate response to Trump’s Jerusalem declaration were calls for “Day of Rage” demonstrations, to “confront the occupation”, sometimes several times each week, in both the West Bank (where protests are prohibited by military regulations) and in Gaza.  These calls were initially backed by all Palestinian factions: Fatah’s deputy leader Mahmoud Al-Aloul was one of the few in the leadership who participated in the first one in Ramallah. The protesters in the West Bank are mostly young, and they go with their friends. The Gaza marchers faced worse conditions.

Three months later, a coalition in Gaza organized a “Great Return March” to take place at Gaza’s perimeterfrom Palestinian “Land Day” on March 30, to Palestinian “Nakba (Catastrophe) Day” on May 15.  Though it wasn’t a Hamas initiative, it was impossible to miss the level of organization and the amount of resources that Hamas has contributed.

Approximately 2/3 of the population of Gaza are refugees from 1948. Return has been the priority demand of Hamas since its founding in 1987.  A number of the marchers would like to march straight across Israel’s security fence.

The “peaceful masses moving forward” strategy was already tried in the West Bank, though on a smaller scale, and without backing from the leadership in Ramallah, in 2011. The call was simply to enter Jerusalem. There were not many marchers, and they didn’t get past Qalandiya Checkpoint. The real drama happened elsewhere: in the heady days of the Arab Spring, on Nakba Day (May 15) and then on Naksa Day (June 5) in 2011.

In May 2011, Nablus millionaire Munib Al-Masri’s grandson, also named Munib, and then 22, was badly wounded by Israeli fire in Lebanon near the border, and has been permanently paralyzed as a result.

In June 2011, Palestinians from Yarmouk Camp near Damascus, Syria were bussed to the Golan and marched across marked mine-fields..  Refugees and their supporters in Lebanon were also bussed down to the Israeli border, and also tried but were unable to cross. Reports say 10 to 14 Palestinians were killed, mostly in the Golan.

However, Israelis adamantly refuse the idea of any return of Palestinian refugees, and say it would pose an existential threat. Just ahead of the Gaza Return March that began on March 30 (Land Day) in 2018, the Israeli military went on war footing, saying they fear an invasion of tens of thousands of protestors from Gaza. IDF Chief of Staff warned in advance – and deployed – 100 snipers at the Gaza perimeter, who have since taken a high toll, especially in the first four weeks of the Great Return March.

Five Israeli and one Gazan human rights groups have petitioned Israel’s Supreme Court to stop the IDF from using snipers and live ammunition to stop the civilian demonstrators in Gaza – the first time this has happened. However, Israel’s Supreme Court prefers to help the Israeli government become better without public confrontation or rebuke.  And there has been an apparent change in the IDF’s rules of engagement.  On May 4, for the first time in six weeks, no killings were reported, and there were fewer than 200 reported injures, rather than thousands.

Almost 50 Palestinians have been killed at the Gaza perimeter since March 30 and over 8,500 people injured, straining Gaza’s health care resources to the limit.  (9 May: Spokesman for the Ministry of Health: 47 Martyrs, including 5 children, and 8536 wounded by IOF gunfire since the start of the return marches on the borders of the Gaza Strip. https://twitter.com/qudsn/status/994268438293041154 ) Some of those injured will be permanently disabled.

Overall, since Trump’s December 6 announcements about Jerusalem, about 100 Palestinians have been killed by the IDF in both the West Bank and Gaza.

Pres Abbas declared a day of mourning on the day after the March 30 Land Day demonstration at the Gaza periphery — but nothing since, other than a statement in his opening speech to the PNC on April 30 saying that children should be kept away from the perimeter.

Jerusalem expert Daniel Seidemann has warned that “we have never witnessed a geopolitical move as potentially shocking and infuriating to the Palestinian sector as moving the embassy. Such a move will tell the Palestinians: ‘Abandon hope. Political processes – negotiations, diplomacy, and the like – will not only not help you, they will harm you.’ Likewise, it will send them a resounding message: ‘It’s official – East Jerusalem and its holy sites are lost to the Palestinians, to the Arabs, and to Islam’.”

Seidemann notes, however, that “geopolitical issues are not generally what trigger violence in Jerusalem; rather, what triggers violence is threats, real or perceived, to the sanctity of sacred places, and most notably to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif”, link <a href=”http://t-j.org.il/LatestDevelopments/tabid/1370/articleID/878/currentpage/1/Default.aspx“>here</a>

Meanwhile, the Israeli Temple Mount organizations have reportedly put out massive messaging calling – through their media and social networking sites, to their supporters and to the settlers – to go up to the Al-Aqsa Mosque Compound as the Palestinian people are marking the Nakba.. http://www.wafa.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=BrsHQba819586867902aBrsHQb

Other Palestinian media say that calls have gone out for have at least 2,000 Jews to go up to the site on Sunday, May 13 – which, this year, is “Jerusalem Day”.

Trump, however, believes that he’s taken the issue off the table, claiming to have solved this most contentious of issues all by himself – though it’s been internationally agreed since the Madrid Conference in 1991 that Jerusalem is a final status issue that must resolved through Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

Abbas waited for six weeks before convening the PLO’s (Palestine Liberation Organization) Central Council in mid-January, where he exploded in anger at Trump: In a televised speech, Abbas responded furiously to Trump’s assertion that the Palestinians had refused negotiations (“What negotiations?”, Abbas asked, in frustration “When did we refuse to negotiate?”). Abbas then cursed (“yikhrab beitak”, may your house fall into ruin). It made headlines all over the world.

Abbas strategy, based on his calculation of the imbalance of power and the few tools at his disposal, has been to wait. Palestinians are the weaker party, so they must wait. Abbas has himself suggests that this is a manifestation of the traditional Palestinian virtue of sumoud (steadfastness). “We are here and we’re staying here”, Abbas had said on a number of occasions.

Abbas has waited for Prime Ministers to resign, for Presidential elections, for new administrations to read-in on issues, for circumstances to change, for public opinion to move. He waited for President Donald Trump to call (the call came in March 2017), waited for an invitation to the White House (he went on May 3), waited for Trump to come to Bethlehem (that was on May 23), to meet Trump at the UN (September 20) when Trump said to Abbas in front of the cameras: “I certainly will devote everything within my heart and within my soul to get that deal made”.

For months Abbas waited patiently (just as Hussam Zomlot, Abbas’ Strategic Advisor and now PLO representative in Washington, was impatient) to see the “Deal of the Century”, being drafted by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner + long-time legal advisor Jason Greenblatt.  Zomlot said he was “literally nagging” them, since May, “saying we’re ready, we’re ready, don’t waste another day, not another week, we’ve wasted enough time — what are you waiting for?”

Zomlot said in a presentation at the Middle East Institute (MEI) in January that he’d lost count of the many meetings he’d had with Trump’s team, Jared Kushner and Jason Greenblatt (but Abbas said in September it was “more than 20 times” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-abbas-palestinian-authority-bilateral-meeting/ ). But they were blindsided when Trump announced his Jerusalem decisions.  Zomlot said he felt “backstabbed”, and angrily added that “President Trump reneged not only on the long-held US and international policy but also reneged on his own promises”.

Zomlot said he’d been pressing for a Trump indication of support for previous U.S. policy. The two-state solution – which Zomlot says was not a Palestinian demand but is instead “a Palestinian concession” – was unanimously endorsed (US voted ‘yes’) in UN Security Council resolution 1515 of 2003 (https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7924.doc.htm), honoring President G.W. Bush’s earlier “vision” of creation of a Palestinian State. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/04/AR2005100401410.html

But, Zomlot recounted, Trump avoided doing so.  Zomlot, citing Trump: “I did not endorse the two-state solution because I do not want to impose, I do not want to dictate, I do not want to influence, I do not want to tell the two sides what to do”.  Then, Zomlot said at MEI, as if addressing Trump: “You come all of a sudden and you decide to take the heart of the two state solution out, the core of all issues, the mother of all issues – Jerusalem”.

Months later, Abbas convened the Palestine National Council (PNC) –“the supreme authority of the Palestinian people in all their places of residence” (https://www.palestinepnc.org/en/) – to deal with the challenge in Jerusalem, and also, significantly to “protect Palestinian legitimacy”, under challenge on many fronts.

This PNC 23rd Session was held in the tightly-guarded and secured presidential compound in Ramallah, the Muqata’a, from April 30 to May 4 – convened as a matter of urgency, after several postponements in recent years. The last full PNC session was in Gaza in 1996.

There was a strong but ultimately unsuccessful campaign of opposition to this PNC session, a sign of growing frustration with the worsening of all conditions in the West Bank and a dramatic desperation in Gaza.

Ohio-born American-Palestinian businessman Sam Bahour, who isn’t a member of the PNC, but who is a civil-society advocate for Palestinian development and Palestinian rights, said he was disappointed: “First, its location and the insistence by Chairman Abbas that we are free political subjects while under Israeli military occupation. He knows better and so does every Palestinian. Secondly, the membership continued to be defined and revised in a nontransparent and unrepresentative fashion. Thirdly, the session’s substance was weak at best, regurgitating the same worn out long diatribes. Lastly, the composition and median age of the elected PLO Executive Committee leaves much to be desired for a people whose national liberation movement is being seriously challenged”.

The PNC (established in Gaza in 1948) sets policy for the PLO (established at a meeting of the PNC in Jerusalem in 1964). The PNC also elects (by a show of hands, in open meetings; it’s always been that way) the PLO’s two ruling organs/bodies – the 18-member Executive Committee, and the 100-member Central Council.

The PLO was recognized by the UN General Assembly in 1974 as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”, and admitted as an observer organization in the UN General Assembly.  It was the PLO which established, under the Oslo Accords and with Israel’s assent, the Palestinian Authority, in 1994, ostensibly as an interim authority.

Past PNC Sessions have adopted some key decisions.  Under iconic leader Yasser Arafat: there was a deciion to establish a state on any inch of liberated Palestine, with its permanent capital in Jerusalem/Al-Quds (in its 12th Session, held in Cairo in 1974). In Algiers in 1988, the 19th PNC Session approved the Declaration of the Independent State of Palestine with Jerusalem/Al-Quds as its capital.

 

Uri Davis, a PNC delegate who was born to Jewish parents in Jerusalem in 1943 under the British Mandate for Palestine, is a long-time member of Fatah and married to Miyasa Abu Ali, another long-time member of Fatah. Davis firmly believes that Ramallah was the best place to hold the PNC Session, because “There are a number of UN resolutions that demand Israeli withdrawal from this land…Imagine the PLO was still stuck in Tunisia and Trump would make his awful statements about Jerusalem, would the PLO voice have any significant weight?”

As President Abbas said,  “it is our homeland”.

Davis added, with approval and pride: “President Mahmoud Abbas, Abu Mazen, is the only Arab leader to my knowledge in the Middle East who actually said ‘No’ to Trump”.

“Hamas refused membership in the PLO and in the Palestine National Council on a number of bases, or better say pretenses, one of which is its rejection of the Oslo Accords”, according to Davis. “I first learnt of it when it was published, and I had serious reservations…for the simple reason that it distinguished between an interim state of negotiations (or interim status) and the permanent status”.

“The PLO is the representative of the Palestinian people, there’s no question about it”, Davis said. “Any body, corporate body, that seeks to modify or reject or nullify or reiterate the Oslo Accords has to do it from within the structure of the representative body.  Don’t just condemn the Oslo Accords from the outside.  If you’re serious about it, do it through the by-law + regulations of the PNC”.

Hamas – which had been negotiating its possible entry into the PLO since 2005, if not earlier (it wanted a larger representation in the PNC than Fatah was willing to give) – may have missed a good chance, if it ever actually wanted to join the PLO.  All 132 members of the PLC received identical invitations to participate in the PNC session, a PNC official told this reporter, including the 74 elected Hamas MPs (though some of them are in Israeli jails).  But none showed up, including any of the few who live in the West Bank.

(One Hamas official who accepted Abbas’ invitation to attend the 7th Fatah General Conference, also held in the Ramallah Muqata’a, in late 2016, was treated as a guest-of-honor.)

GAZA

Unexpectedly, there was sustained criticism during the PNC Session of sanctions Abbas imposed against Gaza a year ago – which include non-payment of salaries to employees in Gaza.

Abbas ordered electricity cuts last April, in order to coerce Hamas to return the control of government institutions in Gaza following the June 2007 “split”.  The Abbas sanctions follow ten years of worsening electricity crises, exacerbated by devastated infrastructure only partially repaired after three major Israeli military operations, and with tens of thousands of people in Gaza living in still-unrepaired homes or apartments.

Dr. Mustafa Barghouti is a medical doctor, a politician, and a member of the PNC. “In the conference”, Dr Barghouti said, “everybody, including myself, emphasized the necessity to remove and cancel all punitive acts against Gaza, including cutting the salaries, or reducing the salaries, of PA (Palestinian Authority) employees”.

Dr Barghouti got his start in politics by running against Mahmoud Abbas in the special January 2005 elections to replace the late Yasser Arafat as President of the Palestinian Authority; Barghouti got 19% of the vote. Barghouti then stood in the January 2006 PLC election and won a seat. But, Dr. Barghouti said, this PNC Session was the first for his political party, Mubadara (Palestinian National Initiative) – which he says is the youngest Palestinian movement.  Barghouti said the agreement to allow Mubadara join the PLO was made in March 2015, “ten years after we applied – it took ten years”. How did it happen?  “Oh, I made a speech”, Dr. Barghouti said. “I said, to the (PLO) Central Council ‘We’re celebrating the tenth anniversary of our application, so you have to say either yes, or no’.  I told them, ‘if you are worried about us because we differ with you politically, how will you be able to absorb Hamas and (Islamic) Jihad in the future?’  And, I said, ‘if you think we’re too young, what would you say to the real young people who are waiting without being represented in most leadership structures?’…We also talked to the different groups, to Mr. Abbas and others – and eventually, we finally got in, after ten years”.

Hamas kicked Fatah-led Palestinian Preventive Security forces out of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 after a few weeks of shockingly cruel clashes, amid reports of U.S.-backed Fatah plots against Hamas. Even before, Israel had sealed shut its land crossings to Gaza; after 2007, the IDF were allowed to implement a plan of progressively tightened sanctions that intended to reduce imports to Gaza by 15% each month, to the bare minimum needed to sustain life (at one point, only 13 categories of commodities were allowed in); Egypt allowed supplies to pass through Hamas tunnels for years, but after overthrowing elected Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s President Sisi still keeps the Rafah crossing largely closed.  Three IDF full-scale military operations have been carried out on Gaza between December 2008 and August 2014. and the codification of an Israeli maritime blockade to stop the arrival of “Freedom Flotillas”.

A reconciliation was announced in June 2014, during which Hamas ministers resigned their posts to allow ministers newly-sworn-in by Abbas to take control. Abbas made it clear at the time that he required complete surrender, and soon complained that a Hamas “shadow government” (some 26 or 27 deputy ministers, he said) was still in place.

There’s another fundamental difficulty: Abbas has insisted that Hamas must put not only its security forces but also its entire military arsenal under Ramallah’s control.

Now, there’s also a tenacious Palestinian financial dispute about who, exactly, should pay the government employees in Gaza their arrears, and going forward.  Unresolved, despite June 2014 declarations that a committee had been formed to start work right away to deal with the evident problem of merging two administrations, little to nothing was done.  So, there’s the matter now of deciding who the government employees are who should be paid: those hired by Hamas in Gaza since the 2007 split, to keep the work of government functioning?  Or, those loyal to Ramallah – some tens of thousands ordered by Ramallah to stay home and not work for Hamas after the 2007 split, but who received their salaries for the following decade?  No vetting has taken place to determine who among them are most qualified and should be retained, who should be removed, and who should be retired. And after unrest followed a few heavy-handed decisions ordering mass retirements, the directives were rescinded, or suspended, it’s not clear. The issue of financial transfers under sanctions placed on Hamas has been only temporarily resolved.

Meanwhile, Donors have lost patience and cut their subsidies to Palestinian institutions in Ramallah, causing looming financial problems.

Mamoun Abu Shahla, Palestinian Minister of Labor since the formation of the June 2014 Government of National Consensus, is from Gaza, but spends part of his time in Gaza and part in Ramallah.  He’s now on the PLO Central Council.  He spoke about Hamas maintaining a “hidden government” Asked about the sanctions on Gaza, at a conference the day before the opening of the PNC Session, he replied: “If you want to rule Gaza, take all the responsibilities, or give it to me: this is the decision of Mr. Abbas, and the government here in total. I am not going to be the cash machine.  If you want me to rule Gaza, give me all the power, and I shall be responsible for everything. If not, go, continue, keep everything in your hands, do whatever you like, pay all the dues for Gaza. But you cannot imagine that every day and night you are shouting against me, and asking me at the end to pay for the life of your government.  So that’s it. It is a political story”.

At the end, Abbas made a surprise announcement in his closing speech to the PNC Session, saying that the salaries for Gaza employees and beneficiaries will be paid “tomorrow”.  There had been an unspecified “technical problem”, Abbas said.  But, he was not terribly sympathetic to his compatriots in Gaza:  “We are not an oil-rich state”, he said, and salaries have also been cut in the West Bank on multiple occasions –“Remember 2006?”  Abbas was referring to the sanctions placed on everybody in the occupied Palestinian territory by Israel and the entire donor community after Hamas won the majority of seats in the 2006 PLC elections.

Dr. Barghouti was wary about the Abbas announcement of payment: “The political decisions that were made (in the PNC) were what we wanted, (but) the test is in the implementation…We have to wait and see the results…We have to see if it’s happened or not, because when the general communique came out, that resolution was not in the communique”, although he said many people in the Council “emphasized very much this issue and the need to remove it…Because we think it’s punitive, it’s illegal, and it contradicts the law, it shouldn’t happen. It’s inhuman…I hope this issue will be resolved”.

The Palestinian Finance Ministry reportedly announced on Sunday that 50% of the normal salaries had been deposited to accounts in Gaza, and added that if there were any further instructions, they’d be announced + fulfilled.  https://twitter.com/48nnews/status/993059717680369664

This situation is still not clear.  (Some reports say that ATM machines in Gaza distributed 80% of one month’s salary on May 3, the same day salaries were paid in the West Bank, when two months’ salaries were due in Gaza).  .

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Slow but building reaction to the publication of the Swiss report finding polonium in forensic testing of Arafat's remains

Reaction built slowly on Thursday to the previous day’s revelations about a Swiss lab’s new findings of Polonium in Arafat’s remains after forensic testing that followed last year’s exhumation.

A press conference has been announced for Friday morning at 10:00 am in the Ramallah Muqata’a.  Tawfik Tirawi, Chairman of the committee appointed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to look into reports that Polonium poisoning caused the death of the late Palestinian leader, will preside.

Continue reading Slow but building reaction to the publication of the Swiss report finding polonium in forensic testing of Arafat's remains

Hamdallah still in office: Facebook page[s] + Twitter account[s]

Somebody here, I think, thinks Twitter and Facebook don’t matter…

This is more than just a symptom — it is a syndrome. It’s because communication doesn’t really matter, here.

Communication is expected to follow formalistic rules. A political statement uses certain prescribed terms and is delivered in loud and rising tones. An elegant and polite person would never take such a strong stand as Rami Hamdallah did when he resigned last week [it’s considered “too divisive” — and this, in a place where division has wreaked havoc since January 2006 parliamentary elections brought a surprise win for the Hamas-backed Change and Reform Party, which stood for the first time].

At least, Hamdallah is behaving well enough to say, as requested, until something new is put together…

Daoud Kuttab wrote today [though with a somewhat vague timeline] that “The apparent conflict of authority between the president and the prime minister in the Palestinian areas is certainly not new: But, Kuttab wrote, The bias toward the presidency escalated after Haniyeh and his Hamas supporters rejected the authority of Abbas, forcing [!] the Palestinian
president to dismiss Haniyeh and appoint Salam Fayyad in 2007. The defacto suspension of the Palestinian Legislative Council meant that the appointed government did not gain a vote of confidence from the Palestinian representatives. When Fayyad attempted [recently] to question the power of the Palestinian presidency — with the refusal to allow back the resigned Minister of Finance Nabeel Kassis — he found himself on the losing end of a power struggle, and eventually had to hand in his resignation in April 2013. Hamdallah appears to have noticed this issue much earlier and seemed to have rinsisted on retaining all the legal and administrative powers that came with the office … Without a parliament to vote confidence into a government, the relations between the presidency and the prime minister’s office can get complicated. Technically, every prime minister takes on a legal position after being sworn into office in front of the president.
These consecutive governments in Palestine are known to be governments of Abbas, and he holds ultimate power to keep or dismiss the prime minister. However, the Palestinian Basic Law, which functions as a temporary constitution, gives the prime minister a lot of power, including being the reference point of all his ministers”. This is posted here.

Kuttab doesn’t stress enough, however, the fact that the Palestinian Basic Law has not yet been approved precisely because the Palestinian Legislative Council is in a state of “de facto suspension”…

In his piece, Kuttab does report that Hamdallah, after his appointment, publicly stated that “he hoped to stay prime minister until Aug. 14. On this date, an agreed-to prime minister — as part of the reconciliation process — would be found. [So] Hamdallah has not officially resigned from his academic post [as head of an-Najah University], but rather has taken a leave of absence”…

Kuttab also notes that “The fact that Hamdallah had clearly accepted a temporary position seems to have led some to believe that the real prime minister is one of the deputies”…

Continue reading Hamdallah still in office: Facebook page[s] + Twitter account[s]

Salam Fayyad is replaced as “Caretaker” Palestinian Prime Minister by Nablus Academic Dr. Rami Hamdallah

Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian Authority’s Finance Minister since 2002, who then served as Prime Minister since late June 2007 when Mahmoud Abbas named him to replace Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh after the Hamas rout of Palestinian Preventive Security in Gaza — and who insisted on resigning on April 13 after John Kerry’s too-overt praise during an Abbas-Fayyad dispute — is finally being replaced by Nablus Academic Dr. Rami Hamdallah.

Hamdallah, who reportedly has a PhD in linguistics, was born in Anabta village near Tulkarem and has been the head of an-Najah University in Nablus for almost 15 years.

Ma’an News Agency reported here that Hamdallah told AFP: “President Abbas has asked me to form a new government and I have accepted…The government will be formed in the coming days…Most ministers of the outgoing government will stay and I will bring in a new finance minister”.

Ouch.  [Salam Fayyad has been PA Finance Minister virtually non-stop since 2002 — Nabil Kassis was the only other person who served as Finance Minister in this time, and it was Fayyad’s fight with Kassis, then Fayyad’s too-quick acceptance of Kassis’ resignation, that brought about the events that led to Fayyad’s resignation.]

Continue reading Salam Fayyad is replaced as “Caretaker” Palestinian Prime Minister by Nablus Academic Dr. Rami Hamdallah

Kerry says Tony Blair has 300 businessmen planning to raise $4 billion for the West Bank Palestinians

After the build-up that led to the Swiss-based World Economic Forum’s session at Jordan’s Dead Sea on Saturday and Sunday — it was hard to understand why, at least during the speeches of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli President Shimon Peres.

Abbas waived a copy of the Arab Peace Initiative in the air and asked Israelis to actually read it. It was not clear why. [Later it did become clear that the reason was the incentive it gives to Israel for withdrawing from the West Bank: recognition + full normal relations including trade with the entire Arab and Muslim world.]

Peres spoke about being born in an age of agriculture and living in a world of technology, where all good things could happen to the region if only there were peace. It was not clear why. [Peres contradicted the Israeli government’s current disapproval and said the Arab Peace Initiative was a strategic opportunity…] It was not clear why.  But, his reasons seem to be the same as Abbas’.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry started to talk, and seemed to have not much new to say; he thanked a lot of people and spoke about the Arab Spring. It was not clear why.

Then, Kerry said, he wanted to give ” I want to say a special thank you to the Quartet Representative, former Prime Minister Tony Blair… he is working diligently on a special project that I want to share with you in a few minutes”…

It was all downhill from there…

US State Dept photo - Kerry greets Blair at WEF Dead Sea, Jordan meeting 26 May 2013
US State Dept photo - Kerry greets Blair at WEF Dead Sea, Jordan meeting 26 May 2013

Photo from the US State Dept “Amman and Dead Sea, Jordan” Flikr set, here.

Kerry said: “No one doubts that this is a very complex moment in international relations. But still, I don’t think that there is any secret about the conditions that are necessary for peace and stability to succeed. Those are: good governance, security, and economic opportunity. And so the real question for all of us, for President Abbas, President Peres, Prime Minister Netanyahu, all of us, is a very simple one: Will we, despite the historic hurdles, have the courage to make the choices that we know we need to make in order to break the stalemate and provide a change of life for people in this region?”

Then, Kerry announced the creation of an investment fund to be financed with a possible $4 billion dollars to spur private-sector development in the West Bank [though he did also mention  4 million people, though it was not clear who: if Kerry meant Palestinians only, that would include the West Bank population of some 2.8 million  and Gaza with some 1.5 million…]

It was clear that Kerry’s remarks were the real reason all those people were there, in the meeting at the Dead Sea in Jordan on a Sunday afternoon…and Abbas and Peres were just there to prop up the show.

Kerry then explained the still-vague Blair super-project:
“I have asked Quartet Representative Tony Blair and many business leaders to join together. And Prime Minister Blair is shaping what I believe could be a groundbreaking plan to develop a healthy, sustainable, private-sector-led Palestinian economy that will transform the fortunes of a future Palestinian state, but also, significantly, transform the possibilities for Jordan and for Israel.

It is a plan for the Palestinian economy that is bigger, bolder and more ambitious than anything proposed since Oslo, more than 20 years ago now. And this, the intention of this plan, of all of its participants, is not to make it merely transformative, but frankly, to make it enormously powerful in the shaping of the possibilities of the future so that it is more transformative than incremental and different from anything that we have seen before.

To achieve that, these leaders have brought together a group of business experts, who have donated their time, who have come from around the world over the course of the last six weeks to make this project real and tangible and formidable – as we say, shovel-ready. They have come from all over the world because they believe in peace, and because they believe prosperity is both a promise and a product of peace.

This group includes leaders of some of the world’s largest corporations, I’m pleased to say. It includes renowned investors and some of the most brilliant business analysts out there – and some of the most committed. One of these senior business leaders actually just celebrated his 69th birthday in Jerusalem at the Colony Hotel after spending a 14-hour day in the West Bank trying to figure it out.

When others ask them, all of them, why they’re here, doing this on their own time, the unanimous answer is: ‘Because we want a better future for both Israeli children and Palestinian children’.

Their plan begins with encouraging local, regional and international business leaders to, and to encourage government leaders in various parts of the world. I raised this issue with the President of China, with the Prime Minister of Japan, with all of our European leaders, and everywhere – with the Brazilian Foreign Minister a few days ago, with the New Zealand Foreign Minister. All of them have on the tip of their tongues the idea that we can make peace in the Middle East and need to, and all of them are committed to be part of this effort in order to change life on the ground.

The fact is that we are looking to mobilize some $4 billion of investment. And this team of experts – private citizens, donating their time – are here right now. They’re analyzing the opportunities in tourism, construction, light manufacturing, building materials, energy, agriculture, and information and communications technology.

This group will make recommendations to the Palestinians. They’re not going to decide anything. The Palestinians will decide that in their normal course of governance. But they will analyze and make recommendations on a set of choices that can dramatically lift the economy.

The preliminary results already reported to me by Prime Minister Blair and by the folks working with him are stunning: These experts believe that we can increase the Palestinian GDP by as much as 50 percent over three years. Their most optimistic estimates foresee enough new jobs to cut unemployment by nearly two-thirds – to 8 percent, down from 21 percent today – and to increase the median annual wage along with it, by as much as 40 percent.

Continue reading Kerry says Tony Blair has 300 businessmen planning to raise $4 billion for the West Bank Palestinians

Olmert's 2008 proposal on Palestinian refugees – to take a total of 5,000 over 5 years

Of course Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas could not have signed on to this stingy proposal when it was tabled by Israel’s then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in their last meeting on 16 September 2008.

Not only is the number of Palestinian refugees that Israel would take back “inside the Green Line” less than Ehud Barak’s previous suggestion [to take back tens of thousands a year, as a “humanitarian gesture”] at Camp David talks in late July 2000, but this is also supposed to extinguish any further mention of the “Right of Return”. At the same Camp David discussions, the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat said he wanted to solve the problem of some 450,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon first — an idea that the Israeli delegation, who had just completed their unilateral May 2000 withdrawal for almost all of the “security zone” they had created during their 25-year occupation of South Lebanon, did not dismiss out of hand.

It is true that the Barak team said that most of the Palestinian refugees who would want to return would have to do so to the future Palestinian state. [Then, there was some suggestion that Israel would want to have a say in who and how many returned, even to the Palestinian territory = West Bank or Gaza…]

In any case, here is the relaxed way Olmert himself recently described it to Israeli journalist Avi Issacharoff in a recent interview which was reported yesterday, here:

“I agreed to absorb into Israel up to 5,000 Palestinian refugees over five years. Why 5,000? It may sound kind of strange, but during the talks between Rice and Abu Mazen he said that he needed the settlement of tens of thousands of refugees inside Israel, and that Ehud Barak had been ready to take in 100,000. She told him that he could get the same number of people as could fit inside the Mukataa at any given moment. We estimated that number to be about 5,000. So that’s how I came up with the number. I’m telling you, if Abu Mazen had been ready to sign on an agreement that would require our absorbing 10,000-15,000 over five years, I would have agreed. It was after all about the number of African illegals who were sneaking across the border every year back then. But all of it, of course, on condition that they would sign an agreement for an ‘end of conflict and end of demands,’ so there would no longer be a ‘right of return.’”

Olmert added that “he explained to Abbas during their talks that Israel could not agree to any solution to the refugee problem according to UN Resolution 194, which in his view had created the Palestinian’s ‘claim of return’ myth. ‘But I said to him, first we will set up a special fund for compensation to the refugees, second, we will accept the road map, which includes in it the Arab peace initiative which also refers to resolution 194 with respect to a solution for the refugee problem. That way you too can claim that Israel accepted the basis of the Arab peace initiative including Resolution 194’.”

And, what did Mahmoud Abbas say?

From Olmert’s account, as reported by Issacharoff, you could get the impression Abbas was only prepared to engage immediately on the Land Swaps proposal… and even on that he hesitated [and cancelled the follow-up meeting of map expert’s scheduled for the next day].

Continue reading Olmert's 2008 proposal on Palestinian refugees – to take a total of 5,000 over 5 years

Can Mahmoud Abbas negotiate on equal basis with less fluent English?

The language in which Israelis and Palestinians negotiate is: English. The original language of documents signed during the Oslo process is: English.

This brings up a delicate but extremely important point: Can Mahmoud Abbas negotiate on an equal basis with less fluent English than the Israeli Prime Minister?

Israeli journalist Avi Issacharoff touched on the point in his report today, published here, of his interview with Israeli former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who presented a map and detailed negotiating points to Abbas in their last meeting on 16 September 2008.

The question is worth exploring.  Issacharoff reported that the first meeting between Olmert and Abbas on 23 December 2006 “launched a model for talks between the two leaders: every so often, usually every two week, the two would meet and after some opening remarks and some food, they would go off to the side and speak one-on-one about the issues regarding final status”.

Was Abbas able to navigate the subtleties?  Did his imperfect control of the English language have anything to do with his reported lack of response?  The last discussion between Olmert and Abbas was inconclusive — yet Abbas wants any new talks to start from that point.

Mahmoud Abbas has said many times that he wants direct negotiations to resume where they left off on that day.

Israel’s current Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu does not agree. He explains this by saying he wants negotiations without preconditions. But, Netanyahu does not agree with the major concessions that Olmert offered Abbas in September 2008 — (1) that the hugely important mosque esplanade in the Old City of East Jerusalem would be under no country’s sovereignty, and would instead be administered by a five-nation group of countries; and (2) that Israel was prepared to make significant Land Swaps with Palestinians, including giving up the Jordan Valley that Netanyahu seems determined to retain on a long-term basis as an essential security assurance. [Netanyahu is also determined to obtain Palestinian recognition of Israel as “a Jewish State” or “the state of the Jewish people”, which is a point that was also raised by Olmert at the start of the Annapolis process of negotiations in November 2007.]

The substantive part of the negotiations began, apparently, four months earlier — in May 2008.

Olmert told Issacharoff that Condoleeza Rice “was concerned about the differences in our English – since mine was much more fluent then Abu Mazen’s…”

It’s interesting that Rice was so concerned. The disparity in power between the two parties — one of whom is occupied by the other — and who have engaged in direct negotiations over the self-determination of one of them, could be considered an argument that might invalidate the legality of any agreement reached. And the imbalance in negotiating conditions is exacerbated by an imbalance in linguistic capability.

By Olmert’s account [reported today by Issacharoff], he said that even before the Annapolis process — in fact, on 23 December 2006 — Abbas asked for Israel to free 500-600 prisoners. “I said, ‘Why don’t you ask for more?’…”

In this 23 December 2006 meeting at Olmert’s house, Abbas “asked for the taxes owed the PA – 50 million [shekels]”… And Olmert said he told Abbas: “not a chance…you will get 100 million, it’s Palestinian money. The days when you have to ask for what is rightfully yours are over…”

But, when Condoleeza Rice gave Abbas Olmert’s proposal “that he appoint a representative on whom he relied completely who would formulate the peace agreement. I had already turned to someone like that; someone with international standing. But Abbas said he preferred that the talks be carried out directly with him. She was concerned about the differences in our English – since mine was much more fluent then Abu Mazen’s – but I promised her that I wouldn’t take advantage of it, and she believed me”

But, by Olmert’s account, he actually had to coach Mahmoud Abbas: “When we talked about the subject of borders, Abbas reiterated that he wanted land swaps of 1.9% only, or the 1967 borders. I told him that the 1967 borders did not include a passage between Gaza and the West Bank, and if they want to make that connection and the necessary adjustments of the map, then it should be done in a smart way”…

According to Olmert, “The two men met 36 times, mostly in Jerusalem + once in Jericho”.

At the end of this series, it was Sa’eb Erekat who cancelled the post-map-presentation follow-up session scheduled for 17 September 2008, Olmert said, and their excuse was that they’d “forgotten that Abbas had to go to Amman”.

Olmert told Avi Issacharoff that he’s “still waiting” since September 2008 for a call from Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, just as just as Yasser Abed Rabbo told Avi Issacharoff [for an article published in mid-May in the Times of Israel] that he’s been waiting for a call from Netanyahu since February 16 2011..

Our reports on Avi Issacharoff’s recent reports are on our sister blog, Palestine-Mandate, here: [Olmert-Abbas 2006-2008] here … and [Yasser Abed-Rabbo-Netanyahu 2011] here.

Remember this? April 2013

Remember this?  In the very beginning of April [in fact, on April 1st], Salam Fayyad was taken to Ramallah Hospital for the second time in recent months — this time, for abdominal pain.   He was said to have been diagnosed with an inflamed pancreas.  [This can be due to gall bladder infection, whose acute symptoms can initially resemble a heart attack, and Fayyad did previously have a heart attack two years ago. Fayyad stayed in the hospital for three days — though this was not covered in the news, and few people even asked about it… perhaps because one of Fayyad’s chief aides told the media that Fayyad left the hospital on the first day…

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visited him on the first day, despite reported work tensions between the two men:

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visits his PM Salam Fayyad in Ramallah hospital
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visits his PM Salam Fayyad in Ramallah hospital

The photo was taken by Thaer Ganaim [APA Agency] and — to put it into context – it’s posted by Electronic Intifada, here, in it’s This Month in Pictures feature for April 2013.

Fayyad then insisted — despite the intervention of the U.S. Secretary of State John Kelly — on handing in his resignation to Abbas, who received Fayyad, drank tea with him, and accepted the resignation on 13 April…

More Fayyad Fallout

The BBC’s Jon Donnison reported, in his Fayyad article [labelled a “What next?” piece], that “When the 61-year-old again announced he was quitting on Saturday night, it was at least the third time he had resigned since he was first appointed to the job in 2007.  That is not to mention all the threats of resignation over the past six years.  And yet Mr Fayyad is still doing the job, at least in a ‘caretaker’ role”. This is posted here

Donnison lists the two previous Fayyad resignations as being in March 2009 and then in [May] 2011, both times to make way for a government of “national unity” or of “transition”, in order to “heal the political division between Fatah and Hamas — which may indeed be part of the reason again now.

[Fayyad also quit once before that, to run in the 2006 parliamentary elections’]

Meanwhile, Hugh Naylor wrote in The National that:

“Last month, the two leaders [Mahmoud Abbas + Fayyad — but Fayyad cannot really be called a “leader”] were at loggerheads over the resignation of Nabeel Kassis as finance minister. Mr Fayyad reportedly accepted it before consulting Mr Abbas, which caused acrimony.  An official in the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which Mr Abbas also chairs, said that spat encouraged the Palestinian president to accept Mr Fayyad’s resignation.  ‘I also think Abu Mazen was tired of Fayyad resigning every two months’, said the official, referring to Mr Abbas by his nickname. ‘But I also think Abu Mazen saw Fayyad’s threatening to resign as a bargaining chip to leverage power’…” This piece is published here.

Ah, yes, power — for, the scenario now being acted out was, and is, a classic power struggle between the two men, who otherwise are not really enemies. Abbas may well even feel some sympathy for Fayyad at the moment.

After all, Mahmoud Abbas himself was the previous champion of resignation [see our page on that, on this blog], when he served as Palestine’s first Prime Minister, an institution created at donor insistence to curb Yasser Arafat’s freeranging power. In a continuation of that paradigm, Fayyad was supposed, in some way, to be a “check + balance” to Abbas, who has since consolidated his hold on all reins of Palestinian power, and who has stayed in office beyond the expire-by date of his mandate until the next elections which only he has the power to proclaim, and which he also has the power to cancel.

Abbas does not seem uncomfortable at all in ruling by decree [at the encouragement of donors who believe in democracy only when all actors are “good guys”], in the absence of a functioning parliament [the Palestine Legislative Council], which closed up shop, at least in the West Bank, not long after the surprise election of Hamas [after Hamas did, for those 2006 elections, what everybody had called on it to do, which is to convert itself into a political party and contest the vote].

Donnison also reports, in his BBC piece, another theory [one of the standard Palestinian templates]: “One Palestinian official told me he believes Mr Fayyad has bigger ambitions, possibly to replace Mr Abbas, and wants to leave the job of prime minister in order to try and build his personal popularity”.

Continue reading More Fayyad Fallout